891.00/2078
The Minister in Iran (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State
No. 750
Subject: Declaration by the United States, the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom regarding Iran.
Sir: I have the honor to report, for the Department’s background information, the circumstances of the drawing up of the joint declaration [Page 841] regarding Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, and on the same day declared acceptable by the Iranian Government through its Minister of Foreign Affairs.
During a visit by General Hurley and myself to Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed on November 25, 1943, the Iranian officials spoke of the proposed declaration on Iran1 which was discussed, but not approved, at the Moscow meeting of foreign secretaries October 19 to 30. (See Mr. George V. Allen’s despatch of November 4 from this Legation.2 I do not know how the Iranian Government learned of this Moscow proposal but assume they were informed by the British.)
General Hurley informed me that on November 28 he discussed with the President the possibility of securing from the conference of the chiefs of governments a declaration pertaining to the status of Iran. The President had authorized him to see Foreign Ministers Eden and Molotov and endeavor to work something out.
On the morning of November 29, when I called at the Foreign Office regarding another matter, Prime Minister Soheily told me [he] had just seen Mr. Eden and had put forward the request that the conference should issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover the following points:
- 1)
- Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.
- 2)
- Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance3 with respect to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.
- 3)
- Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.
M. Soheily said that Mr. Eden had agreed in principle but had requested that he approach the Soviet representatives and the American Minister.
General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30 and advised me that he had reached agreement with the British Foreign Secretary on the desirability of a declaration such as that proposed. The Moscow draft declarations4 were considered, and General Hurley suggested that, in addition to the points which they covered, there should be a reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Mr. Eden assented. [Page 842] It was further agreed that the provision of the Moscow draft calling for support for foreign advisers in Iran should be omitted.
General Hurley advised me that, inasmuch as the Moscow draft had not been approved by the Russians, he and Mr. Eden had agreed it would be appropriate to have the Iranian Prime Minister present his request himself to M. Molotov and endeavor to obtain Soviet consent to the new proposal. Later that same day, the Iranian Foreign Minister told me that Premier Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov had expressed their willingness to meet the request for a declaration. However, from information reaching General Hurley, it appeared that Soviet concurrence was not certain, and the following day he requested the President to speak to Marshal Stalin on the matter. General Hurley tells me he was afterwards informed that the President had done so.
December 1 was the last day of the meeting at Tehran, and there was no time for joint discussions among the American [,] Soviet and British representatives with respect to the text of the proposed communiqué. In consultation with General Hurley, this Legation had prepared a tentative draft, which was the first draft to include specific affirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It was approved by the American delegation to the conference and was submitted to Mr. Eden and M. Molotov late in the afternoon of December 1. With a few minor changes in wording, this draft was accepted by the final plenary session of the conference, held that evening. I understand time was so short that it was not practicable to make three original copies, and that only one was signed, this original remaining in possession of the American delegation. A copy of the final text is enclosed herewith.5
I had previously given the Iranian Foreign Minister a copy of the Legation’s first draft, which he had discussed with the Prime Minister. I had also informed him that the proposal would be discussed by the chiefs of government on December 1. Accordingly, when the conference session ended at about 11 o’clock in the evening, General Hurley and I took a copy of the final draft to the Foreign Ministry and went over it word by word with M. Saed, explaining the slight changes which had been made in the phraseology. The Foreign Minister called the Prime Minister on the telephone and read him the altered phrases. He then informed us that the revised text was acceptable to the Government of Iran. He initialed a copy which we had brought for that purpose.6
[Page 843]The Foreign Minister agreed to give no publicity to the Declaration until it should have been released by the three signatory governments. It was explained to him that this would probably be delayed for several days.
In the course of our conversation with M. Saed, General Hurley emphasized that the American representatives had given special support to the proposed declaration, that certain objections had been encountered, but that we had, happily, been able to secure the agreement of the British and Soviets. Since the Foreign Minister also could see for himself that the Legation’s draft declaration had been adopted almost in toto by the conference, I think there can be little doubt in his mind that the United States played a large part in the issuance of the declaration.
As the Department will recall, the Soviet delegation at the Moscow Conference resolutely opposed the issuance of any statement regarding policy toward Iran. I was, therefore, surprised at the readiness of Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov to agree to a substantially similar proposal when made at Tehran only a few weeks later. It may well be that the President’s personal appeal, coming at the end of a successful conference, was the deciding factor, although I am inclined to think that some general shift in Soviet attitude toward Iran may also have taken place in recent weeks. (As I have previously reported, there are indications that Irano-Soviet relations have attained a more friendly basis.) Contributing or alternative reasons for Soviet acquiescence at Tehran may have been:
- 1)
- The opposition at Moscow may have originated with subordinates, such as former Ambassador Smirnov, who were not present here and so could not bring their views to the attention of the chiefs.
- 2)
- At Moscow, the proposal was made by the British and supported by the Americans, no Iranian representatives being present. At Tehran, the proposal came from the Iranians themselves, and the Soviets may have felt that they could not well oppose it without placing themselves in an unfavorable light vis-à-vis the Iranian Government, especially after both the American and British representatives had indicated agreement.
- 3)
- The Soviet leaders may have thought this a more appropriate occasion to make a gesture toward Iran, since the meeting was taking place on Iranian soil.
Respectfully yours,
- See ante, pp. 131, 133.↩
- Not printed herein.↩
- Treaty of January 29, 1942; Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249.↩
- Ante, pp. 118–119.↩
- The final text is printed ante, p. 646.↩
- A facsimile of the copy initialed by Soheili was obtained by the Department from Hurley (023.1/6–454).↩