Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

023.1/10–2954, 1–28/55

Report From the Office of Strategic Services²

secret

Bari, Italy, 29 October, 1943.

Subject: Preliminary Report on a visit to The National Army of Liberation, Yugoslavia.

To: Major Louis Huot, OSS Advance Base, Bari

1. The following conclusions were formed as a result of personal observation in the field with the National Army of Liberation during the period from 17 September to 27 October 1943.

2. The Partisan movement is of far greater military and political importance than is commonly realized in the outside world.

3. The Partisans have created solely by their own efforts in the face of the Germans, Italians, Ustasha, and Chetniks a free community of no mean size entirely encircled by enemy forces. Within this area, Mohammedans, Christians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Communist Party members, any person of any religion or political belief can express an opinion concerning the way in which he believes the affairs of the community should be conducted.

4. The above situation is probably unique in all Occupied Europe. The Partisans are in contact with liberation groups in all the adjoining countries. A considerable number of Italian troops are fighting with them as organized units. It seems quite certain that the manner in which the movement develops, the way of life which they decide to adopt, will have a great effect upon all the Balkan states and probably upon the greater portion of Europe.

5. The initial resistance against the occupying Axis forces and their native Quislings after the defeat of the regular Yugoslav Army stemmed from the indomitable will of various isolated groups to remain free. Peculiarly favorable geographic conditions aided these bands to persist in the face of utterly overwhelming odds.

6. The Communist Party, especially after the German attack on the Soviet, actively recruited resistance groups,-but their principal initial function in the Partisan movement was to supply the underground organization whereby the isolated groups could communicate with each other and weld themselves into a common body.

7. The Communist Party failed in its initial attempt to organize the movement strictly along Party lines and sensibly decided to concentrate every available force of any character against the common enemy. Thus, the Communist Party is in theory only one element within the Partisan movement, but it is a very active one, and there is every evidence that strongly indoctrinated Party members are working hard to shape the structure of this newly born state according to their social, political, and economic beliefs.

8. The average Partisan soldier and civilian was undoubtedly pleased to meet the members of the Allied Mission. As an American, the observer was at times embarrassed by the enthusiastic reception which he received and the implicit faith of the people that the United States would come to their aid. This was especially true in the case of those who had relatives or friends in America, and there was never a village, a unit, or group of any kind visited that there were not people in this category. This is a factually true statement concerning which the observer paid particular attention.

9. In view of the facts stated above, it seems quite evident that, if an atmosphere of free and enlightened discussion can be maintained, there is a wonderful opportunity for the Partisans to select for themselves those portions of all forms of government and way[s] of life which they believe would be suitable to their temperament and environment. In such a case, it seems quite probable that a state will emerge which will be a meeting ground between political beliefs which are now widely separated in their extreme phases. The Partisans are very favorably placed in this regard due to the fact that they can directly incorporate into their way of life those portions of these divergent beliefs which they think would be good for them without going through the slow and cumbersome processes of any existing legislative system. It was in such an environment and under similar conditions that the beginnings of the United States were established.

10. There can be no question of a doubt that the Partisan forces dedicated themselves to the fight against the Axis from the beginning; that they have always fought them; that they are fighting them at this time, and will fight them to the end. The story of this struggle is at times almost beyond the imagination. It is so immense that only a suggestion of it can be given in this short report. The observer must content himself with the statement that if ever a movement had the background of indomitable will and courage with which to build to great things, it is to be found in Yugoslavia. It may not take place, but, nevertheless, all of the necessary elements are there, and it will be to the eternal discredit of the leaders of the Partisan movement if they do not build wisely and unselfishly upon the solid foundation of this tremendous human effort. We have sent representatives to the Partisans and have been supplying them with weapons and materials. If the Partisan movement should fail, and if such failure could be directly attributed to our improper appraisal of the situation or lack of effective material support, then we, also, must accept our portion of the responsibility.

