Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

131. Memorandum from McNaughton to Nitze, July 3¹

July 3, 1962

SUBJECT

• Test Ban

There was a meeting this afternoon at ACDA in which we discussed the three papers that Captain Foster gave you this morning. The following consensuses were reached:

1. Atmospheric Test Ban. There is general agreement within the Government favoring an atmospheric test ban and that it is all right to hand an edited version of the draft you have to the British on Thursday. I added DOD caveats about outer space and underwater testing; on Lee Haworth’s suggestion, all reference to the possibility of extending the proposal to underground was deleted. It was also understood that the annex, relating to detonations for peaceful purposes, would not be handed to the British. Butch Fisher agrees to have a revised atmospheric test ban draft to us by July 6 so that we can send it to the Chiefs. One thing which troubled me with respect to the atmospheric ban was the ambivalence of some of the people about the importance of underground testing. Several of us tried to make it clear that approval of the atmospheric ban was based on the assumption that underground testing would continue; others insisted on separating the issues as if they were not connected.

2. Comprehensive Test Ban. It was agreed that no paper would be handed to the British representing a comprehensive test ban treaty draft. It was agreed, however, that the issues would have to be discussed with the British—the extent to which “national” systems can satisfy the detection requirement, and the manner in which we get the requisite on-site inspections. There was a small explosion when it became apparent that ACDA was in the sixth revision of a comprehensive test ban treaty draft and had showed earlier versions to the British. However, the point was made that the paper and the principles underlying it would have to be considered by the various agencies before it could be handed even to the British.

3. Detection Capabilities Memorandum. It was agreed that Frank Long’s memorandum discussing detection capabilities and suggesting the possibility of a system of twenty to thirty high-quality stations, could be handed to the British on Thursday.

John T. McNaughton

1. Readout of ACDA meeting on test ban issues. Confidential. 2 pp. Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OATSD (AE) Files: FRC 69 A 2243, 97 USP, Nuclear Test Suspension/Geneva, 1960–1962.