L/T Files

The Military Agreement

[Editorial Note.—The only reference in the minutes to the drawing up or consideration of this document appears ante, pp. 578, 581. According to Churchill, p. 404, it was initialed on the evening of December 1, 1943. The initialed original was received by the Department of [Page 652] State from the White House February 4, 1946 (Leahy’s letter of that date; 740.0011 EW 1939/2–446). The text was released to the press by the Department March 24, 1947 (press release 240 of 1947). For references by Roosevelt in June and July 1944 to his understanding of the military plans agreed upon at Tehran, see Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 66, 721, 723.]
secret

Military Conclusions of the Teheran Conference

The Conference:—

(1)
Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:
(2)
Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
(3)
Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria.1 The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
(4)
Took note that Operation Overlord would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:2
(5)
Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.
F. D R.
И. C3
W S C
  1. See ante, pp. 537, 545, 588.
  2. See ante, pp. 565, 577, 579.
  3. I. S.