The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions
listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special
study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since
they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These
three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet
determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward
France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strong points
or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as
trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of
political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward
France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves
convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the
harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies
elsewhere.
While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is
sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war
continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The
states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted
to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be
stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will
not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment.
Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial
size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any
appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would
be the only important military and political force on the continent of
Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political
impotence.
There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the
Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set
forth the facts.
[Attachment]
Attitude of the Soviet Government on European
Political Questions as Expressed by Marshal Stalin During the Tehran
Conference.
secret
These views have all been recorded in the official records of the
Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they
occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are
summarized here for convenient reference.
1. International security after the war.
No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to
restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a
course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps
as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases
and other strong points in the vicinity of those countries and in
general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be
assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism.
These bases will be held as trustees for the international
organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity
by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United
States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that
fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might
increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa. (No
specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet
Union.)
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2. Treatment of Germany.
The Soviet Government does not consider that any international
organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or
twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war
industry and supervision could not prevent this process being
concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The
various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves
together in any federation either among themselves or in association
with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany
with the framework for developing another great aggressive state.
Strong points (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity
of Germany to prevent Germany’s “moving a muscle”.
3. France.
The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its
criminal association with Germany. De
Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical
France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi
Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted
to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France
to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases
would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the
French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology.
The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for
the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an
insignificant military power and become a charming but weak
country.
4. Confederations.
The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any
federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the
reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.
5. Poland.
The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be
agents of Hitler and charges
its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in
fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider
reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile it
must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and
must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight
actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is
given the northern part of east Prussia including Königsberg and
Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas
primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwow is
admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely
Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason.
The Soviet Government is
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prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder
River.
6. Finland.
Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to
have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet
conditions are:
- (1)
- The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the
reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.
- (a)
- The Soviet Government would, however, be willing
to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo,
the latter town to pass into the permanent
possession of the Soviet Union.
- (2)
- The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime
strength.
- (3)
- Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of
the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of
Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union;
these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from
five to eight years and if Finland should default the Red
Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.
- (4)
- Finland to break off all association with Germany and
expel the German forces from her territory.
If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no
intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a
province of the Soviet Union.
7. The British Empire.
Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government
considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire,
but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning
over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and
strong points throughout the world.
8. The Dardanelles.
The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in
regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer
navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace.
This question was not pursued in any detail.
