I enclose four copies of a memorandum which you may wish to turn over to
the scientists for appropriate analysis.
If you approve I would also suggest a copy be sent to the President for
his information.
Attachment
MEMORANDUM BY ARTHUR H. DEAN WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
1. In the immediate aftermath of Cuba and the Chi-Com attack on India
there would appear to be little likelihood of the Soviet Union’s
agreeing to any effective number of internationally supervised
detector stations on its territory equipped with proper and modern
instrumentation, to their location in quiet areas or to the training
of the USSR nationals on such
stations.
2. There would also appear to be little likelihood that they would
agree to any meaningful-on-site inspections by an international
commission of unidentified events. To get Soviet acceptance the
invitations would either have to be “invitational” in accordance
with the Eight-Power memorandum or would be in accordance with
Ambassador Lall of India’s proposal that the commission would first
ascertain whether an invitation, if issued by the commission, would
be honored so that if the answer to the query were in the negative
no invitation would be issued and therefore there would be no breach
of the treaty.
3. The proposals with respect to having two or three automatic
stations on Soviet territory, according to Sir Solly Zuckerman,
offers endless possibilities for argument as to the size, the
equipment and location of
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such stations and the manner in which their
data would be recorded, reported and processed. While this
scientific work was going on the Soviets would in effect be
demanding a further uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium with
respect to seismic events.
In order to meet the projected USSR
unilateral proposal that all further testing underground be stopped
on an uninspected and uncontrolled basis, the following program is
put forward for examination:
I. The scientists be asked how effective a set of stations in quiet
locations with modern instrumentation would be if such stations
could be located in Japan, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, India,
Afghanistan, and possibly Poland, by the United States and could be
manned by the United States with appropriate number of local
nationals.
II. If the answer of the scientists would be that such a set of
stations might be more effective in detecting, locating and
identifying seismic events than a relatively few automatic stations
on Soviet territory plus some larger number of automatic stations on
the territories of countries contiguous to the Soviet Union, and if
the scientific possibilities of such a system of stations would
permit the detection, location and identification of all significant
seismic events, the United States might be willing to say the
following:
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A. The United States will not ask for an international
supervisory commission or for internationally supervised control
posts manned by nationals on Soviet territory and will not ask
for obligatory on-site inspections.
B. The United States will announce unilaterally that it will not
test in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space or
underground as long as it has no evidence satisfactory to it
that the USSR or any other
state is not testing in any one of these environments.
C. If the United States receives evidence satisfactory to it
which leads it to believe that the USSR or any other state is testing in any one or
more of these environments, then the United States reserves the
full right to take any and all action as it may deem fit and
proper with respect to the question of whether or not it will
resume testing.
The foregoing proposal would seem to have the following
disadvantages:
(1) It is not a treaty and does not obligate the Soviet Union.
(2) There will be no internationally supervised but nationally manned
detection posts on the territory of the Soviet Union.
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(3) There will be no right of the commission to make obligatory
on-site inspections of unidentified seismic events on the territory
of the Soviet Union. This program is based upon the premise which
must be carefully examined by the scientists that by the setting up
of our own stations in nearby countries with proper equipment and
properly manned, despite the fact that there are no properly placed
detection posts on the territory of the Soviet Union and no right of
on-site inspection of unidentified events, we can do as reasonably
good a job as we would with internationally supervised but
nationally manned posts in the territory of the Soviet Union.
(4) There will be no right to make on-site inspection of unidentified
events on the territory of the Soviet Union. But even with some 8 to
10 detection posts with modern instrumentation and possibly located
on the territory of the Soviet Union the problem of location and
identification will still be great, and even if the USSR were to agree to having the
commission make its own decision with respect to on-site inspections
there is no assurance that the Soviet Union would in fact cooperate
in actually permitting the commission to carry out these on-site
inspections effectively and efficiently.
(5) If the decision as to whether on-site inspections were to be left
to a group of 17 scientists from each of
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the countries which are
parties to the treaty, if the scientists thought that their
declaration there was an unidentified event which needed on-site
inspection might lead to the denunciation of the treaty, then the
fear of making such a political decision, or the pressures which
might be put upon them not to do so, might lead them not to ask for
the right to make on-site inspections for certain unidentified
events. If so, the actual request to make an on-site inspection
might never arise.
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Advantages:
(1) We design, equip and locate the stations.
(2) We operate them ourselves.
(3) We make our own decision as to whether there is an unidentified
event and whether we have the right to resume testing and do not
have to convince scientists from the non-aligned countries. Out of
the eight nations, India and Burma are close geographically to
Communist China and [text not
declassified].
The Chi-Com attack on India and the rift between USSR and Chi-Com remain to be
appraised. The relationship of the UAR and the USSR is
well-known.
(4) [text not declassified]
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(5) [text not declassified]
(6) [text not declassified]
(7) Even if the Proposed system has scientific disadvantages it gives
the United States certain moral advantages and arguments with the
non-aligned nations as against either (a) a policy of agreeing to
any uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium on seismic events
following the unilateral declaration of the Soviet Union against
testing, or (b) being forced by world opinion to agree that we will
discontinue further underground tests without any provisions for
detection posts or on-site inspections on Soviet territory or
without any clear right to resume testing if we find violations.
(8) It gives the United States control over the location and manning
of the posts and control over the decisions.
If the program is handled in a highly objective scientific manner the
fact that you do not have non-aligned nations concurring in the
decision that there has been
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either a nuclear test or an
unidentified event will be largely overcome.
If the foregoing proposal were cleared as satisfactory to the
scientists it would of course have to be cleared with Senator
Russell of Georgia and
with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee in view of the statements
that have been made with respect to the proposed treaty and with
respect to resident supervision of the international commission at
nationally manned detection parts in the territory of the Soviet
Union.
