Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 10:30 a.m.

secret

1. Approval of Conclusions of C. C. S. 134th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.³

2. Draft Agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(C. C. S. 423 and 423/1)⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

Admiral Leahy said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister.⁵ The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation Tarzan and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander⁶ must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.

Admiral Leahy said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of Tarzan. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.

Sir Charles Portal said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.

General Arnold said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.

Sir Charles Portal reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.

General Arnold said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.

General Marshall said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the air line; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten⁷ with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation Tarzan were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation Tarzan would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.

General Marshall expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.

Sir Charles Portal then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.

General Marshall pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation Buccaneer. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.

Admiral King said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of Buccaneer might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.

Sir Andrew Cunningham denied this suggestion.

Admiral King, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet⁸ would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (Admiral King) was much concerned over the success of Tarzan. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than Culverin. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation Buccaneer was as much a part of Tarzan as Anvil was of Overlord.

Sir Alan Brooke said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation Buccaneer were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from Tarzan, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation Buccaneer as a justifiable diversion from our main object.

General Arnold said that the 14th Air Force was operating “on a shoestring.” They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.

Admiral King felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.

General Arnold said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was agreed that if Buccaneer was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to Overlord and Anvil.

Admiral King said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to Overlord and Anvil.

Sir Charles Portal said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of Buccaneer must increase the chances of success of Overlord and Anvil and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of Buccaneer would give far greater military advantages to the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 423/2).⁹

3. Integrated Command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area
(C. C. S. 400,¹⁰ 400/1¹¹ and 400/2¹²)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in C. C. S. 400/2.

b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.

4. Directive for Unification of Command in the Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 387/1 and 387/2)¹³

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of C. C. S. 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted C. C. S. 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).

5. Amphibious Operation Against the South of France
(C. C. S. 424)¹⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to consider C. C. S. 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.¹⁵

6. Directive for Intensification of Support of Partisan Forces in Yugoslavia
(C. C. S. 425)¹⁶

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a. Approved the draft directive to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa¹⁷ with regard to Balkan support, and

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.¹⁸

3. The minutes as amended are printed ante, p. 681.
4. Neither printed herein. The agreed memorandum (C. C. S. 423/2) for the President and the Prime Minister is printed post, p. 796.
5. See ante, pp. 675 ff.
6. Admiral Mountbatten.
7. In August 1943.
8. Admiral Sir James Somerville.
9. Post, p. 796.
10. Ante, p. 228.
11. Ante, p. 432.
12. Post, p. 787.
13. Neither printed herein, but see C. C. S. 387, ante, p. 150, and C. C. S. 387/3, post, p. 794.
14. Post, p. 797.
15. See post, p. 723.
16. C. C. S. 425 (not printed herein) was the report by the Combined Staff Planners submitting the text of the draft directive referred to in this paragraph.
17. General Eisenhower.
18. The directive, as amended, became Appendix B to C. C. S. 387/3, post, p. 795.