Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 4, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

secret

1. Conclusions of C. C. S. 133d Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 133d Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

2. Integrated Command of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area
(C. C. S. 400/1³ and 400/2⁴)

Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time to study the United States Chiefs of Staff paper thoroughly but felt from a brief consideration of it that the points put forth by the British Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum on this subject had not been fully appreciated. He would like to discuss the matter quite frankly. He would like to make three points. Firstly, he fully conceded the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to organize their own air forces as they saw fit. Secondly, in spite of this he would like to go on record as advising most strongly against the arrangements proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff since, in his view, they would not attain the objects desired, were quite unnecessary, and would prove inefficient. Finally, he would like to make it quite clear that, if in spite of his advice, the United States Chiefs of Staff made the reorganization they proposed, he, for his part, would do his utmost to ensure that it worked as smoothly as possible.

From paragraph 2 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper, it was clear that the U. S. had sufficient personnel and equipment for each AAF group station to be organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods. He had not appreciated this point.

The points which the U. S. reorganization was aimed to achieve were better coordination of the air operations based on Italy and the United Kingdom, the ability to take advantage of varying weather in the two theaters, and the ability of one man to decide on the movements of groups of aircraft from one theater to another.

He would like to point out that after two or three years of experience in the operation of bombers, he considered that it was impossible to coordinate bomber operations from two theaters or work rigidly to a given program. The technical difficulties of getting some 2,000 aircraft in the air at a time required days of planning done by a committee which brought together all the best available knowledge. The final decision to launch the operation had to be taken within four or five hours of its taking place. No amount of unity of command or drive could overcome the inherent difficulties in the operation of large bomber forces.

In his view the insertion of an over-all air commander for Europe would merely insert another link in the chain of command.

With regard to the moving of groups, a quick decision was not always the right decision, and the views not only of the bomber commander but also of the theater commanders concerned must be considered. To give the power to move groups to one man who could take his decisions without consultation with others concerned might result in faulty decisions being taken and even in the movements of groups having to be countermanded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The new proposals would, he believed, tend to break up the close integration which had been achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Eighth Bomber Command. The Air Ministry had a large staff fully integrated with all the R. A. F. commands in England, and here the operations of the various U. S. and British commands were coordinated. This was done under his own direction and he exercised his functions under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To insert another commander over the U. S. Air Forces would rupture the present relations between the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry.

The U. S. proposals would also result in the elimination of the present system of dual responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff to the British Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It must be remembered that the United Kingdom was in the front line and the operations of the bomber forces from the U. K. were of vital moment to the life and industry of England. When the use of “Window”⁵ had been advocated, it had had to be debated in consultation with the British Government over a long period. If a supreme commander were appointed, he might take action of this nature on his own initiative since he would have no responsibility to the British Government.

From the Naval point of view the Commander of the Strategic Air Force would be divorced from that close contact now existing between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. If, for example, the German Fleet put to sea, the quickest possible action was required and aircraft of many different forces had to be brought to bear. For quick action in a case like this, coordination by the Chief of the Air Staff was, in his view, essential.

The question of additional staffs must also be considered. If the supreme commander for Overlord had only one air commander under him to deal with, then he, the supreme commander, did not require an air staff. If, however, there were two air commanders under him, the supreme commander must be provided with such a staff in order to integrate the two air commands. The Commander of the Strategic Air Force would also require a large staff which would be duplicating the staff already in existence in the Air Ministry. He (Sir Charles Portal) could not undertake any commitment to provide additional staffs.

With regard to the power of the Strategic Air Commander to move forces from one theater to another, he considered that no theater commander would advocate a system where he might, without consultation, be bereft of a large part of his air forces. His own proposal to deal with this matter was, briefly, that his (the Chief of the Air Staff’s) own operation headquarters should be used by the 15th Air Force as it was used at present by the 8th Air Force, under himself, acting for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would then indicate or recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the targets for the 8th and 15th Air Forces and would move these forces as might be necessary after consultation with the theater commanders concerned.

He did not claim that he could vote against the U. S. proposal, but he did feel that he must most strongly advise against it. He would, however, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on adhering to their proposal against his advice, move heaven and earth to make the new organization work.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Charles Portal said that he would certainly allow General Eisenhower to use the 15th Air Force in his theater as might be necessary since he conceded the principle that a theater commander had a right in an emergency to use such forces as were in his theater provided that he informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his action.

