J. C. S. Files
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes
The President said he understood that the British felt our forces in Italy could advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. He believed that as we push north into Italy, the Germans will retire behind the Alps.
Admiral Leahy said as he saw it we could do either of two things: (1) Undertake Overlord, or (2) go after Italy and Rhodes, and then Overlord would revert to the status of an operation of opportunity such as Rankin.
General Marshall said that if our forces advance as far as the Ancona line and the Rhodes operation should be undertaken in February, it would mean postponing Overlord probably until about 15 June, possibly July. He said the British want to do Rhodes earlier unless the Andaman operation is thrown out. The British propose to undertake Rhodes in lieu of the Andaman operation. The means which would be sucked in for the accomplishment of the Rhodes operation would be considerable. He pointed out that the Soviets probably want a more immediate operation than Overlord. He said we could probably increase the pressure in Italy and expedite General Eisenhower’s advance. The British are very anxious to bring Turkey into the war and undertake the Rhodes operation. They state that this will result in opening the Straits. General Somervell believes that even should Turkey enter the war, it might be six to eight months thereafter before the Dardanelles could be opened. This consideration is predicated largely on the fact that in order to undertake operations in the Aegean, a change of base will be required, and it always takes considerable time to shift from one base to another.
The President inquired whether the British had explained the total number of men they have in the Middle East.
General Marshall stated that the Prime Minister realizes and desires to deploy these troops. The main problem as regards collaboration with the Soviets is that they desire pressure exerted within the next two months. If, on the other hand, the Soviets decide that they do not really need immediate assisting operations, it might be possible to complete the operation north of Rome, undertake Rhodes, and delay Overlord until about 15 June. The British Chiefs of Staff are in an embarrassing position with regards to giving up Buccaneer. The Prime Minister claims that if Turkey entered the war and we undertake the Dodecanese operation, Bulgaria and Rumania would immediately fall.
[Page 478]The President inquired, “Suppose we can get the Turks in, what then?”
General Marshall said the requirements will be difficult to provide for Aegean operations. The British idea is to have the Turks hold the Straits.
Admiral King added that the British furthermore consider that Rhodes and certain other islands in the Aegean must be taken. He pointed out that we can not do Rhodes before sometime in February.
General Marshall said he believed that we should buck up General Eisenhower without effecting any undue delay in Overlord.
General Marshall added that the Soviets should know better than anyone else about the situation in Bulgaria, whether or not that country could be expected to fall if Turkey entered the war and the Dardanelles were opened.
Admiral King pointed out that General Wilson had stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff he did not know very much regarding the conditions in Bulgaria.
General Marshall said that the Germans already know considerable about the land and air build-up in the U. K. in preparation for Overlord—also about the concentration of landing craft in the U. K. and they are conscious of the definite gathering of force in the U. K. He added that it looks as though a delay in Overlord would certainly be necessary if we undertake additional commitments in the Mediterranean.
The President said that he understood there were now some 21 German divisions in the Balkans and the Dodecanese. What should we say if the Soviets inform us that they will be in Rumania soon, and inquire what can the United States and Britain do to help them?
General Marshall said that we could certainly do more along the east coast of the Adriatic by opening up small ports and getting supplies in to the Tito forces. He pointed out that communications inland from the coast are very bad. He believed, however, that it would not be difficult to get in munitions, foodstuffs and other supplies for the guerrilla forces. He said that it had been agreed with the British that the Adriatic should be made a separate command under one officer. He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff had also agreed to a unified command in the Mediterranean, subject to the President’s approval. It was believed that we could put ships into the Eastern Adriatic Coast and assist in supporting Tito.
Admiral Leahy said that General Eisenhower feels that if he can get far enough north in Italy he can push into the northeast toward Austria.
General Marshall added that he could also push with a left wing toward Southern France. These two movements, together with the [Page 479] limited operations on the Adriatic Coast, could hold several German divisions.
The President made the suggestion that certain special 2,000–ton merchant ships constructed for the U. S. Army be converted to LSI(L)’s.
General Marshall said delays would be caused largely by vehicular transportation facilities. LST’s would not be the bottleneck in such a movement. On the other hand, LST’s are a bottleneck as regards overseas transportation. One LST is equivalent to about six or seven LCT’s. He believed that the Prime Minister would use every wile to cut out Buccaneer. He pointed out that the United States have constructed suitable landing fields on captured islands in as short a period as twelve days.
The President pointed out that control of the Andaman Islands would make it possible to cut, by air, supply lines from Bangkok. He said we are obligated to the Chinese to carry out the amphibious operation Buccaneer.
Mr. Hopkins observed that the Prime Minister considers that as between Rhodes and Buccaneer, the former is the more important.
Admiral King pointed out that as an alternative to withdrawing means for the carrying out of Buccaneer, withdrawal of certain shipping earmarked for Overlord had been suggested.
The President observed that the Generalissimo had been told that the British would build up their fleet in the Indian Ocean. The question was, of what value would the fleet be there unless some operation were carried out?
Admiral Leahy pointed out that only a small portion of naval strength would be involved in the Burma operation.
Admiral King said that the Prime Minister told the Generalissimo orally what ships would be available to support the Burma Command. The only place for the use of landing craft is the Andaman Islands.
