Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.

secret

1. Approval of Decisions of C. C. S. 131st and 132d Meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 131st meeting and the conclusions of the 132d meeting, subject to the insertion of the words “via the Supreme Commander, S. E. A. C.” after the word “Generalissimo” in the conclusion of Item 1 of C. C. S. 131st meeting. The detailed reports of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.²

2. Implications of Military Conclusions of the “Eureka” Conference
(C. C. S. Memorandum for Information No. 165)³

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the military conclusions reached at the Eureka Conference as set out in the enclosure to C. C. S. Memorandum for Information Number 165, and consider the implications of these decisions and the action necessary. The military conclusions were then examined in turn.

(1) Partisans

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a directive should be issued to General Eisenhower on the lines of this conclusion. There were certain points which should be covered. He understood that General Eisenhower had set up, or was setting up, a commander with a joint staff to deal with the whole question of supplies to Yugoslavia on a regular basis. There was also the question of the supply of equipment. He understood from General Eisenhower that captured Italian equipment was running short. It might be better to give this equipment to the Partisans who already had weapons and ammunition of Italian make and would use the equipment to good advantage, and to arm Italian troops where necessary with Allied weapons.

Admiral King suggested that these points might form a part of the general directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean area.⁴

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should, as soon as possible, produce a short directive to the Supreme Commander dealing with the question of supplies to the Partisans.⁵

(2) Turkey

Sir Alan Brooke said that all the necessary preparations were going forward in anticipation of Turkey entering the war.

Admiral King said he felt that there were implications in this decision which should be considered. For instance, how many squadrons of aircraft and how may anti-aircraft regiments would be required to support Turkey?

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the details of the commitments were set out in C. C. S. 418.⁶

Admiral King said that he considered that paper, at least in part, out of date. For instance, a target date of 15 July was regarded as a possibility for Overlord.

(C. C. S. 418, “Entry of Turkey into the War” was later considered in closed session.)

(3) Russian Declaration of War on Bulgaria

It was generally agreed that there were no particular implications to this conclusion.

(4) Overlord and Operations Against the South of France

Sir Alan Brooke felt the first step in considering the implications of this conclusion should be that the whole landing craft situation must be examined in order to discover from where the necessary landing craft for the South of France assault could be obtained. He suggested that the Combined Staff Planners should examine this at once on the basis that the Overlord operation took place during May and that a two-divisional assault took place against the South of France.

Admiral King pointed out that the decision at Eureka⁷ was only that the operation against the South of France should be undertaken in as great a strength as the availability of landing craft permitted and that there was no decision as to the strength of the assaulting force.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he regarded a two-divisional assault as the minimum which could be accepted. The attack must be planned with sufficient strength to make it successful.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the Combined Staff Planners must be given an agreed basis on which to consider the landing craft situation. The British Chiefs of Staff felt and hoped that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed with them, that an assault with less than two divisions would be asking for failure. He reminded the Committee that the plan which had been considered at Eureka⁸ envisaged something in the neighborhood of a two-divisional assault with an advance up the Rhone by some ten divisions. If undertaken with less strength, the operation could only be in the nature of a diversion. It appeared that in order to carry out a successful operation in the South of France, other operations would have to suffer. Unless the Planners were given an indication from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the strength of the assault, they would probably do no more than report that this operation was impossible of successful accomplishment.

Admiral Leahy felt that the Planners should be told that this operation should be carried out without interference with Operation Overlord.

Admiral King said that the problem might be approached in two ways: The Planners could be directed to study and report on the lift possible with the landing craft available; the other method was to begin with an arbitrary number of divisions and determine whether resources could be made available for a lift of this size.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that in considering the availability of resources, all other operations must be taken into consideration except Overlord. He considered that if no strength was set, the Planners could not examine the availability of resources properly. He suggested that they be told, firstly, to report on the required strength for the assault and, secondly, to put forward proposals from where the landing craft resources to lift this assault force could be made available.

Admiral King said that he believed there was no record in the Eureka discussions with regard to a two-division assault. As far as his recollection went, the paper, which had been hastily prepared, showed that without interfering with other operations, there was an amphibious lift for some 37,000 personnel.⁹

General Marshall pointed out that the conclusion at Eureka implied a definite limitation of resources. What was required was a report on the landing craft necessary for a successful operation against the South of France without affecting Operation Overlord. This operation could not be planned on a lavish scale.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that one hypothesis might be that the necessary resources could be found by giving up the Andaman operations.

It was agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be directed in collaboration, as necessary, with the Combined Administrative Committee, to examine the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of Overlord.

This report to include a statement showing where the necessary resources particularly in assault shipping and landing craft might be found.

(5) Coordination with the Russian Staff

It was generally agreed that coordination of effort with the Russian Staff should be achieved through the U. S. and British Missions in Moscow.

It was suggested that it might be desirable that experts should be sent to Moscow from Washington and London in order to deal with the problem of deception.

3. Draft Agenda for the Remainder of “Sextant” Conference

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the future subjects for discussion might be grouped in blocks under main headings. He presented for consideration, a draft agenda¹⁰ set out on this principle.

Admiral Leahy then explained that he believed the United States Chiefs of Staff would have to leave Cairo on the morning of Monday, 6 December, or possibly on the morning of Sunday, 5 December.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that it would be a calamity if the Combined Chiefs of Staff broke up without fully agreeing on all the many points still to be resolved.

Admiral Leahy said he saw no hope of postponing their departure after these dates.

General Marshall then suggested an agenda¹¹ designed to deal only with the essential points before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That all but the most essential items should be excluded from the Sextant Agenda.

b. That the following should be the order of priority in which they should be dealt with:

(1) Entry of Turkey into the war.

(2) Integration of the U. S. Air Command—directive to Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

(3) Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan.

(4) Rankin—discussion only.

(5) Operations against the South of France.

(6) Relation of resources to requirements.

(7) Final Report.

(At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.)

4. Entry of Turkey Into the War
(C. C. S. 418)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Approved C. C. S. 418 as amended during the course of the discussion. (Subsequently published as C. C. S. 418/1.¹²)

5. Progress Reports

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that all progress reports submitted for the Sextant Conference should be taken as having been noted by them. This is not to be taken as meaning that any recommendations that there may be in different progress reports have been accepted. Should such acceptance be needed, the recommendations in question must be put forward separately.

6. Combined Bomber Offensive

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed:

a. That the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive¹³ should remain unchanged.

b. That General Eaker should not be urged to catch up the three months of arrears.¹⁴

c. That General Eaker should be told to expand his operations to the extent possible with the aircraft and crews available.

2. See ante, pp. 358, 563.
3. This memorandum reproduced the “Military Conclusions of the Tehran Conference”, ante, p. 652.
4. i. e., to the officer to be appointed to the position, about to be created, of Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; see ante, p. 150, and post, pp. 704, 761, 794.
5. See post, pp. 704, 795.
6. Not printed herein. As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this paper became 418/1, which is printed post, p. 782.
7. See ante, p. 652.
8. See ante, pp. 556, footnote 3, and 559.
9. See ante, p. 557.
10. Not printed herein.
11. Not found.
12. Post, p. 782.
13. See Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1955; 7 vols.), vol. ii, chapter 11.
14. See ibid., p. 376.