Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

secret
C.C.S. 400/2

[Cairo,] 4 December 1943.

Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and in the Mediterranean

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, C. C. S. 400/1,¹ and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U. S. daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated by the British Chiefs of Staff.

2. We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each A. A. F. group station is organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods.

3. Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the existing close coordination of operations between the U. S. Strategic Air Forces and the R. A. F., as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U. K. in unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th Strategic Air Force into a unified command.

4. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded:

a. That control of all U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit the flexibility of U. S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that these forces should be employed primarily against Pointblank objectives or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the R. A. F. Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for over-all base services and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate commanders of U. S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to Pointblank as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U. S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the R. A. F.

f. That the Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U. S. Strategic Air Force Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that operational and training technique and uniformity of U. S. tactical doctrine are maintained.

5. A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore being issued to the following:

• Commanding General, USSAFE
• Commanding General, ETOUSA
• Commanding General, NATO

Enclosure

Draft Directive by the United States Chiefs of Staff²

To: Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

• The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
• The Commanding General, NATO.

1. Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U. S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

2. The U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, E. A. F. will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the S. A. C., and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all Pointblank operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of Pointblank targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available [sic] for his forces.

3. The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean.

4. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U. S. Army air units in their respective area, including the provision of base services. The Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth Air Force in performance of operation Pointblank as the air operation of first priority.

5. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.

6. The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for Pointblank, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (Fan 254).³

1. Ante, p. 432.
2. Following the discussion of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 4, 1943 (ante, p. 682), the United States Chiefs prepared a revised version of this draft directive. The revised version appears in the J. C. S. Files as the enclosure to C. C. S. 400/2 and is the one printed here.
3. Not printed herein.