J. C. S. Files
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
C.C.S. 418/1
Entry of Turkey Into the War
1. The object of this paper is to discuss the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war, and the extent of our commitments likely to be involved.
turkey’s role in the war
2. We consider that our object in the Balkans should be to bring about the surrender of Bulgaria and open a short sea route to Russia.
3. The surrender of Bulgaria is most likely to be achieved by:
- a.
- Air action.
- b.
- Russian diplomatic and subversive action.
- c.
- The psychological effect of Turkey becoming an active ally of the United Nations.
4. We do not propose that Allied forces should be concentrated in Thrace to cooperate with the Turks. In Thrace, therefore, the Turks must be persuaded to stand on the defensive and to concentrate their forces for the protection of the Straits. To assist them we would continue to bomb the Bulgarians.
5. The opening of a short supply route to Russia through the Dardanelles would achieve a considerable economy in shipping, but might also enable us to take the strain off the Persian supply route. The Turks should be called upon to provide us with the bases from which to protect the convoys.
commitments involved
6. The commitments which would be involved in the above policy can be considered under two headings:
- a.
- Minimum air and anti-air assistance to the Turks, who make a great point of the necessity for protecting their main cities, communications and industries from German air attack.
- b.
- Action, within the capacity of the forces that can be made available, for opening the Aegean Sea, the capture of Rhodes and the other Dodecanese Islands.
Assistance to the Turks
7. We can provide a reasonable scale of air defense for Turkish key points.
[Page 783]Opening the Aegean
8. In addition to 6 a above, we can find the necessary air forces to provide air cover for convoys in the Aegean and the Marmora, without any serious effect on operations elsewhere.
9. The naval forces required for escorting and minesweeping for a fortnightly convoy cycle would have to be provided from outside the Mediterranean.
10. With the above naval and air forces it should be possible to pass occasional convoys through the Aegean without first capturing Rhodes. In these circumstances, however, the losses in ships might be considerable, and for the passage of regular convoys it would be necessary to capture Rhodes and highly desirable to clean up Kos, Leros, Samos, Khios, Mytilene and Lemnos. From the military point of view it would be an immense advantage if the Turks could cooperate in the assaults on the islands other than Rhodes.
11. The forces required for the capture of Rhodes over and above those now in M. E. Command would be:
- a,
- Naval forces for the assault.
- b.
- One British division.
- c.
- The assault shipping and craft for one division, two brigades assaulting.
- d.
- Two parachute battalions and the necessary air lift for them amounting to 90 transport aircraft.
12. As far as can be foreseen at present the land and air forces for this operation could be found from resources in the Mediterranean Theater.
13. There are two possible sources for the necessary assault shipping and craft: the Mediterranean Theater, and the Southeast Asia Theater.
14. The two parachute battalions and the 90 transport aircraft could only come from the Central Mediterranean and their release would depend on the requirements of the situation in Italy, and the preparations for operations against Southern France.
15. From the point of view of the weather it might be possible to stage an assault on Rhodes towards the end of February, but other factors are likely to affect this date.