Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.

secret

1. Operations in Southeast Asia

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed future operations in Southeast Asia with Lt. Gen. [Major General] Stopford, Bear Admiral Troubridge and Air Vice Marshal Baker.

General Stopford said that a plan had been made for the capture of the Andamans, based on a troop lift of 58,000. It was now felt that the operation to capture Port Blair could be undertaken with a troop lift of 50,000 men. However, the latest intelligence on Japanese dispositions, particularly their air dispositions, had led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to capture Kar Nicobar and retain it for use by ourselves.

In reply to a question by Sir Andrew Cunningham, Admiral Troubridge said that shipping was available for the required assault lift of 24,700 for Port Blair. The remainder of the shipping required could be procured. The estimate of the potential strength of Japanese air forces in the area had recently risen from some 300 aircraft to 600. It had originally been intended to knock out the air strip on Kar Nicobar with a commando raid, but now it was felt that a brigade was required and the Air Commander in Chief⁴ considered that the 120 carrier-borne aircraft provided in the plan were insufficient and should be raised to 240 carrier-borne aircraft. Virtually all the assault shipping required was now available.

Air Vice Marshal Baker explained that the estimate of 600 enemy aircraft was the total force the enemy could assemble within striking distance of the Andamans. This would include those based on an arc from South Burma to the north tip of Sumatra. Some 80 to 100 enemy aircraft could be based in the Andamans and Kar Nicobar.

General Stopford said that no plan had yet been completed for the capture of Kar Nicobar. It was estimated that there were 5,000 Japanese troops in the Port Blair area and that they could build up to a total of 3,000 in Kar Nicobar.

Admiral Leahy said that an estimate of 50,000 Allied troops against some 5,000 Japanese appeared excessive.

General Stopford explained that the figure of 50,000 included troops required for the development of facilities in the island, the building of airfields and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that of the total of 50,000 some 34,000 would be fighting troops, including headquarters, engineers, and anti-aircraft units; some 16,000 would be non-fighting troops.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, Admiral Troubridge explained that the present date fixed for Operation Buccaneer was 23 March. This date was dependent on tide and moon conditions and could not be advanced since the necessary naval covering force would not be available in the area before 15 March.

Sir Alan Brooke then asked what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be undertaken, assuming that the bulk of the Buccaneer landing craft and shipping was returned to the European Theater. This operation might take place either against the islands or on the mainland.

General Stopford said that he would like to consider this possibility further before giving a definite reply.

Admiral King said that he would like to repeat a statement he had made at the Plenary Meeting earlier that day⁵ to the effect that if additional carriers were found necessary for Buccaneer, he believed, though he could not guarantee, that he could find some four to six additional CVE’s.

(The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the remainder of the agenda in closed session.)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of Operation Buccaneer to Operation Anvil.

Sir Alan Brooke said that as regards Anvil, the critical part of the operation would be the seizure of a bridgehead, including a port through which the build-up could take place. The assault must be in sufficient strength to tide us over this dangerous period, otherwise we were in danger of being thrown into the sea.

General Marshall, in discussing the timing of Operation Anvil, said that he felt that it should take place after rather than before Overlord and suggested that a period of approximately one week should lapse between the launching of the two operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed with this view. COSSAC had been of the same opinion. He did not wish France to rise before the launching of Operation Overlord, nor could the timing of Operation Overlord itself be exact in view of weather conditions in the Channel.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the wording of a telegram to Admiral Mountbatten with regard to possible operations in his theater on the assumption that certain of his resources were removed to the European Theater.

(At this point General Wedemeyer entered the meeting.)

Sir Alan Brooke said that, had he realized General Wedemeyer was still here, he would of course have asked him to be present during the discussion with the Force Commanders.⁶ He asked General Wedemeyer if he would give his views on possible alternative amphibious operations of a hit-and-run nature capable of accomplishment with less forces than Buccaneer.

General Wedemeyer said that he considered that some operation commensurate with these lesser resources could be undertaken. The Supreme Commander⁷ had been given the objective of opening the land route to China through Upper Burma. It was considered that an amphibious operation would contribute in the military sense to the success of this task, and Operation Buccaneer had been decided on as the operation most likely, with the means available, to assist this task. It would deceive the enemy and split his air forces. Amphibious operations along the coast had also been considered but were rendered difficult by weather, tides, and the lack of ports through which they could be maintained.

General Wedemeyer considered that a hit-and-run operation could be undertaken but would not be so effective as Buccaneer. For Buccaneer it was now considered that some 120 more carrier-borne aircraft were required. This would mean 4 or 5 additional CVE’s or 2 fleet carriers. He considered that both the Andamans and Kar Nicobar could be captured with an amphibious lift of 50,000. It was strongly felt that the first large operation undertaken in the Southeast Asia Command must be a success. The morale of certain of the Indian troops was low, and a smashing victory would restore it. Operation Anakim might be undertaken with only slightly less resources than those required for the Andamans, but it would be against a strong defensive position and would not, he considered, contain as many Japanese forces as would Buccaneer. Hit-and-run operations would not, in his opinion, divert strong enemy forces, and their cost might well prove incommensurate with the results achieved.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note:

(1) That the assault forces for Buccaneer have not been increased.

