Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister¹

secret
C. C. S. 426/1

[Cairo,] December 6, 1943.

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at Sextant Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. Over-all Objective

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives.

j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.

IV. Execution of the Over-All Strategic Concept

The U-Boat War

7. We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (C.C.S. 399 and 399/1)²

the defeat of the axis in europe

The Combined Bomber Offensive

8. a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (C. C. S. 403)³

b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to Overlord (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before Overlord can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.

“Eureka” Decisions

9. At the Eureka Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. [Here follows the text of the military agreement printed ante, p. 652, beginning with the words “The Conference”. The five paragraphs are lettered from a to e instead of being numbered, and there are no initials at the end.]

10. In the light of the above Eureka decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:

a. Overlord and Anvil are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May, 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

b. Overlord as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

c. The examination of Anvil on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to Overlord and Anvil.

e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

Operations Against Southern France

11. We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation Overlord and that he will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.

Operations in Italy

12. We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until the 15th January 1944 the 68 LST’s due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for Overlord.

Command in the Mediterranean

13. We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (C. C. S. 387/3).⁴

Support to the Balkans

14. We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (C. C. S. 387/3, Appendix “B”).⁵

Turkey

15. We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war^* and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (C. C. S. 418/1).⁶

Coordination “With the U. S. S. R.

16. We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the U. S. S. R. should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.

Emergency Return to the Continent

[Here follow paragraphs 17 and 18 which, with minor editorial changes, are the same as the first two paragraphs of C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised), ante, p. 786.]

19. We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.

20. We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to Rankin and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

the war against japan

Long Term Strategy

21. Active study continues regarding the Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle C. C. S. 417⁷ and 417/1⁸ (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

Specific Operations in 1943–1944

22. We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (C. C. S. 397 Revised)⁹ with the exception of the references contained therein to Buccaneer.

Higher Direction of Operations in Southeast Asia Command

23. We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.

Operations in the S. E. Asia Command

[Here follow (as paragraphs 24, 25 a and b, and 26) paragraphs a to d of section 6 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on December 6, 1943, 11 a.m. (ante, p. 737), with such changes—required by the context—as the insertion here of the words “We have agreed to” at the beginning of paragraph 24 and of “We have decided:—To” at the beginning of paragraph 25.]

Relation of Available Resources to the Operations Decided Upon

27. We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.¹⁰

V. Conclusions on Miscellaneous Subjects

United Chiefs of Staff

28. We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U. S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the U. S. S. R. or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, Trident, Quadrant and Sextant, which are convened from time to time; and that the U. S. S. R. and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.

Note

The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.

1. The source text contains on a cover sheet the subscriptions “OK FDR” and “WSC 6–XII” in the handwriting of the two Heads of Government.
2. Neither printed herein.
3. Not printed herein.
4. Ante, p. 794.
5. Ante, p. 795.
6. See paragraph 9 b above. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. Ante, p. 782.
7. Ante, p. 765.
8. Not printed herein, but see ante, p. 736.
9. Ante, p. 779.
10. See ante, p. 737, and post, p. 828.