Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

United States–United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

December 6, 1943

most secret

Prior to the meeting President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish President had been in private conference.⁴

Mr.Churchill said that the Turkish President had decided to postpone his departure until midnight on 7th December. This would provide an opportunity for going over the ground in greater detail. He had submitted to the President⁵ a plan of action⁶ and this would raise the question of how it was to be carried out if Turkey were attacked and drawn into the war. In the interval a plan would be drawn up for Turkish action in conjunction with the great Allies.⁷ There was also the question of political guarantees, if Turkey by her actions should be drawn into the conflict. It was right and proper that in this event the Allies should see Turkey through.

President Roosevelt remarked that when it came to the discussion of political guarantees it would be desired to include Soviet representatives.

The Turkish President said he had been in contact with Mr. Churchill during the afternoon when the essential points had been made. They would be able to discuss these tomorrow⁸ when the position would be clearer in all directions. He thought however that one feature governed the solution of the whole question, namely the period for material preparation. After that came other phases. As The President now understood it, however, such a period of preparation was not envisaged, or rather that a mixed method was contemplated. This was a cardinal point.

President Roosevelt thought in the first period Turkey would commit only neutral acts. She would receive equipment and material (Mr.Churchill—personnel) and men in mufti. Mr.Churchill remarked that in these conditions the Germans would not want to break with Turkey.

The Turkish President said that for months Turkey would face the German army alone. He had not contemplated this. He had thought that when the Germans declared war the Turks would be in touch with some Anglo-American forces. But in this period of months the Turks would be alone with the Germans. This was a great question and The President did not think he could decide upon it.

President Roosevelt remarked that he did not think that the Germans would declare war in the first period.

President Inonu said that their record showed that the Germans always attacked for prevention. When they saw after a certain time that Turkey had taken her place openly with the Allies they would use this argument and attack.

President Roosevelt pointed out that the Turks had already been receiving supplies on a considerable scale without the Germans taking exception thereto. Why then should the Turks worry now? In the first period there would be no question of the Turks taking the kind of action which would justify the Germans attacking them. Surely the work on airfields and the introduction of material, flak, etc., i. e. the same sort of thing as had been going on in the past, could continue. This would apply to lend-lease material and the trucks previously promised would be delivered. In fact there would be no change except that there would be an accelerated tempo.

Mr.Eden remarked that the technicians would also have to come in. This was essential.

President Inonu said that the Turks had replied to Mr. Eden’s request for air bases for the Allies. It has been said that the provision of these would not provoke war. The Turks had replied that they must regard the matter as very serious because they were convinced that it would provoke war. This meant contemplating Turkey’s entry into the war. The Turkish army was not ready and the country was exposed to enemy air attack. They must therefore have assistance and there would have to be a period of preparation. According to the plan action would begin at the end of this phase. We were now in the first phase and he understood that it was thought that preparation would take too long at a time when the Allies could not wait. The Allies seemed to think that the Turkish Government should act in spite of risks. This was difficult.

Mr.Eden said that a German land attack was most improbable, especially in view of the warning which Russia had promised to give to Bulgaria.

President Inonu said that Turkey would be exposed to air attack and also to land attack by the Bulgarian army fortified by the Germans. President Roosevelt doubted whether Bulgaria would face a hostile Russia.

President Inonu said that perhaps a hostile Russia would induce Bulgaria to hold back, perhaps it would not. The present Bulgarian government was completely committed to Germany.

President Roosevelt did not think that Bulgaria would declare war on Turkey, and he doubted whether the Germans had enough men to stage a German land offensive against Turkey by way of Bulgaria. President Inonu thought, however, that the Germans would be able to get to Istanbul.

In reply to a question by President Roosevelt President Inonu said that Turkey had about forty divisions scattered about the country. They were not prepared. If the Allies had been able to give the desired material assistance in the past the Turkish Government could have replied affirmatively to any demand. As it was they had put all available material, including some very very old stuff, into service. They had hoped that this entirely out of date material would be replaced by new material. How was it possible to get out of the impasse?

Mr.Churchill said that the first thing was to prepare the nests for the birds. This must be done secretly and discreetly in order not to alarm the Germans. The equipment and personnel agreed upon would be put in. Then would come the second phase when all was ready and when the air squadrons would arrive within twenty-four hours. From that moment Turkey would have much greater security than during the preliminary period.

