Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

United States—United Kingdom Agreed Minutes

December 4, 1943, 5 p.m.

secret

President Roosevelt welcomed the opportunity of discussion with the Turkish President. It was important that as many Nations as possible should join the United Nations, now numbering about 35, and Turkey’s accession to the United Nations would be welcomed. They were concerned not only with winning the war but also with the period after the war, and for both, unity of Nations was necessary to achieve the purpose of them all. At Tehran important decisions had been reached.

(1) As regards the war itself. Agreement had been come to for operations in 1944 for Russian, British and American Forces in such a way that an Anglo-American Second Front would be opened on a very large scale. This would be timed with an increase of Russian pressure, so that attacks would be developed against Germany from all sides.

(2) As regards post-war problems. It must be seen to that Germany and Japan did not start another war in 20 years’ time.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that he had assured the Turkish President and Government that the British Government would not invoke the alliance³ or ask them to join the war unless and until such action could be taken without unfair risk for Turkey, for whom he had great regard. He now thought the moment had come when Turkey should very seriously consider associating herself with the great Allies. The dangers which had been present at the time of the Adana Conference⁴ had now very largely passed away. The advantages to Turkey from joining in the war would be permanent and lasting, more particularly from the point of view of Turkish relations with Russia. These were causing Turkey anxiety, but if Turkey accepted the invitation being put to her, Turco-Russian relations would be put on the best possible footing. Turkey would sit on the Bench with Russia, America and the United Kingdom and the other United Nations. Turkey’s great friend and Ally felt it would be a pity if she now missed her chance. In a few months, perhaps six, German resistance might be broken, and Turkey, if she did not accept the invitation now, might then find herself alone, not on the Bench, but wandering about in Court. It would be dangerous if Turkey now missed the chance of joining the English speaking peoples numbering, excluding coloured races, some two hundred million souls. There were risks either way. But if Turkey associated herself with the United Nations she would also be associated with Russia, one of the strongest military Powers in the world, if not the strongest, at any rate in Europe and Asia. President Roosevelt and he had been authorized by Marshal Stalin to assure President Inonu that, if Turkey entered the war against Germany or if Germany attacked Turkey, and Bulgaria took action, Russia would at once declare war on Bulgaria.⁵

President Roosevelt remarked that Marshal Stalin had been very clear about that. The moment Bulgaria acted, Russia would declare war.

Mr. Churchill also asked President Inonu to note that at Tehran the Soviet Union had signed, with Great Britain and the United States, a new undertaking to respect Persia.⁶

Mr. Churchill said that these were important declarations. If in the circumstances Turkey should feel inclined, at the request of her ally, Great Britain, who was now invoking the Alliance, and of the two greatest Powers in the world, America and the Soviet Union, to throw in her lot with them in the near future, we could then go ahead and consider how best to help Turkey with her preparations, more particularly against the possibility of German and Bulgarian aerial attack. The publicity side was also most important, as the greatest possible time should be gained for preparation before everything became known. Finally it would be necessary to discuss the nature of the campaign to be waged by Turkey, i. e., whether it should take an offensive or defensive form.

Mr. Churchill said that the entry of Turkey into the Grand Alliance of 35 nations would bring about great international changes. Roumania was now begging for peace. Hungary wished to get out of the war. Bulgaria was greatly divided. Mr. Churchill’s own opinion (and he had been associated with European politics for about 35 years) was that the entry of Turkey into the war, arranged in the right way and at the right time, would bring about a series of landslides in these countries. It would be most fruitful and welcome.

After a brief interval President Inonu said that he attached the greatest importance to this meeting. When he learnt that President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill wished to study and discuss the situation with him in full sympathy and friendship, the possibility of the discussion was envisaged by his country and by the Turkish Assembly with the greatest confidence. He expressed thanks for the invitation and for the offer of study.

The Turkish President said that since the beginning his country had taken a clear decision—to stand beside those who were fighting the cause of the United Nations. She had been one of the first so to state her position clearly. The war had shown great fluctuations and difficulties, but throughout Turkey had remained firmly anchored to her Alliance with Great Britain, and to the ideas which she postulated for the future of humanity. In this decision Turkey had not been moved by any egotistical or personal interest.

In connection with the object in view, it was equitable to think of the method which those who had provoked this war had used to convince their peoples—vengeance, etc. Turkey had been one of the greatest victims of the last war. From the first moment, however, she had decided firmly and seriously to collaborate with those who were fighting for the fraternity of peoples, and she had remained faithful throughout the years. These had not been without risks for Turkey. She had been alone and isolated. Great Britain had gone through a hard time and had fought gallantly. In her own way Turkey had done her best and she had sacrificed none of her principles.

