Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

secret

[Tehran,] 30 November 1943.

Memorandum for the President:

From: The United States Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Allocation of Italian Ships to the U. S. S. R.

The question of the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R., as requested at the Moscow Conference,¹ may be brought up during the Eureka proceedings.

The original Russian request was for 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 displacement tons of merchant shipping. This request is the subject of the exchange of a number of dispatches between our delegation in Moscow and the President.² During these exchanges the allocation, or possible allocation, of one-third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the U. S. S. R. was concurred in by the United States. However, it is understood that the U. S. S. R. would not be prepared at this time to man and employ one-third of the Italian Fleet.

If the allocation of Italian ships to the U. S. S. R. is brought up at this time, the action agreed upon should be solely with regard to its influence on the prosecution of the war. The following factors are to be considered:

a. The turning over of Italian ships to the Russians at this time would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war in Italy and in such other places as Italian forces are now cooperating. It seems quite possible that the Italian crews, before surrendering the ships to the Russians would scuttle. Italy has been accepted as a co-belligerent. The surrender of Italian ships would provide valuable propaganda for use by the enemy with the Italians in Germany, occupied Italy, even elsewhere.

b. Italian ships would not come provided with spare parts and ammunition. Further, they would probably require some modernization, especially as regards antiaircraft armament, which the U. S. S. R. has no means of effecting.

It is recommended that it continue to be agreed in principle that one-third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated for the use of the U. S. S. R. It is further recommended that any question of the allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy.

William D. Leahy

³
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

1. See Hull’s telegram 1704 of October 23, 1943, 2 p.m., ante, p. 112.
2. See ante, pp. 120, 126–129.
3. The source text is unsigned, the name being typewritten below the signature space. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of November 30, 1943, from Royal to Leahy, stating that this paper had been “prepared at the instance of Mr. Hopkins, to be available if needed”, and had been cleared by Marshall, King, and Arnold.