Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

130. Memorandum of the President’s Decisions, June 20¹

June 20, 1962

MEETING ON NUCLEAR TESTS

1. The President announced his objective of completing the current series of tests by 20 July although recognizing the possibility of slippages due to weather and other causes.

2. The President concurred in the view that the highest priority should be accorded the Starfish and Blue Gill test shots.

3. The President approved the following test shots and target dates:

Starfish Prime (1.4 MT at 400 Km)—4 July

Blue Gill Prime [text not declassified]—19 July

It is understood that weather conditions may cause some slippage in this schedule and that Blue Gill Prime may be as late as 26 July.

4. The President is reconsidering the necessity for conducting the Urraca test shot ([text not declassified] at 1300 Km), which could not be conducted earlier than 4 August under the most favorable circumstances, and will decide this matter shortly.

5. The President took note of the decision of the Department of Defense not to press for the inclusion of the Kingfish test shot [text not declassified] in this test series.

6. The President reviewed the schedule proposed for the remaining tests to be conducted at the Nevada Test Site. He authorized two tests that had previously been approved for readiness planning only—Little Feller 2 ([text not declassified] surface) and Johnie Boy (500 Tons-shallow underground).

7. The President approved the following test shots and target dates:

Sedan (100 KT—underground cratering)—6 July

Small Boy ([text not declassified] surface)—8–18 July²

Little Feller 2 ([text not declassified] surface)—9 July

Johnie Boy (500 Tons—shallow underground)—12 July

8. The President deferred authorization at this time of Little Feller 1 [text not declassified] surface) proposed for 24 July if it cannot be held before Blue Gill Prime. He will decide this matter at a later date when the schedule appears more firm.

McG. B.

1. Decisions on various aspects of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 4/5/62–7/30/72.
2. This test should be as late as possible consistent with safety requirements and allowing for weather; it should not be later than the last test in the Pacific, unless unusual weather delays require a short overrun.