Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill¹

29 January 1944.

Translation

Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Presiden[t] Fr[a]nklin D. Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Winston Churchill

On January 23 I have received your two joint messages, signed by you, Mr. President, and you, Mr. Prime-Minister, on the question of transference for the use of the Soviet Union of Italian vessels.²

I have to say, that after your joint affirmative reply in Teheran to my question regarding the transference to the Soviet Union of Italian vessels before the end of January, 1944, I considere[d] this question as settled and it did not occur to me that there was a possibility of revision of this accepted and agreed upon, among the three of us, decision. So much the more, as we came to an agreement, that in the course of December and January this question should have been settled with the Italians as well. Now I see that this is not so, and that the Italians have not been approached on that question at all.

In order not to delay, however, this matter, which is of vital importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is ready to accept your proposal …³

In your reply, however, is no mention made of the transference to the Soviet Union of eight Italian squadron destroyers and four submarines, regarding the transference of which to the Soviet Union still at the end of January, you Mr. President, and you Mr. Prime-Minister, gave your consent in Teheran. Undoubtedly for the Soviet Union primarily is this question, the question regarding destroyers and submarines, without which the transference of a battleship and a cruiser is of no value. You will understand yourself that cruisers and battleships are powerless without destroyers escorting them. Since you have at your disposal the whole Italian naval fleet, fulfillment of the decision agreed upon in Teheran pertaining to the transference for the use of the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines from this fleet should not be difficult. I agree, that instead of Italian destroyers and submarines the Soviet Union be given to use the same number of American or English destroyers and submarines. Besides, the question of transference of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be solved simultaneously with the transference of the battleship and cruiser, as it was agreed upon, among the three of us, in Teheran.⁴

1. Roosevelt’s copy was presumably sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.
2. The joint message of January 23, 1944, printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 115, conveyed to Stalin (1) the conclusions set forth in the memorandum of the Combined Chiefs of Staff mentioned in Churchill’s telegram of January 16 1944, ante, p. 871, and (2) a proposal, which Churchill had made to Roosevelt in the same telegram, for the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of certain non-Italian ships instead of the surrendered Italian ships.
3. The omitted passage, which does not refer to the Tehran Conference, is printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 117.
4. Churchill, in a telegram to Roosevelt dated February 1, 1944, repeated the text of this message which he had received from Stalin and added the comment: “What can you expect from a bear but a growl?” (Roosevelt Papers). Further passing references to the Tehran agreement on Italian ships, in correspondence of February 1944 with Stalin, will be found in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, pp. 118, 122.