Office of the Historian

Hopkins Papers

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill1

Cairo, December 5, 1943.

Memorandum for: the Prime Minister

I propose to send over my signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight. Do you concur in this action?2

“Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of Tarzan to insure success of operation.

“This being the case: Would you be prepared go ahead with Tarzan as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of Tarzan? Also there is the prospect of B–29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok.

“If not, would you prefer to have Tarzan delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China.

[Page 804]

“I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.[”]3

F[ranklin] D[elano] R[oosevelt]
  1. A facsimile of this document is printed in Sherwood, p. 801, where the first line of the text begins, as typewritten, “The President proposes to send over his signature”, and handwritten changes (by Hopkins, according to Sherwood) make the text read as printed here.↩
  2. The paper is endorsed at the bottom by Churchill: “I agree. WSC 5 XII”.↩
  3. The telegram to Chiang was sent from Cairo at 11:05 p.m., December 5, 1943, Cairo time. It was sent to Washington and relayed to Chungking via military channels. On December 7, 1943, Stilwell (at Cairo) cabled Hearn (at Chungking) that Hearn should see Chiang and urge him to proceed with China’s part in the campaign despite the cancellation of Buccaneer; see Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 74. Chiang’s reply to Roosevelt is printed in the same publication, p. 74.↩