President Inonu said that even if the twenty air squadrons⁹ had arrived or were ready to come in, it would not be possible to say that Turkey was ready. Complete plans for assistance would have to be made and material would have to come in for the fortification of the army. In the event of attack the Allies would have to assist. Only one part of the preparation for this assistance was being discussed. The rest was being left to wait. But during the preparatory period proposed in the discussions, he must prepare his army, mobilize it and concentrate it. Much had been done but it was most inadequate, and a sort of concentration must take place. All this was apparently to be finished by 15th February, and the Turkish army must be put on a war footing for the Germans would strike at the first sign of the entry of the twenty squadrons.

Mr.Churchill enquired whether the Turkish army was not already mobilized and was informed that it was half mobilized.

President Roosevelt suggested that if mobilization had first to take place it would take a long time and suggested, as did Mr.Churchill, that in any case mobilization would surely be more provocative than work on air fields.

President Inonu said that precipitate action without preparation seemed to be contemplated. He did not see any possibility of undertaking this.

Mr.Churchill remarked that the Turkish President seemed to think there was a serious danger of invasion. He however thought invasion by Bulgaria was most unlikely.

President Inonu said it was a matter of opinion. One could not be sure what the enemy would do. Both the Bulgarians and the Germans had forces on the Turkish frontier, and the Turks must calculate that they would all be used.

Mr.Churchill thought that it was impossible to get to a conclusion at this meeting. He would like to go over the ground with the Turkish President on 7th December together with documents. The discussion could not be concluded this evening.

President Roosevelt said that what he envisaged was to talk of the first period and to set an objective date for it. This date would not be a hard and fast one, but it would be something to aim at. During this period, which would be in two parts, the Turks would give the Germans and Bulgarians no excuse whatever for declaring war on Turkey. In the first part of the period work on the air fields would go ahead exactly as had happened before, and supplies and equipment, delivery of which was behindhand, would be sent forward. Neither of these would give any excuse to the Germans.

The delivery by the Americans of the thousand lorries with which they were behind-hand would give the Germans no excuse or provocation. At the same time mechanics, equipment, Radar and technical equipment would come in as it had done before, and none of this would provide an excuse for Germany.

Mr.Churchill interjected that the flow would be on the same lines as before but on a much more intense scale, otherwise Turkey would not be ready.

President Roosevelt said that as regards work on the air fields, the work would go on as before and Turkish labour would be employed. This action would not provoke the Germans.

President Roosevelt went on to say that in the second part of his contemplated first period the Turks would bring more of their troops scattered throughout the country to the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey had the right to do this without provoking an attack. It was President Roosevelt’s expectation (not alone his hope) that Turkey could get through the whole of this period without attack or war. At the end of it the tempo would be accelerated but by that time preparations would have got so far that the twenty squadrons could be brought in and be in action within twenty-four hours if Turkey were attacked.

President Inonu said it was a question of practical things. He was afraid that hopes could not be realized. The standpoint of the British was that Turkey must come in as soon as possible. If he said yes the plan would be that proposed by Mr. Churchill, then Turkey would begin to mobilize. The first thing would be to facilitate the arrival of the British squadrons. Mr. Churchill’s expectation would then be realized. But this would mean Turkey’s immediate entry into the war and the only assistance she would receive would be air assistance. The Turks contended that they were not ready for immediate entry. Their view was that a planned preparation must be made before Turkey could enter. It seemed to be thought that in contending thus, the Turks were merely dragging things out and adopting delaying tactics.

President Roosevelt said that the Allies also were not ready, for the twenty squadrons would only be ready on 15th February and Mr. Churchill said that he was asking for the squadrons to come in on 15th February.

President Inonu said however that other things were necessary, in particular the army had to be strengthened.

Mr.Churchill enquired how long this would take. In view of the paucity of Turkish communications it would take months to make the Turkish army completely strong so as to enable Turkey to be safe and by that time there probably would be no desire that Turkey should come in. The war was going on and the moment for Turkey would pass. This was a serious possibility for the Turks.

President Roosevelt remarked that the Turkish army was very good, particularly the infantry. Its artillery was good, especially for ground warfare. It needed improved communications and aviation. He had been wondering whether by February 15th the Turkish army could not be trained and concentrated in the north to an extent adequate to ward off attack with the aid of air support.

President Inonu said that if this was a question only of mobilization and concentration it could be done, or at least for the greater part. But at the end of it the Turkish army would only have its present material. Technical points were now being discussed and Mr.Churchill said that the strengthening of the Turkish army would take months and months. It was twenty days since the Turkish government had given their reply of November 17 th,¹⁰ and nothing had happened in the interval. Turkey’s material needs could be studied and ascertained in a week and then the Allies could say, on the basis of supply and transport possibilities, how long it would take before Turkey was ready.