11. Whereas the Partisans have fought steadfastly against the Axis occupying forces, other Yugoslav groups have not done so. The Ustasha are the Himmerlite [Himmlerite?] terrorists of the Croatian puppet state and the evidences of their ferocious treatment of Partisan communities can be seen on all sides. The Domabrands are the conscripted soldiers of the puppet state. They have never fought effectively and never attempted to do so. The Chetniks under Col. Mihailovitch and other officers of the Yugoslav Army fought for a time against the occupying Axis troops in conjunction with the Partisans. But Mihailovitch made the fatal mistake of allowing his political beliefs and his plans for the future to overcome his better judgment. He feared Communism more than he feared the common enemy. He and his leaders were more concerned with their plans for themselves after the war than with the actual ending of the war by defeating the Axis. Acting upon these misconceptions, Mihailovitch ordered his Chetniks to attack the Partisan forces, and thus commenced the bitter civil war which has become so savage that it is difficult to see how a reasonable understanding can be brought about.

Not all the Chetnik leaders obeyed the order to attack the Partisans and some of them came over to the Partisans. Since then more have come and are coming over every day. The above is the story they tell. Unquestionably it will not be the story of Mihailovitch, but that the Chetniks are now fighting the Partisans is a fact to which the observer can personally testify. Furthermore, the Allied Mission has numerous captured Chetnik documents including routine correspondence, orders, pay books, pay rolls, etc. which afford ample concrete evidence that the Chetnik forces have been fighting with the Germans and Italians against the Partisans.

12. The presence of this civil war in Yugoslavia is unfortunate. As in any civil war, it is extremely difficult for a foreign observer to understand the no quarter ferocity with which it is being fought. But these facts stand out from a military standpoint:

a. Repeating, the Partisans have always fought the Germans and are doing so now.

b. They are a more potent striking force at this time than they have ever been before. They are better trained and equipped, and there is every evidence that, provided they can obtain the necessary arms and supplies, their army will constantly increase in size and efficiency. Their present strength is given by them as 180,000 men which are included in 18 divisions, garrison troops, and detachments guarding the lines of communication.

c. These forces control one large mountainous area extending from the Montenegro-Serbian border northwest through Herzegovina to Western Bosnia. Other mountainous portions of Croatia, Slovenia, Slavonia, and the Pola Peninsula are also in their hands.

d. All of the Adriatic Coast, with the exception of the principal seaports, such as Zara, Sibenik, Split, Makarska, Dubrovnik, and Kotor, is controlled by the Partisans, as well as the coastal islands, with the possible exception of Peljesac where fighting is now taking place.

e. The Germans and their Ustasha Quislings hold all of the principal cities but outside of few miles radius of these points their control of the country ceases. The observer does not have accurate information at his disposal concerning the strength of the German, Ustasha and Chetnik forces, but he does know from personal experience that it is in no way sufficient to prevent the Partisans from travelling almost at will throughout the length and breadth of the country, from Albania to Austria, from the Dalmatian Coast to Belgrade. The observer states without hesitancy that, provided the Partisans are efficiently and immediately supplied with food, clothing, medical equipment and supplies, transport, weapons, and other materials which are needed to properly equip their present forces and the recruits which are available, Allied personnel can in comparative safety be conducted to any point from the Adriatic Coast to the Danube Basin. A communication system to the outside world can be established, airfields constructed, supply dumps established, and any other projects of military importance accomplished. But in all this it must be remembered that this report could not be written and these plans could not be envisaged if it had not been that a comparative handful of men, betrayed and harassed by a portion of their own countrymen, had the courage and faith to stand up to what was at that time the most powerful military power the world had ever seen. These few people have made such things possible. Now they compose the backbone of the National Army of Liberation and they are justifiably proud of the fight they have made. It is time they received full credit, and we must work directly through them and with them in this strategically important gateway to the Danube Basin and the Northern Balkans.

