I am enclosing a memorandum to the President which is based on the
memorandum from the Director of ACDA
to the Committee of
[Typeset Page 317]
Principals dated April 4, 1962, but revised in
light of discussions which took place in the Committee of Principals
meeting on April 5. This memorandum is being transmitted to the
President today.
The three attachments to the memorandum of April 4 should be used as
attachments to this memorandum and are not re-transmitted.
Attachment
April 6,
1962
SUBJECT
- Issues for Discussion at Meeting on April 6, 1962
Following the discussions with the President on March 6 and March 9,
certain major issues concerning the U.S. disarmament program were
left to be resolved at a later date.
At the urgent request of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva, ACDA has been preparing a draft
“Outline of Provisions of a Basic Treaty on General and Complete
Disarmament in a Peaceful World.” Copies of the drafts of a
Preamble, Stage I, Stage II, and Stage III have been forwarded to
the various departments and agencies concerned. It is intended that
decisions reached at the subsequent meeting with the President, on
April 6, will be forwarded to Geneva for the use of the U.S.
Delegation and will be incorporated in the Outline Treaty. However,
the Outline Treaty itself will be the subject of subsequent
inter-agency consultation in the immediate future.
The basic structure of the U.S. proposal is a cut during the first
stage of 30 percent (in increments of
[Facsimile Page 3]
10% a year for three years)
in nuclear
[Typeset Page 318]
delivery vehicles and major conventional armaments. It is proposed
that strategic nuclear delivery vehicles be reduced not only in
numbers but also in destructive capability. The following are a
series of questions upon which decisions are reported or must still
be made in order to make further progress possible in drafting the
“Outline of Provisions of a Basic Treaty on General and Complete
Disarmament in a Peaceful World.” They have been discussed at a
meeting of the Committee of Principals on April 5, 1962. The issues
which are presented are covered somewhat more fully in the attached
copies of letters to the Secretary of Defense (Tabs A and B) and in
Tab C.
1. Method of Reduction
ALTERNATIVE A.
Reduction by categories of armaments of which
the following would be offered as illustrative and in the first two
of which (the “strategic delivery vehicles”) the reductions would be
by “destructive capability” as well as by numbers:
[Facsimile Page 4]
(1) Armed combat aircraft over 30,000 kg. (DOD would have this figure 40,000 kg.) empty weight,
all missiles with over 5,000 km. maximum range, all
submarine-launched missiles and all air-to-surface missiles with
ranges over 300 km.
(2) Armed combat aircraft between 15,000 kg. and 30,000 kg. (DOD would have this figure 40,000 kg.)
empty weight, all missiles (other than submarine-launched missiles
and air-to-surface missiles) with between 300 and 5,000 km. maximum
range.
(3) Anti-missile missile systems.
(4) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile
systems.
(5) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and
15,000 kg.
(6) Surface-to-surface and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic
missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 km. and 300
km.
(7) Tanks.
(8) Armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
(9) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a caliber
of 100 mm. or greater.
[Facsimile Page 5]
(10) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or
greater of the following classes: aircraft carriers, battleships,
cruisers, destroyer types, and submarines.
ALTERNATIVE B.
Reduction by types of armaments narrowly
defined.
2. Limitations on Production of
Armaments.
It has been decided that some limitation should be placed upon
production of strategic armaments and those categories of
non-strategic armaments to be reduced in Stage I. It remains to be
decided what method will be used in determining these limits. The
magnitude of the limits on production, under whatever system is
decided, will be determined at a later stage.
A. If the Alternative A method of reduction (by categories) is
adopted, production within the agreed categories and within the
reduced levels of numbers (and, in categories (1) and (2), of
destructive capability) will be subject to agreed limitations.
ACDA believes that the agreed
production limitations for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should be equal
and based on a percentage of the inventory in each category of
whichever state had the smaller inventory,
[Facsimile Page 6]
in terms of numbers and,
where germane, in terms of destructive capability at the beginning
of each step. DOD wishes to examine
the latter concept further.
[Typeset Page 319]
B. If the alternative B method of reduction (by narrowly defined
types) is adopted, production would be limited by categories such as
those contained in Alternative A. As in the other alternative, the
kind and amount of limitation would be as agreed. In this
connection, the limitation on production becomes somewhat more than
a limitation on production, it also becomes a limitation on the
freedom to vary the mix within the categories. While, theoretically,
this alternative leads to simultaneous reduction and production of
the newer and more desirable weapons systems, this incongruity could
be handled by allowing a nation to escape some “type” reductions by
charging them against “category” production allowance. Thus if a
nation had 50 Polaris missiles and was required by Alternative B to
destroy 15 of them, it need not destroy the 15 but could credit the
15 against its total production quota of strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles applicable to Category (1) of paragraph 1A.
3. Elimination of Armaments Intended for
Reserve Forces.
The Soviet draft treaty of March 15 contains a proposal that in Stage
I “Conventional Armaments and Equipment Intended for Reserve Forces
Shall also be Destroyed”.
[Facsimile Page 7]
It has been suggested that this Soviet
proposal might provide the U.S. an opening whereby we could
establish a foundation for advancing the concept of general parity
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in major non-strategic armaments. This
would be done, presumably, by also proposing in our outline treaty
that armaments intended for reserve forces would be eliminated by
the end of Stage I. It remains to be decided whether or not the U.S.
should make such a proposal and if so exactly in what context the
proposal should be made. (See Tab B.)
4. Destruction of Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
During Negotiations.
The U.S. in proposing only a 30 per cent reduction in strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles and in permitting production which would
allow Minuteman and Polaris missiles to be substituted for B–47
bombers, is vulnerable to charges of insufficiency in dealing with
the threat posed by strategic nuclear weapons. To help offset
charges of this nature, it has been suggested that we might propose
to begin the reduction of certain strategic delivery vehicles during
the negotiations. This could be done by having the U.S. deposit in
UN designated hands, a certain
number of long-range strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and then
propose that those vehicles would be destroyed if the Soviets would
reciprocate with an equal number of long-range vehicles.
[Facsimile Page 8]
This
process would continue at a designated rate for a designated time
period as long as negotiations were being conducted. It is proposed
that the Committee should consider whether or not such an offer
should be made, when it might be made, and who should make it. If
the
[Typeset Page 320]
Committee believes that such a proposal is worthwhile, then it
should consider what category or type of vehicle should be used, how
many should be destroyed each month, and how long the process should
continue. (See Tab C)