Mr.Churchill pointed out that Turkish communications had been fully occupied since the delivery of the Turkish note on November 17th. The Turkish army was good; it had been mobilized for four years. It was a considerable force, much stronger than the Bulgarian army, and it had already received much. It was true that it had not received as much as the Turks would have liked, but he considered that the danger of a Bulgarian land attack was negligible.

Mr.Churchill suggested that it would be better to adjourn the discussions. If President Roosevelt would confide the further discussions to him he would continue conversations with President Inonu on December 7th and report to President Roosevelt by telegram.¹¹

President Roosevelt said that he would have liked to have been here to complete the discussions, but that he must leave on 7th December. He urged very strongly that serious consideration should be given to the question of how much could be done before 15th February without giving offence to Germany and Bulgaria.

President Inonu said the situation seemed to be that Turkey would intervene on 15th February (President Roosevelt and Mr.Churchill at once contested this). There would be a period of preparation. What could the Allies give Turkey in two months? What could be carried? The Turkish General Staff would study these points. But what would happen after February 15th? That, he presumed, would be the period for action.

President Roosevelt said it would not necessarily be the period of action. But from February 15th the Turks would be expected to do things which were no longer neutral. It meant that there would be two months before Bulgaria or Germany would attack, and Mr. Churchill remarked that in that time Bulgaria might well be out of the war.

President Inonu wondered at what the level of preparations would be in two months. It could not be determined without study.

Mr.Churchill said that this would be gone into in the further conversations. To the Turkish President’s remark that he had no military experts with him, Mr.Churchill said that the Allies would say what they could put in.

President Inonu said he would wait for this information. He could not say whether it would be enough, but he would take the information and return to Ankara. He would however be obliged to reserve his reply. To President Roosevelt’s remark that his Chief of Staff (General Somerville)¹² would arrive tomorrow and be here for two days, The Turkish President enquired why there should not be staff talks. Mr.Churchill pointed out that time was too pressing and that the twenty squadrons had to be got ready.

President Inonu said that in three or four days he would be ready to reply. The decision would be taken on all the facts. They found themselves in a situation which was fixed by time, but he would see what could be provided within two months and the Turkish staff would offer their observations, including modifications and additions.

President Roosevelt thought that agreement should be reached on that. It was useless to talk about other matters. This was the core of the whole problem. He would leave General Somerville [Somervell], or his assistant, to pursue the discussions which were mainly military. Mr.Numan again remarked that the Turks had no military experts, but Mr.Churchill pointed out that the question should be discussed and the Turks then send their observations.

Mr.Eden stressed that not everything should be adjourned for consideration at Ankara. Things must be pushed forward.

Mr.Churchill cautioned that at the best not much could be provided for the Turkish army. The Turkish communications would be blocked by the delivery of the air programme. The agreed material and technicians must go forward, and there would not be much room for anything else. The Turks must therefore not put their military material expectations too high as otherwise all hopes would be killed.

President Inonu said he was forcing himself to try to find a possible position in the Allied programme. He was doing so with the best will in the world. But he must make the position clear. So far the Turks had no material. A preparatory period of two months was now proposed to him. He had not said that this was enough. The Allies had the material and the transport, but he did not know how much-was going to be available. He understood however that the main effort was to be concentrated on aviation material and personnel. (Mr.Churchill interjected that air was the only danger). At present, as the The Turkish President saw it, it was contemplated that Turkey would enter the war with anti-aircraft preparation alone.

President Roosevelt then suggested the conclusion of the meeting and kept back the Turkish President to whom he wished to bid goodbye.¹³

4. No record of the conversation referred to has been found.
5. Presumably Inönü.
6. Presumably the plan given to Inönü on December 5, 1943; see ante, p. 714.
7. This may be the paper that Churchill gave Inönü on December 7, 1943; see post, p. 754.
8. See post, p. 751.
9. See ante, pp. 726, 729.
10. See Hull’s telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 374.
11. Telegram of December 9, 1943, post, p. 839.
12. The reference is apparently to Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces. Somervell, however, was listed as present at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 11 a.m. that morning; see ante, p. 734.
13. For Hopkins’ suggestion that Roosevelt include, in his farewell conversation with Inönü, a request that he “be ready to go to war Feb. 15”, see post, p. 817. No record has been found showing whether Roosevelt did so.