Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 6, 1943

secret

The President read out paragraph by paragraph the report of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Sextant Conference (C. C. S. 426/1)¹

There was some discussion over the Emergency Return to the Continent (paragraphs 17 to 20). The President understood that objections had been raised to the United States proposals in paragraph 18 on the grounds that they would involve a move of the United States forces from the right to the left across the British lines of communication. He understood that in practice this objection should not be a serious one, as the change-over would not take place until operations had been concluded.

The Prime Minister said that he could not commit the British Government to these proposals. They would have to be put to the War Cabinet.

With regard to the Higher Direction of Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (paragraph 23), The Prime Minister said that this did not affect the decision taken at the Quadrant Conference that the British Chiefs of Staff were to be the channel of communication with the Southeast Asia Command.²

With reference to paragraph 26, The Prime Minister said that he thought the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command,³ should be sent a copy of the President’s recent signal to the Generalissimo on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.⁴ The President agreed and The Prime Minister gave instructions for the signal to be dispatched.

After reading out paragraph 28, The President said that he had been approached by the Chinese, here at the Sextant Conference, with a request for Chinese representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He had made it clear at once that such representation could not be agreed to. The Chinese had also asked if a U. S.-Chinese Committee could be appointed for the consideration of the military operations with which China was concerned.⁵

When The President came to the end of the report, he commended the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the report that they had produced.

The Prime Minister classified the report as a masterly survey of the whole military scene. He gave it as his opinion that when military historians came to adjudge the decisions of the Sextant Conference, they would find them fully in accordance with the classic articles of war.

The Prime Minister then expressed his deep sense of gratitude to his United States colleagues. The Anvil operation had been a great contribution made by them to this Conference. He was convinced that this operation would contribute largely to the success of Overlord.

The President and Prime Minister then initialled the report (C.C.S. 426/1).

In answer to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether the draft communiqué on the U-boat war had been approved, Admiral King stated that the communiqué had been cleared with the President, that it had been dispatched already to Washington, and that it would be released on the 10th of the month.⁶

The Prime Minister suggested to the President that the communiqué should be made out in alternate months by the United States and the British respectively, and that as the British had prepared the present communiqué, that for next month should be prepared by the United States. The President agreed with this proposal.

A draft message to Marshal Stalin was then considered. It was approved with a minor modification and instructions given for it to be sent at once.⁷

A draft telegram to the Generalissimo was then read out.⁸ It was agreed that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret information into a dispatch of this nature. It was decided not to dispatch a telegram to the Generalissimo until his reply had been received to the recent telegram sent to him by the President on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.⁹

1. Post, p. 810.
2. The records of the Quadrant (First Quebec) Conference, August 1943, are scheduled to be published subsequently in another volume of the Foreign Relations series.
3. Admiral Mountbatten.
4. See Roosevelt’s memorandum of December 5, 1943, to Churchill, post, p. 803. See ante, pp. 325, 337.
5. See ante, pp. 325, 337.
6. The communiqué summarizing Allied anti-submarine operations during the month of November was published in the press on December 10, 1943. The text may be found in the New York Times of that date, p. 1, col. 6.
7. For the message as sent, see post, p. 820.
8. Not printed herein.
9. See Roosevelt’s message of December 5, 1943, to Churchill, post, p. 803. Chiang’s reply and subsequent correspondence will be found in Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 74 ff.