(2) That the resources necessary for the operation were either already available in the theater, or in sight, excepting for an increased demand of some 120 carrier-borne fighter aircraft.

(3) Of a statement by Admiral King that there was a possibility of making from 4 to 6 CVE’s available from U. S. sources for this operation.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commanders, S. E. A. C. and the Buccaneer force Commanders now at Sextant, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners should examine and report on the morning of 6 December 1943 what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be carried out in the S. E. Asia Theater in 1944, assuming that the bulk of landing craft is returned to the European Theater, the report to indicate the scale, nature, and objectives of the operations proposed.⁸

(2) To dispatch a signal to Admiral Mountbatten asking for a flash estimate on the above. (Annex)

(At this point General Wedemeyer left the meeting.)

2. Operation “Anvil”
(C. C. S. 424)⁹

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners (C. C. S. 424) on Operation Anvil.

Admiral Leahy said that he considered that forces should be taken from Buccaneer only if they were essential to the success of Anvil. They should not be taken for diversionary operations, such as Rhodes.

Sir Andrew Cunningham pointed out that an early decision would have to be taken with regard to Operation Buccaneer, since otherwise we were in danger of “falling between two stools” and the necessary time for the training of any craft which might be withdrawn would not be available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to amend paragraph 4 C on page 3 of C. C. S. 424 by striking from the first sentence the words “from the United States”¹⁰ and by deleting the second sentence.¹¹

General Arnold discussed the air transport requirements for both Anvil and operations in the Burma-China area. The additional transport aircraft required for Anvil could only be found by cutting out the provision of these aircraft to all countries other than the United States, and to the domestic air lines in America. This he was quite prepared to do.

It was also agreed to amend paragraph 4 of Appendix “B” on page 8 by inserting the words “at least” between the words “for” and “two.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved C. C. S. 424 as amended, and directed that the directive contained in Appendix “B” be forwarded to General Eisenhower.

b. Agreed that the detailed planning for this operation should be left entirely to General Eisenhower’s planning staff.

3. Directions to Combined Staff Planners and the U. S. and British Shipping Authorities

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed what instructions or directions could usefully be given to the Combined Staff Planners or to the United States and British shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to keep the shipping authorities closely in touch with the progress of the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and that both the Combined Staff Planners and the shipping authorities should do all possible preliminary work on their estimates of the resources required. This to be undertaken both on the basis of the decisions already taken, and on the basis of the various possible assumptions with regard to operations on which final decisions had not yet been reached.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform the Combined Staff Planners and the U. S. and British shipping authorities of the above decision.

4. Future Work

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 1100 on 6 December¹² to consider the draft report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 426),¹³ the report by the Combined Staff Planners on the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan (C. C. S. 417),¹⁴ and the study of alternative amphibious operations being undertaken by the Force Commanders in consultation with General Wedemeyer and the Combined Staff Planners. The Combined Chiefs of Staff further agreed to meet on the following afternoon, if necessary, and on the following evening on receipt of the report called for from the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command.¹⁵

annex

To: SACSEA

From: Mideast

most immediate

clear the line

Following for Admiral Mountbatten from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. If, as a result of Eureka Conference overriding priority were to be given to European operations, this would make it necessary to withdraw bulk of your landing craft and assault shipping during the next few weeks.

2. This would rule out Buccaneer as at present planned before the monsoon, but the necessity would remain to stage, in conjunction with Tarzan, amphibious operations on a smaller scale, possibly of a hit-and-run nature involving carrier raids and landings of commandos.

3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so, telegraph urgently flash estimate of resources you would require.

4. Your reply must be received by 1600 G. M. T. 6th December.¹⁶

4. Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse.
5. i. e., the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, ante, p. 705.
6. i. e., the discussion, at the beginning of this meeting, with Stopford, Troubridge, and Baker.
7. Admiral Mountbatten.
8. See C. C. S. 427, December 5, 1943, post, p. 800.
9. Post, p. 797.
10. After “will have to be provided”.
11. The second sentence stated that aircraft and crews from the United States could not arrive in time to be fully trained.
12. For the minutes of this meeting, see post, p. 734.
13. Not printed herein. For the report as approved, see post, p. 810.
14. Post, p. 765.
15. For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, December 6, 1943, 7:30 p.m., see post, p. 747. The meeting at which Mountbatten’s report was considered is that of December 7, 1943, 11 a.m., post, p. 756.
16. For Mountbatten’s reply, see post, p. 815.