Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

203. Telegram 223 from Moscow, July 19¹

Moscow, July 19, 1963, noon

Today’s session began at 3 PM with same US group as yesterday.

Gromyko opened by asking for US-UK views re Soviet withdrawal clause submitted yesterday.

Harriman said had prompt reply from Washington which indicated Washington insisted reasons for withdrawal be related to topic under discussion, i.e., nuclear explosions. “Extraordinary circumstances” might be almost anything and therefore phrase should be replaced with “any nuclear explosion has occurred in prohibited environments.” Also said his instructions were add to Soviet draft provision for statute of limitations. Gave Sovs language (contained Embtel 208, para 3.) Pointed out reason for addition was to prevent parties from justifying their withdrawal on grounds nuclear event in distant past. Distributed revised draft and hoped US proposal would help Soviets since it in fact limited reasons and opportunities for withdrawal and also limited time within which such action could be taken. Stressed it essential from US standpoint, particularly in order get Senate approval, that withdrawal be related to nuclear explosion. Re nine-month notification period, said it could be either lengthened or shortened if Sovs desired.

Recalling Gromyko’s link between inclusion withdrawal clause and elimination article 2 re peaceful uses, Harriman said he instructed US prepared, though with reluctance, drop peaceful uses clause to conform Sov wishes. Pointed out, however, this on understanding Sovs would accept withdrawal clause with US suggested changes.

Noting US would have minor changes of purely drafting nature for article 1, Harriman expressed view withdrawal clause appeared be final problem to be settled.

Hailsham said had received communication from London less precise and categorical than Harriman’s but which permitted him accept for British delegation US amended text. Said withdrawal clause must refer to nuclear explosions since this was test ban treaty. Supported arguments Harriman had made on this point and hoped US text could be accepted by Soviets. Argued this was in Soviet interest as restrictive rather than expansive. Said had no particular opinion concerning specific duration statute of limitations. Felt amendments likely have favorable effect on world public opinion. Concluded by saying British accept US amended text.

Gromyko said Sovs generally opposed to inclusion withdrawal clause, reiterating his previous arguments re bad effect on public opinion. Pointed out if states guided by supreme considerations of their own were to decide to withdraw, they would merely exercise their sovereign rights. However inappropriate point finger at some state, though unnamed, as possible violator. Yet to facilitate agreement, particularly in view US requirements in Congress, Sovs had agreed to inclusion withdrawal clause, but clause must be acceptable to both Soviets and U.S. Hoped US would take account of Sov position as well.

Said today’s US suggestions in effect represented US-UK old formula pointing at violator and thus included what Sovs believed undesirable mention in treaty. Reiterated if some state concluded certain phenomenal event occurred compelling it to withdraw, such state would be absolutely free to do so and explain reasons therefor. No one could restrict this right of states. Thus Sov formula took account of US position while at same time met Sov needs and thereby enabled USSR agree to inclusion withdrawal clause.

Gromyko then distributed text TB draft treaty reflecting their position at this point which he said could be basis for agreement, but noted this on assumption there would be simultaneous agreement on NAP. (Text of TB draft being analyzed.)

Harriman stated US could not accept Soviet draft withdrawal clause without changes had indicated. Stressed again this essential requirement and not whim. Said would study Sov test ban text and Sovs should study his remarks re withdrawal clause as this of primary importance to U.S.

Gromyko asked US-UK study Soviet TB text. Said Sovs had taken into account US position re withdrawal but US should not make this article unacceptable to USSR. Both sides should take account of each other’s positions.

Harriman said wished point out he had been instructed US would not accept Sov language for withdrawal clause. In sharp reaction, indicated importance of issue to US, stressed that Sov should give it serious consideration and intimated issue might be breaking point.