President Inonu said that he did not want to go over all the ground, but President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill would remember that the Turkish attitude had been appreciated, and the Turks were very pleased at the repeated assurances of this appreciation. At the moment when Germany was about to declare war on Greece,⁷ she gave as one of the reasons for doing so that the Greeks had sent an officer to Ankara for consultation. (Mr. Churchill pointed out that it had only been a pretext.) President Inonu said that this was typical, and no doubt had Germany thought it worth while to make Turkey pay for her policy, she would have done so.

Now, however, President Inonu continued, the situation had totally changed. Mr. Churchill had outlined the advantages which would accrue to Turkey if she joined in the war. President Inonu must, however, first point out that so long as Turkey was not in the war she was not in danger. He could not accept the thesis that there would be danger for Turkey in staying out. Turkey’s attitude was not a matter for discussion. Turkey knew her engagement and she had replied to the invitation. She wished to collaborate with her Allies. She remained faithful to the principles which she had embraced from the first moment.

The points which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had disclosed were of great importance. The Soviet engagement about Persia and collaboration in connection with Bulgaria were of appreciable value. The Turkish reply of November 17th⁸ had re-affirmed Turkey’s desire to collaborate. Naturally Turkey had to state conditions, political and otherwise. But practical considerations, i. e., military needs etc., came before all others. Turkey was alone. If Germany declared war on her, the situation would be dangerous. Turkey was not prepared. From the beginning of the war there had been talk of preparation, and help had come along, sometimes quickly and sometimes more slowly. To a certain extent this was fair. The Turks had asked for aeroplanes and tanks, but these had often been refused. The President had agreed to these not being supplied when he was assured that they were needed for active operations. In face of this assurance he had had nothing to say. If, however, the reason was not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration or another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely different.

A general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish President meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish cordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and El Alemein [Alamem], i. e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed their assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together Turkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this. The Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually, and although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the Turks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the dangerous moment, he had repeated his advice “be strong in Egypt”. All this background conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready. Supposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy, he alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in.

Mr. Churchill said that he had always realised that Turkey’s preoccupation was Russia. But Turkey’s only sure course was with the Allies. As he had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen moment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world.

President Roosevelt said there was no implication of a threat. The advantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles away, but would always remain Turkey’s friend. The United Kingdom would also be the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and if he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very seriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with Russia—Mr. Churchill interjected “to bind themselves with Russia”.

President Inonu said he dealt with the past in order to arrive at one point. He had wanted to explain Turkey’s entirely loyal attitude. The war might finish with or without Turkey’s collaboration. In neither event would egotistical factors dominate. He had, of course, to pay attention to the interests of his country, but Turkey remained faithful to her original decision of association with the common cause. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had responded to the invitation of a month ago, and the Turkish Government had replied.⁹ Turkey wished to be with the Allies. But there was the practical side, and the practical difficulties must be resolved. Turkey was not prepared. If the Allies were prepared to meet the minimum essential requirements of Turkey, and if after these had been met Turkey could be useful to the Allies, “we will come with you”.

But the Germans would understand. They knew that there was effective collaboration, and that Turkey was doing many things which were incompatible with neutrality. It was for this reason and in order to gain time for preparation that the Germans had been told that the Allies had asked Turkey to come into the war, but that she had refused. It was possible that Germany did not believe this statement. In any case, she would watch every development most carefully. So far Germany had raised no strong objection to Turkey’s actions. There had been no serious protests against her unneutral actions. Turkey was not in the war and perhaps Germany still thought that she would not come into it. But if the day came when Germany was persuaded that Turkey was coming into the war, the Germans would react to the utmost of their ability.

Mr. Churchill agreed, but said that Germany could not do nearly as much as she could have done previously.

President Inonu said that the Turks had considered all these things. It was true that Germany could not execute a campaign from Istanbul to Syria. She could, however, by air action do vast destruction and could seize Istanbul. She had the material readily available to the westward of Turkey, where it had been concentrated for two reasons, as a menace to Turkey and to prevent the Allies getting at her.

President Inonu said, however, that for him there was one practical point, i. e., the capacity to defend herself with the minimum indispensable requirements. It was essential that in the period of preparation the Germans should not be provoked. If the Allies have no confidence in Turkey they would not discuss future developments until the period of preparation was over. If they had confidence they could discuss plans now.

President Roosevelt remarked that this was reasonable.

President Inonu said that so far preparations and supplies had not been encouraging. If a new decision were taken it would depend on the Allies how long it would be before Turkey was ready. He could not say. But essential things must be provided. Turkey had mobilised everything she had, even material dating from the Middle Ages.

President Roosevelt enquired the position as regards anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and was told that so far about 800 of the latter had been provided.

Mr. Churchill said that this was more than the United Kingdom had at the outbreak of war.

