Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Tehran Legation Records

The Third Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Jernegan) to Brigadier General Hurley’s Aide (Henry)

[Tehran,] December 3, 1943.

Major Henry: So far as my knowledge runs, the following are the main facts in connection with the “Declaration by Three Nations Regarding Iran”:

A) Prime Minister Ali Soheily spoke to Mr. Eden and Minister Dreyfus, separately, on the morning of November 29 and requested that the conference issue a joint communiqué regarding Iran, to cover three main points:

1) Allied recognition that Iran had given every possible help in the prosecution of the war.

2) Confirmation of the pledges given in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance of January 29, 1942 regarding the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.¹

3) Assurance that the economic needs of Iran would be considered when the peace treaty should be negotiated.

According to Soheily, Mr. Eden had indicated his agreement in principle but had asked that he approach the American Minister and the Soviet representatives to determine their attitude.

B) Minister Dreyfus informed General Hurley, who immediately saw the President about it. The President approved the idea and asked General Hurley to see Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov and try to get their agreement.

C) I showed General Hurley a rough draft of a declaration which I had worked up in anticipation that the question might be broached at the conference, and he suggested certain changes. I then prepared a shorter draft, which was submitted to General Hurley and which eventually became the basis for the final declaration.²

D) General Hurley saw Mr. Eden on November 30, and they agreed that a declaration would be desirable, but that the Iranians should be told they must endeavor to get Soviet consent. The same evening, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Saed, told Minister Dreyfus that Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov had agreed in principle. (This, however, does not check with Molotov’s own non-committal remarks to General Hurley the next day.)

E) On December 1, General Hurley saw the President and told him that British agreement had been obtained but that the Soviets were doubtful. He asked the President to speak to Marshal Stalin. The President did so and told General Hurley afterwards that he had made a strong personal request and that Stalin had consented.

F) On the afternoon of December 1, the short draft which General Hurley had approved was shown to Ambassador Harriman, who made some slight changes and then got the O. K. of Mr. Hopkins. Copies of the corrected draft were sent to Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov immediately. Just before dinner, the draft was considered by the conference and was accepted with two or three additional minor changes in wording. It was signed by Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, in that order, at the end of the final session that night.³

G) Minister Dreyfus had informed Saed that the matter was being considered, and had given him a copy of our original draft. As soon as the final session of the conference ended, the Minister and General Hurley went to the Foreign Office and showed the Foreign Minister the text which had been signed. After consulting with the Prime Minister by telephone, Saed said the text was acceptable and initialed a copy.⁴ He agreed not to release it until the general release on the conference should be made.

So far as I know, neither the British nor the Russians took any initiative in the matter at any time, although the British were obviously favorably disposed from the beginning. I am quite sure that neither of them prepared a draft. There is no doubt that it was only General Hurley’s interest in the matter, and especially his intervention with the President and the latter’s intervention with Stalin, which prevented the proposal from being blocked or ignored by the chiefs of government and their immediate entourages.

Of course, we could not put much of the foregoing into the press release.⁵ One point which might be stressed is that the Iranian Government was kept informed and that the declaration had its full approval. I am not sure that it would be a good idea to say that the Iranian Government made the original suggestion. That might be checked first with the British and Russians and then with the Foreign Minister. If they think it advisable, I see no objection.

I think the Minister should see the press release before it is put into final form.

John D. Jernegan

1. Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, March 21, 1942, p. 249.
2. This is the draft printed ante, pp. 624–625.
3. Apparently Roosevelt signed before Stalin but left a space for Stalin’s signature; see post, p. 886.
4. A facsimile of the copy bearing Sa’ed’s initials was received by the Department of State from Hurley with a letter of June 4, 1954 (023.1/6–454).
5. No press release or draft press release regarding the development of the Declaration on Iran has been found in official files. The Hurley Papers, however, contain copies of (1) a document which was apparently used by the Legation in informing the press regarding various details of the Tehran Conference and (2) the script of a “Radio America” broadcast of December 6, 1943, at Tehran on the subject.