Gromyko commented he had no doubts Harriman had received instructions but Harriman should not ask USSR to accept US position. If only one side were to make concessions that would be very bad and not only in this context. Said Sov withdrawal language did not expand reasons for withdrawal, but gave states right make appropriate decision and explain its motives. It difficult expect harmonious solution this problem if one side were to say its conditions must be accepted. Each side should make efforts meet halfway. Harriman denied US adopting a take it or leave it approach; all the US asking Soviets was give consideration to its views. Urged Sovs take US views most seriously for reasons explained earlier. Pointed out nothing Gromyko had said changed US positions. Hope agreement on this vital matter could be reached at the next meeting.

Hailsham said wished take full account Sov position but was not sure understood it fully. Soviets recognized French problem and US concerned about another power. Said UK less concerned re both countries. US suggested clause takes account both problems. Main contention now is whether “extraordinary circumstances” should be more specifically defined as US proposed. Hailsham had not yet understood what Sovs find objectionable in US draft which merely defined what “extraordinary circumstances” refer to. Suggested should not pursue matter indefinitely at this time but should consider carefully before next meeting. Requested US draft be carefully studied.

Gromyko reiterated if parties desired agreement they should make effort meet halfway, as this standard procedure in negotiations. Therefore he did not like it if anybody told him here is my position, accept it or there will be no agreement. This would not be right in any negotiations. Sov Govt desired agreement and both Harriman and Hailsham had recognized Sovs had met US-UK position on some points.

Re Hailsham’s request for clarification Sov difficulties with US US suggested changes for withdrawal clause, Gromyko repeated argument re undesirability of referring to possible violators. Also repeated Sovs had taken account of US difficulties in Congress and put forward formula they believed would enable states to withdraw and state their reasons therefor. Sov formula did not restrict such freedom but at same time it did not weaken treaty by mentioning possible violators. Contended Sovs had no one-sided interest in this matter and believed Sov formula was in full accord with international public opinion. Hoped these views and Sov language would be studied further.

At this point, Gromyko said main difficulty, and he wished stress it was the main difficulty, in these negotiations was question of NAP. Suggested conversation so far had given sufficient food for thought for next meeting and believed group could adjourn to meet tomorrow at 11 a.m.

Harriman wished make few comments before adjournment. Said Gromyko in explaining his objections U.S. formula had indicated belief our wording referred to one of the three as possible violators. We understood this objection in context our original language but wished to point out nuclear explosion referred to in new US suggestion could be set off by anyone outside the three; indeed we did not believe any of the three would conduct a nuclear explosion in environments proscribed. Harriman then said Sovs might object to phrase “prohibited environments” in the US suggested amendment; if this were case US prepared replace phrase with something like “three environments described above.” Thus word “prohibit” which might have odious overtones to Sovs, would be eliminated. Perhaps Gromyko would consider this possibility.

Harriman thanked Gromyko for stating frankly his difficulties with US suggestions and said would make effort meet them assuming Sovs would accept inclusion reference to nuclear explosions in place extraordinary circumstances. Said did not ask for immediate reply and hoped Gromyko would study problem.

Gromyko responded Harriman’s remarks changed situation but little. Hoped US would study Sov language objectively and was sure US would find it quite suitable to all.

Hailsham asked if he understood correctly Sov position to be that any attempt to define circumstances as relating to nuclear event would be objectionable even if language were found which would not imply violation.

Gromyko said, “Yes, indeed!”

At end of meeting in response to question by Hailsham, Gromyko summed up his position. It undesirable to have direct reference to violation or to nuclear explosions. It is better to use broader language, which would cover explosions. Of course all of us would understand that this is what is referred to. Although it goes without saying, any state could exercise sovereign right to withdraw. We have no intention of carrying out nuclear explosion and we believe you have no such intention.

Hailsham said would give matter careful thought. Most important overcome this particular difficulty. Preamble not so important as treaty itself.

Was agreed next meeting would be at 11 a.m. tomorrow with no drafting committee meeting beforehand.

1. Meeting with Gromyko: U.S.–U.K. views on Soviet withdrawal clause. Secret. 5 pp. Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–3 USSR (MO).