13. Their favourable geographical position, knowledge of mountain warfare, and great courage enabled the Partisans to defeat a sustained well planned German offensive against them in Montenegro during the first six months of 1943 in which several divisions of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustasha troops encircled 8,000 fighting troops of the Partisan Army. Led by Tito himself, this force fought its way out to the north through successive enemy positions, passing within a few miles of Sarajevo. By their tenacity, their resourcefulness, and their ability to withstand extreme hardships, these people discouraged the German High Command. The Partisans broke through and established themselves in the easily defended Yrbas Valley by taking the towns of Mrkonic Grad, Jajce, Donji Vakuf, and Bugojno. We, of course, can feel a certain satisfaction in the thought that perhaps these events were influenced by the offensives which the Allies were conducting against the Germans on several fronts but, nevertheless, a lesser people than the Partisans could not have withstood the hardships and apparently hopeless positions in which they often found themselves.

One extremely important point is that the Partisans had fought themselves clear and had established themselves in the Vrbas Valley before the capitulation of Italy.

Following the Italian surrender, the Partisan First Division occupied the Adriatic seaport of Split, capturing a large amount of Italian equipment and recruiting 9,000 men, a considerable contingent of Italian troops joining them as well. At that time they asked for Allied air support against the garrison towns of Sinj, Knin, Imotski, Zara, and Gospic, signifying their intention of attacking Sinj, Knin and Gospic, with the idea in mind of severing the coastwise communication system of the Germans, isolating the ports of Zara and Sibenik, thus establishing themselves firmly on the Dalmatian coast with free access to the interior mountainous regions of Herzegovina and Bosnia. They also asked for the delivery of essential war materials to Split, the evacuation of Italian prisoners and seriously wounded Partisans.

The Partisans received no response to these requests except that some 3,000 Italian prisoners were evacuated. The Germans attacked Split from Knin, Sinj, and Imotski in such numbers that the Partisans were forced to fight their way out and retreat into the mountains of Bosnia taking with them as much of the Italian equipment as possible. Merely as a matter of incident, they overran the strongly garrisoned Ustasha towns of Livno and Kupres in order to clear a way for the transport [of] field guns, and tanks which they had been able to bring out of Split. These events took place during the latter part of September and early October. The bulk of the captured equipment arrived at Bugojno during the second week of October. It can never be determined whether the Partisan plans for the occupation of the Dalmatian coast were too ambitious for the resources of the Partisan Army, but two things are important so far as the Allies are concerned, namely (1) the military strategy was sound, and (2) no Allied air assistance was forthcoming.

14. It is hoped that from this brief outline the military position of the Partisan forces can be roughly established. Their potentialities are great, but their position can be improved. The observer believes that two factors are of great importance: (1) immediate delivery of supplies by sea and air, and (2) a limited amount of air support along the Dalmatian Coast in order to protect the supply lines, as well as the German held town of Travnik in Central Bosnia.

Travnik is not a natural German position. This enemy position is only 22 miles airline to southeast of Jajce, the GHQ of the Partisan forces where Tito is in residence. Travnik is well into the mountains and is not an integral portion of any enemy supply line. The observer obtained private information that it is strongly fortified and garrisoned by 2,600 well equipped German troops with tanks. There are Ustasha troops there also. The position was attacked by the Partisans in mid-October, and possibly in the earlier part of the month, but they could not take it.

The importance of Travnik may be summarized as follows:

a. It constitutes a direct threat to the very heart and GHQ of the Partisan positions.

b. At least two of the best Partisan divisions must be held in the mountains to guard against this potential threat. In the Central Bosnian area there cannot be over three Partisan divisions sufficiently well equipped and trained to stand up to the Germans.

c. The observer believes that an attack on the Partisan communications and garrisons on the Dalmatian Coast and islands would be logical German strategy as soon as the snow blocks the mountain passes. If this attack is forthcoming, the Partisans will be faced with the problem of reinforcing the Dalmatian forces, but if they withdraw troops from Bugojno or Donji Vakuf they will expose themselves to the threat from Travnik.

The Partisans have asked for air support for an attack upon Travnik, and the observer believes that this support should be offered to them as soon as it is possible to do so. From a military standpoint it will be nothing more than a bombing and strafing attack in preparation for a ground operation by Partisan troops. The distance from Bari to Travnik is approximately 300 miles. A courier can proceed to the Partisan GHQ, offer the air support and obtain all the necessary information relative to timing, objectives, enemy positions, A/A defenses, air strength, etc. This journey can be made in something in the order of four days.