General Marshall said the British had observed that they can not decide about Buccaneer versus Rhodes until after they have talked to the U. S. S. R. They feel they should not be pressed to carry out an operation for political reasons until the military considerations are proven sound. He, General Marshall, considered that Buccaneer is sound. He said he had talked to Admiral King regarding this matter. As regards the feasibility of constructing only one landing strip in the Andamans, General Marshall said he did not believe it.
The President pointed out that the United States would have more experience with opening up and holding occupied territory.
Admiral King said the British idea is that if they take Rhodes, the Turks will take all other islands. The Allies will have to give material, ships, and supplies for opening up the Dardanelles.
[Page 480]The President felt that the British would probably say after Rhodes was taken, “Now we will have to take Greece.” … If we should get the Andaman Islands, where would we go? He felt that small groups of commandos, operating in support of Tito along the Adriatic Coast, had great possibilities. Another suggestion would be for a small force to penetrate northward from Trieste and Fiume. He said he was much more favorably inclined towards operations from the Adriatic rather than from the vicinity of the Dodecanese.
Admiral Leahy observed that in order to put forces into Trieste and Fiume, we should have to push the German Army further north into Italy; otherwise they would be on the left flank of the penetrations from Trieste.
The President agreed that the Germans should be pushed on toward the Alps. He thought it would be a good idea to go around the ends into France and Austria. He pointed out that during the last war the Austrians required Germans to help them. He believed that if we push far enough north into Italy, the Germans will retreat behind the mountains.
In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the Chiefs of Staff were being pressed by the French to go into Southern France, Admiral King replied in the affirmative. He added that if Turkey comes into the war, we certainly will be involved in the Dodecanese.
In reply to a question from the President as to the value of airfields in the vicinity of Smyrna should Turkey come into the war, General Arnold said we could use certain of these fields for heavy bombers and we would be able to help by using other airfields in Turkey for both heavy and medium bombers.
In reply to a question from the President as to whether or not the British had talked about a landing in the vicinity near Salonika, The Chiefs of Staff replied in the negative.
Admiral King observed that neither General Wilson nor General Donovan think the Bulgars will quit.
The President said he did not have the conscience to urge the Turks to go into the war.
In reply to a question from the President, General Arnold stated that the Germans have now about 700 planes in the Balkans; furthermore, the Turks have no really modern planes, all are obsolete.
General Marshall pointed out that the British originally planned to give the Turks 27 fighter squadrons; they finally gave them 17, but more fighter squadrons would have to be given to the Turks.
General Marshall observed that one of the difficulties in the Italian campaign is lack of equipment for troops due to lack of shipping. [Page 481] There are divisions sitting in North Africa now with insufficient equipment due to lack of shipping. These divisions could be used if the equipment were available. He pointed out that the real issue is, what do the Soviets mean by “immediate help”? The U. S. S. R. evidently wants Turkey into the war as a cold-blooded proposition. The Soviets definitely want something, and we should find out what it is.
The President thought that by January we could mount commando group operations in the Adriatic and the Aegean.
General Marshall questioned whether it would be feasible to undertake very many commando raids. He questioned whether these operations would conflict with planned operations in Italy.
The President pointed out that his idea was that a commando raid should be on a small scale, say with about 2,000 men to a group. These small groups would not require landing craft on the same scale as larger operations.
In connection with a remark from the President regarding retention of landing craft for Overlord, Admiral King pointed out another factor which should be given consideration with regard to the number of landing craft planned to return to the United Kingdom for Overlord. He said we won’t get the 67 retained in the Mediterranean into the U. K. due to the fact that they will have been used in action operations and there will certainly be considerable attrition. He added that all landing craft production after March is earmarked for the Pacific. If there is a delay of one month in Overlord, the one month’s increased production can be diverted to Overlord.
The President observed that we must tell the Soviets that we get just so much production per month. All this production is earmarked for definite planned operations. In order to transfer means such as landing craft, it is necessary to take them away from one place in order to add to the means at another. There is no pool available.
General Marshall observed that when General Eisenhower has one command of the entire Mediterranean, better use of landing craft may be effected.
Admiral King observed that destroyers and other craft could be utilized for commando raids.
General Marshall said the Prime Minister believes he could control the Mediterranean if he could get his own man, General Alexander, in as Commander in Chief.
The President observed that we must realize that the British look upon the Mediterranean as an area under British domination.
General Marshall said the British were wedded to committeeism. Unity of command would expedite operations. General Marshall [Page 482] explained to the President the relationship between General Eisenhower’s and General Wilson’s command, and the attitude of General Eisenhower’s subordinate commanders in chief versus the independent commanders with General Wilson and the effects of this at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting last Friday.1 He pointed out that while the United States perhaps does not do committee work as well as the British, nevertheless they (the British) have certainly had a very serious time in the Middle East due to the lack of unity of command.
The President said he was afraid that Marshal Stalin will ask just how many German divisions could be taken off the Soviet Western Front immediately. He said he did not intend to get involved in a discussion as between the relative merits of the Dodecanese and the Andamans.
General Arnold observed that the flow of planes through the Azores has already begun as of yesterday. He said it was planned to pass 147 through in December and as many as 154 in January.
In reply to a question from the President as to how many squadrons of planes were operating in antisubmarine work out of the Azores, Admiral King replied about three squadrons.