Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 6, 1943

secret

1. Approval of Conclusions of C. C. S. 135th and 136th Meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th C. C. S. meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. Amphibious Operations in Southeast Asia Command Alternative to “Buccaneer”
(C. C. S. 427)⁴

Admiral Leahy suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (C. C. S. 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.⁵

Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note of C. C. S. 427.

b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.⁶

3. Control of Strategic Air Forces in N. W. Europe and in the Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 400,⁷ 400/1⁸ and 400/2⁹)

At the request of General Arnold,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.¹⁰

4. Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan
(C. C. S. 417 and 417/1¹¹)

Admiral Leahy said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.

General Marshall said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417.¹²

Sir Andrew Cunningham asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that he agreed with this concept in principle.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved in principle C. C. S. 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

5. Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944
(C. C. S. 397 (Revised))¹³

Admiral King said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation Buccaneer.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in C. C. S. 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation Buccaneer.

6. Operations in the Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 427)¹⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:

a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to Buccaneer to Operations Anvil and Overlord.

b. Make all preparations to conduct Tarzan as planned, less Buccaneer, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of Tarzan; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,

c. Postpone Tarzan, increase to a maximum with planes available the air lift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B–29’s to be brought to bear on the enemy.

d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.¹⁵

7. Draft Report to the President and Prime Minister
(C. C. S. 426)¹⁶

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 426/1),¹⁷

8. Relation of Resources to Plans

It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo¹⁸ and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command,¹⁹ the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to Buccaneer would now be available for operations in Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.

9. Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo

General Marshall read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo.²⁰ General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

10. Future Business

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U. S. Forces in the Azores.²¹

3. The minutes of these meetings, as amended, are printed ante, pp. 699, 705, 719.
4. Post, p. 800.
5. Reference presumably is to the decision described ante, p. 725.
6. See also section 6 of these minutes.
7. Ante, p. 228.
8. Ante, p. 432.
9. Post, p. 787.
10. See post, p. 757.
11. C. C. S. 417/1 proposed certain amendments to C. C. S. 417. The latter is printed post, p. 765, as amended and approved.
12. Paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C. C. S. 417/1 suggested a revision of paragraph 14 of C. C. S. 417 which would have presented more explicitly Mount-batten’s reservations as to a commitment to recapture the whole of Burma.
13. Post, p. 779.
14. Post, p. 800.
15. For Chiang’s messages of December 9 and 17, 1943, regarding this matter, see Stilwell’s Command Problems, pp. 74–77. For Mountbatten’s message of December 6, 1943, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this matter, see post, p. 815. For a summary of the subsequent military developments which, in a sense, superseded both alternatives mentioned here, see Stilwell’s Command Problems, chapters 3–5.
16. Not printed herein.
17. Post, p. 810.
18. See post, pp. 803 and 804, footnote 3.
19. See ante, p. 724, and post, p. 815.
20. For the message to Stalin as sent after it had been modified, see post, p. 820. It was decided not to send the message to Chiang; see post, p. 749.
21. See post, pp. 757, 760.