With regard to coordination between the Royal Air Force and the U. S. Strategic Air Forces, he felt that only one man must have authority over both or the interest of one must be subordinated to those of the other. For his part, he could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the R. A. F. to those of the 8th Air Force.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, he said the present position with regard to operations of the 8th Air Force was as satisfactory as was possible without the full resources envisaged in the bomber plan. General Eaker had only some 75 percent of his full resources and was, as he had pointed out in his paper, therefore achieving only some 54 percent of the results expected. The program was, in fact, some three months behind. He realized the reasons which had caused this and would like to say that he felt that the 8th Air Force had done everything that was possible in the circumstances. General Eaker had done his utmost to keep the plan to schedule. In spite of his smaller resources, he had penetrated deep into Germany and had accepted the consequent losses. Air operations in Europe and in the Pacific could not be compared. In no other part of the world were our bomber forces up against some 1,600 German fighters over their own country.

General Arnold said that the proposals he had put forward were designed in part to overcome the lack of flexibility in the operations of the U. S. bomber forces in Europe. They had not changed their technique. He had sent a series of inspectors to the United Kingdom to try to probe into the reasons for this. In other theaters 60 or 70 percent of available aircraft were used in operations. In the U. K. only some 50 percent were used. Even on this basis some 1,900 sorties had been launched during the month of September. There were approximately 1,300 bombers supplied to the U. K. This gave 800 with the units and a 50 percent reserve. In addition, two crews were provided. In spite of this, only once in the last month had 600 aircraft taken part in operations on one day.

He could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available should not be regularly employed. The failure to destroy targets was due directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers. A sufficient weight of bombs was not being dropped on the targets to destroy them, nor was the proper priority of targets being followed.

With regard to the transfer of groups in the U. K., aircraft were flying on an average some five sorties per month whereas in North Africa six sorties per month were being achieved. The question of flexibility between the two theaters was, therefore, of the utmost importance. Transfers of groups must be made as proved necessary and a decision to make the transfer must be taken in 24 to 48 hours. The appointment of a Strategic Air Commander would not break up the close integration between the 8th Air Force and the Royal Air Force. Interchange of ideas must and would continue. The commander to be appointed would be responsible mainly for operations. Administration and supply would be handled by the theater commanders. Training, technique, and operational efficiency must all be improved. Only a new commander divorced from day-to-day routine could achieve this.

At present, the necessary drive and ideas were coming from Washington. He believed that more aircraft were being sent to the U. K. than were being effectively used and that unless better results could be achieved no more planes should be sent.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out the difficulties inherent in the operation of huge numbers of aircraft. The joint U. S. and British staffs had yet to learn fully their lessons on this point. If a commander were appointed who insisted on keeping the bomber force rigidly to the program, it would undoubtedly be found that, in fact, less sorties would be flown, and he, for one, could never permit his own fighters to escort bombers on a mission which he did not believe to be sound. It was not always right nor was it possible to keep rigidly to a plan laid down in advance.

General Marshall said that it had always proved the case that a combat commander was loath to release any forces in his possession lest they should not return to him. As far as the air forces were concerned, there was required a commander for the strategic air both in Italy and in Europe who, by reason of his position, was not affected by this very human weakness. He realized that the U. K. was in the front line and that this entailed certain complications. He believed that the technique of precision daylight bombing was not being completely carried out in Europe. The U. S. daylight bombers were being operated from bases all over the world and in some of these places were achieving twice the results obtained in the U. K. Flexibility of thought and imagination were required. A huge force could not be allowed to collect in the U. K. unless it was employed to the maximum possible extent. Whether the 8th and 15th Air Forces were integrated or not, he still believed that a commander in England was required who could give full consideration to the many problems involved and impart the necessary drive. He suggested that action be deferred in order to afford additional time to consider the views put forward by Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C. C. S. 400/1 and 400/2.

3. Mediterranean Command Arrangements
(C. C. S. 387/1)⁶

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to defer consideration on [of?] C. C. S. 387/1 pending receipt of a memorandum on the same subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

4. Over-All. Plan for the Defeat of Japan
(C. C. S. 417)⁷

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that C. C. S. 417 would serve as a basis for further work but that it required recasting in certain respects. Paragraph 2 c would, for instance, require revision in the light of the statements made by Marshal Stalin at Eureka.⁸ He (General Brooke) was in agreement with the general concept set out in paragraph 4 that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. He was frankly disturbed with regard to present ideas on operations in Southeast Asia. The Supreme Allied Commander⁹ had recently put forward his views which he had stressed while present at Sextant,¹⁰ that once the operations in North Burma were undertaken, either they would have to be continued to complete the capture of the whole of Burma or, alternatively, our forces would have to withdraw when the monsoon stopped. The Supreme Allied Commander had also put forward his requirements in order to continue the campaign at the end of the monsoon. He feared that Burma might become a huge vacuum and if this were the case, it would not fit in with the strategic concept set out in the plan under consideration, i. e., that the main effort should be made in the Pacific.