The observer cannot express too strongly the great moral effect that such air support would have on the situation in Yugoslavia. The Germans, of course, would not be seriously affected except by the manner in which their military position is weakened. The Ustasha, whose morale is deteriorating rapidly, would be thoroughly shaken. This would be particularly advantageous if the Germans have left them as garrison troops following the repulse of the Partisan attack. The Chetniks would also be shaken, as they have been spreading the rumour, and no doubt believe, that no Allied support will be given to the Partisans. The Partisans themselves will be the most affected. Even if the military operation attains no great success, the effect will be tremendous. They have been subjected to enemy air attacks for over two years without once seeing a friendly aircraft. Anyone who has been in an area of complete enemy air control will know what this means. A great many Partisans have completely lost faith in the possibility of any Allied air support and have asked the observer some rather embarrassing questions about the leaflet load of the Halifax and the Liberator.³

For morale effect the flight in and out should be over as many Partisan headquarters as possible with the aircraft flying low in order that the markings can be clearly seen. These are also the safest routes. These Partisan positions are—the islands of Vis, Brae, and Hvar, and the inland towns of Livno, Kupres, Bugojno, Donji Vakuf, Jajce and Mrknoic Grad. Localities to avoid are Metkovic, Makarska, Split, Sibenik, Zara, Mostar, Imotski, Sinj, Knin, Gospic, Bihac and Banjaluka. Attacks may come from enemy airfields at Mostar, Knin, Gospic, Bihac, and Bajaluka, but it is not believed that they will be heavy. The Partisans should be asked for detailed information concerning the number and types of aircraft at these or any other adjacent enemy airfields.

The observer believes this offer of air assistance to be of prime importance. As to the morale effect, the observer can only state what it would have meant to him to have seen one of his aircraft during his short stay in Yugoslavia. What it would mean to men who have stood two years of defenseless attack can only be conjectured.

15. The one most important factor in regard to the military effectiveness of the Partisans is that of supply. The needed materials may be roughly classified as clothing, food, medical supplies, transport, weapons (rifles, light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, mortars, and ammunition), light tanks, mines and explosives, grenades, signal equipment and other miscellaneous articles. Considering the scale and complicated nature of modern warfare, these supplies are simple in character, small in quantity, and not of any great value.

The primary factor in the matter of supply must be speed. Winter is fast approaching, when the roads through the mountains will be blocked by snow just at the time when the materials will be the most acutely needed. The supply line passes within a few miles of enemy held towns which are peculiarly non-resistant at this time. A portion of the route is actually used by both the Partisans and the enemy. The observer feels that the apparent indifference of the enemy to an obvious situation is due to the fact that he has plans for the future when the snows have blocked the high mountains and he will have an overwhelming advantage on the Dalmatian Coast.

The observer has never believed that supplies can be dropped from the air in quantities proportionate to the needs of the Partisan Army. Airborne supplies are, however, of vital importance in connection with isolated areas or where hard pressed troops are in need of immediate supply. It seems probable that instances falling within these categories will increase during the winter months.

From personal experience, the observer believes that the efficient dispatch of supplies by air depends to a great extent upon a completely adequate communication system. Those who are within the country and aware of the situation must be able to transmit to the supply base the lists of materials needed together with the exact location and time when they can be received. It is then the duty of the base organization to see that these conditions are met precisely as laid down. If there is any discrepancy whatsoever, those who are working internally must be immediately advised in order that they can make their plans accordingly.

This, then, is the observer’s conception of the problem of delivery of supplies to the Partisans: (1) bulk supplies landed by sea transport to the Dalmatian coast, and (2) airborne supplies, necessarily in smaller and more exact quantities, to isolated internal areas, or to hard pressed troops. These are actually two separate operations under very divergent conditions and involving correspondingly different transport methods and equipment, personnel and stores. The first involves stores, ships, and personnel for the movement across the Adriatic of large quantities of supplies of general categories. This operation requires a minimum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, but necessitates a maximum of bulk stores in Italy. The second operation is exactly the reverse. It requires a maximum of personnel and communication within Yugoslavia, and a minimum of carefully chosen stores at the operational base. These operations are of equal importance and at the present time the Partisan Army cannot be adequately supplied without the efficient operation of both.