President Inonu said that no doubt Turkey’s Allies sometimes asked themselves why they should go on sending supplies to Turkey if she was never going to come into the war. The Turks for their part complained that although they were not given supplies, they were still asked to come into the war. It was a vicious circle. But Turkey could be got in for the last stage of the war if there were collaboration. He would be glad if the war were over in two months without Turkey acquiring any glory. He thought, however, that the war would last another year, and there was therefore plenty of time for Turkey to help.

Mr. Churchill said it was most important that Turkey should decide to enter the war when her influence would be greatest, and so take her place among the victorious nations. It was essential to shorten as much as possible the conflict, which was costing so much in blood and treasure.

President Inonu said he could contemplate two things, (1) a plan of preparation involving supplies to Turkey and (2) a plan of collaboration. It was naturally essential that effective collaboration should be studied by the military experts, and he hoped it would be studied on a big basis. What would suit Turkey best would be that she should fight side by side with British and American contingents in her own part of the world. The President and Mr. Churchill could however say that they had made their plans embracing the whole field of world operations, and that Turkey’s role was so and so. That he would understand. What he would not accept was a background of suspicion of Turkey’s intentions, and a demand to come into the war blindly, with a statement that when Turkey had entered the war she would be told what her part was to be.

President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill vigorously disclaimed any such intention. Discussions could start now on the two stages indicated, and President Roosevelt said that there was no question of Turkey being asked to come in and wait for a month or six weeks without any air protection. They contemplated building up that protection at once. When that had been done by a certain date, Turkey could come in without the risk of having Istanbul bombed to the ground. If President Inonu could accept this in principle, the military authorities could take up the question and get ready.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that this work was already in hand, and he hoped that in a few weeks the preparations would be complete so that the air bases could then be used for attacks on the German held islands. A programme could be arranged.

President Roosevelt suggested that nothing should be done to induce German attacks.

Mr. Churchill said that there was always a danger of this. The Turks had been asked to allow 7000 personnel to be infiltrated, and that involved some risk.¹⁰

President Roosevelt suggested that the personnel might enter Turkey in plain clothes.

Mr. Churchill said that it would be impossible to avoid dangerous moments. It might be that two-thirds of the preparatory work would be completed when the Germans would become convinced that Turkey was irrevocably committed and would act. This danger could not be eliminated. It should, however, be reduced to a minimum by precautions, camouflage etc.

President Inonu said that the period of preparation would be a delicate one in spite of all precautions. These precautions must, however, be taken and preparations made sincerely and seriously. He did not think that four or five or six weeks would be enough for the preparations, but if in that time the anti-aircraft preparations were got ready, that would be something.

Mr. Churchill said that in six or seven weeks the anti-aircraft defences could be in a good state. Moreover, in that time the strategic situation might have changed appreciably. There might, for instance, be a considerable change in the strategic situation as a result of the Russian advance towards Roumania.

Mr. Churchill then said that he contemplated a programme somewhat on the following lines:

(1) A declaration after the present Conference that Turkish policy had not changed.

(2) A period of approximately six weeks during which material, especially for anti-aircraft defence, would be pushed into Turkey.

(3) Immediately thereafter, the placing of British and American combat squadrons on the prepared air fields.

(4) German protests and Turkey’s diplomatic reply, but steady continuation of reinforcement and preparation.

(5) Reactions in the satellite countries—Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. These reactions would be very important, as they would dominate the attitude of Germany. Throughout this period Turkey would continue to send supplies including chrome (but only a little) to Germany. The Germans would be afraid to push things too far. They would be afraid of the Turkish advance towards belligerency having the effect on Bulgaria of making her change sides.

President Roosevelt confirmed that in this phase American heavy bombers, which had already made two raids on Sofia, would be attacking Bulgaria on a scale much greater than they had done hitherto.

Mr. Churchill added that at the right moment in this stage the Bulgarian Government would learn that a Bulgarian declaration of war on Turkey would automatically mean a Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria.

President Roosevelt again stressed the importance of this Russian assurance, and remarked that he had been surprised when Marshal Stalin had volunteered it.

At this stage (7 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

President Roosevelt suggested that President Inönü would no doubt wish to consider what had been said and the conversations would be continued later.

3. For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.
4. A conference between United Kingdom and Turkish leaders, including Churchill and Inönü, held at Adana, Turkey, on January 30, 1943; see Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 704 ff.
5. See ante, p. 537.
6. The document under reference is the Declaration on Iran, ante, p. 646.
7. Germany declared war against Greece on April 6, 1941.
8. See Hull’s telegram of November 22, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 374.
9. The reference is presumably to the Turkish note of November 17, 1943.
10. The request referred to is apparently one which had been made by the Attaches at Ankara of the British Armed Services, in discussions with the Turkish General Staff; see post, p. 718.