Admiral Leahy said that he had always regarded operations in Burma as a diversionary effort.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not agree to an initial campaign in Burma without considering the implications of a large further effort or a retirement. It was now considered that the major effort must be made in the Pacific and large operations to recapture North Burma would not be in accordance with this concept.

Admiral Leahy said that as he understood the position, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet considered the provision of the additional requirements necessary to continue the campaign.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the paper should be returned to the Combined Staff Planners for further study in the light of a further assumption with regard to the necessity of continuing the reconquest of Burma if once the campaign were launched.

Admiral King agreed with this suggestion.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that it would obviously help the Combined Staff Planners in their further study if it could be agreed to accept paragraph 4 of the report. There were many logistic implications which would have to be taken into consideration.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that paragraph 6 b, of Annex III, was politically unacceptable since British heavy bombers must, to a large extent, be employed to fight the enemy rather than being used as transport aircraft.

General Arnold said that he quite appreciated this point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the following additional subparagraph 2 d should be inserted in the enclosure to C. C. S. 417:

“The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried out following on the Tarzan operation.”

b. That the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to reexamine and amend C. C. S. 417 in the light of the above, before resubmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. Operation “Rankin”
(C. C. S. 320/4)¹¹

Admiral Leahy said that he understood that the proposal in C. C. S. 320/4 had been mentioned by the President to the Prime Minister.¹² He considered that it would have to be examined by the political agencies concerned in both countries.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the proposals would entail a crossing of the lines of communication. This did not appear acceptable from the military point of view.

General Marshall said the logistic implications had been briefly examined and found to be difficult but possible. They were most serious when the forces were most deeply committed, i. e., in Rankin Case “A” and least serious in Rankin Case “C.” It had been felt necessary to put forward this paper since at present Cossac was planning on a different basis and an early decision was required in order to be prepared when the need arose.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that paragraph 3 should be amended to read, “That COSSAC be at once directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.”¹³ This amendment was accepted.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to accept C. C. S. 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised)).

6. Review of Conditions in Europe

Sir Alan Brooke said that Sir John Dill had suggested, and he himself fully agreed, that since some six weeks were required to prepare for Operation Rankin, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should either fix a date for planning for this operation or review at monthly intervals the state of Europe in order that they could decide the date on which the operation might have to be mounted. Plans were kept up to date by COSSAC but six weeks were required to take up the necessary shipping.

After a brief discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed to instruct the Combined Intelligence Committee to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to Rankin and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. Occupation of Europe

The Combined Chiefs of Staff briefly discussed the occupation and administration of Europe after the defeat of Germany.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that each occupying power would be responsible for an area and that broad directives would be given by a centralized body. Occupation forces should be kept to a minimum and the maximum use made of the threat of air power and action by armored and mobile forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that the administration must, wherever possible, be undertaken by the Germans with the necessary degree of military control by ourselves. A European Advisory Commission had already been set up in London.

General Marshall said that there might be difficulties due to the different methods adopted, for example, by ourselves and the Russians in administering adjacent territories.

8. Results of the Plenary Session Held at 1100, 3 [4] December 1943¹⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the conclusions of the plenary session held that morning.

General Ismay presented a brief note¹⁵ setting out the general sense of the meeting on the main points considered.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of Buccaneer to Operations Overlord and Anvil and the naval, shipping, and landing craft requirements for these operations.

Admiral King pointed out that since Operations Overlord and Buccaneer had been planned for some time, the requirements for these were presumably available. The deficiency would lie in the resources necessary for Operation Anvil. If necessary, he would do his utmost to provide the resources required for this operation, particularly in aircraft carriers.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, should draw up a paper setting out a draft of matters of high policy regarding the European Theater and the Southeast Asia Command; these papers to be exchanged this evening and considered at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff tomorrow at 1100.¹⁶

2. The record of the 133d meeting, as amended, is printed ante, pp. 668 ff.
3. Ante, p. 432.
4. Post, p. 787.
5. Radar countermeasure, designed to confuse enemy radar readings.
6. C. C. S. 387/1 and 387/2 circulated drafts of a directive to the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, North Africa (Eisenhower). For C. C. S. 387, see ante, p. 150. The approved directive (C. C. S. 387/3) is printed post, p. 794.
7. For the text of this paper as amended, see post, p. 765.
8. See ante, p. 480. The proposal to revise paragraph 2 c was not put into effect.
9. Admiral Mountbatten.
10. See ante, pp. 312, 339, 347.
11. Not printed herein, hut see C. C. S. 320/4 (Revised), post, p. 786.
12. See ante, p. 674.
13. In the original phrasing, the words “to revise” appeared in place of “to examine and report on the implications of revising”.
14. See ante, p. 675.
15. Not printed herein.
16. See post, p. 700.