Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The British Ambassador to the Greek Govemment-in-Exile in Egypt (Leeper) to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)¹

[Cairo, December 3, 1943.]

Secretary of State

I spoke to you yesterday about our desire for a very much closer co-operation with the Americans in the Balkans, both as regards policy and execution of policy. Both Mr. Stevenson² and I are in full agreement on this point, and I cannot do better than attach a copy of a paper he has written on the subject, which is on the Agenda for the Middle East Defence Committee³ this morning.^* I understand that most members of the Defence Committee have already signified in advance their warm approval of these proposals.

R. A. Leeper

Cairo, 3rd December, 1943.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt (Stevenson)

Co-ordination of O. S. S. and S. O. E.

1. General Donovan has demanded a very largely increased share in special operations in the Balkans. We should welcome this demand, provided that an agreed policy is carried out.

2. At present the O. S. S. organisation as a whole is answerable only to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and is entirely independent of the State Department. On the other hand, S. O. E. carries out a policy agreed between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office.

3. There is definite danger that General Donovan’s organisation will not necessarily pursue the same policy as S. O. E. Such a development would obviously lead to incalculable difficulties, and should be avoided if possible.

4. The best, if not indeed the only, way of doing this would be:

(a) to concert our Balkan policy with the United States Government:

(b) to integrate the carrying out of that policy, so far as special operations are concerned, at all executive levels.

5. (a) would presumably be done on the highest political level.

(b) would mean:—

(i) that S. O. E. and O. S. S. should be two separate, but not independent, organisations:

(ii) that by means of working committees the closest possible integration should be achieved in operational policy and control between the two organisations:

(iii) that by some similar means the closest contact should be established between P. W. E. and the moral operations section of O. S. S.:

(iv) that not only O. S. S. but the United States State Department should be represented on the Special Operations Committee at G. H. Q. Middle East, the State Department representative being the United States Ambassador to Greece and Yugoslavia:

(v) that the United States State Department should be represented by the United States Ambassador on the Middle East Defence Committee:

(vi) that operational control of all special operations should remain in the hands of the C. in C. Middle East who would be advised, as now, by the Special Operations Committee and, when necessary, the Middle East Defence Committee.

6. It is suggested that advantage should be taken of the present conference to obtain an agreed decision on the lines of paragraphs 4 and 5 above.⁴

(Intd.)

R. C. S. S[tevenson]

1. This document, which is marked “Copy”, was presumably passed to Roosevelt during the Second Cairo Conference; when and by whom this was done are not indicated.
2. Ralph Clarmont Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Egypt.
3. A United Kingdom policy-coordinating agency, functioning at Cairo.
4. Now approved by M. E. D. C. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. It does not appear that this matter was discussed at the Second Cairo Conference; see post, pp. 840, 871–872.