The actual policy of supply to the Partisans has not actually been a matter of debate for some months. When the first airborne supplies were dropped to the Partisans, that policy was established insofar as they were concerned. Our only problem now is whether we supply them adequately, inadequately, or not at all. Thus, by force of circumstance, we are forced to supply them efficiently, rapidly, and in proportion to their needs.

Cold, hungry and inadequately armed men will surely remember from whence aid came when they were fighting for their very existence. The observer feels certain that one modern, efficiently staffed field hospital will be equal to all the most eloquent words which can be written or spoken in a lifetime.

16. A situation such as exists in Yugoslavia is not easy to assess. It is even more difficult to place these assessments on paper in a coherent manner. The following are a few facts which seem to stand out, no matter from what angle the situation is viewed:

a. The Partisan movement is of far greater magnitude and military importance than is commonly known in the world outside.

b. The Partisans are fashioning themselves a way of life which will surely have a great effect upon the Balkans and probably upon all Europe. It can be a meeting place between divergent political beliefs.

c. The Communist Party has played a leading role in the organization of the movement, but has not been able to indoctrinate it along strictly Party lines.

d. The average Partisan is very sympathetic to the USA and the Allied cause. He is steadfast in his belief that we will come to his aid.

e. The Partisans have steadfastly fought the common enemy from the beginning while other factions within Yugoslavia have not.

f. The Partisan forces have control of a militarily strategic area and travel almost at will in a much larger area.

g. Air support should be offered to the Partisans in an effort to eliminate dangerous enemy strongpoints.

h. By dropping supplies from the air to the Partisan forces for some months, we have committed ourselves to the policy of aiding them. We must, therefore, send them the supplies they need, efficiently and promptly, in order that they may continue their fight against the enemy with increasing intensity, and so that they will feel sympathetically inclined toward us.

i. The supply problem consists of two distinct operations: (1) the transport by sea of bulk supplies across the Adriatic from Italy to the Dalmatian Coast, and (2) the delivery of selected supplies by air to isolated positions in the interior.

j. Speed, efficiency, and complete cooperation between all Allied services is essential.

17. The writer served in Yugoslavia in the dual capacity of an American observer and as a member of the staff of the Allied Military Mission headed by Brigadier Maclean. He wishes to thank the other members of the Mission, all British but one, for their comradeship and complete courtesy and consideration. Yugoslavia is obviously a country where it would be most difficult to conduct efficient operations without complete British and American cooperation toward a common end.

18. The issues in Yugoslavia are confusing and the feeling is so intense that it is almost impossible to obtain and get an unbiased opinion. The conclusions set forth in this report are based solely upon the writer’s personal observations and such other information as he believed to be authentic.

There are other reports which must be taken into consideration, notably those from our Mission to the GHQ of Mihailovitch. There are also the reports of other members of the Allied Mission, some of whom have been in Yugoslavia much longer than the writer.

19. Personalities are of no importance in a matter of this kind. Our sole object must be to correctly assess the potentialities of the Partisan movement. The observer sincerely believes that the most serious mistake which could be made would be to underestimate it.

Linn M. Farish

Major, AUS.

2. See ante, p. 529. No record has been found of the return by Stalin of the copy lent him by Roosevelt. Copies of the report had been sent in 1943, by the O. S. S., to Roosevelt, Hull, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The office having custody of the report in 1954, in furnishing the Department of State with a copy to replace the missing copy sent to Hull in 1943, stated: “Subsequent reports prepared by Major Farish indicate that the opinions on the Partisan movement expressed by him in his memorandum of 29 October 1943 were considerably modified later”. (023.1/10–2954)
3. Allied aircraft.