Office of the Historian

J. C. S. Files

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff1

secret
C. C. S. 411/2
[Cairo, November 26, 1943.]

Points on Which Generalissimo’s Agreement Should Be Obtained

1.
Since the Combined Chiefs of Staff are unable to find the 535 additional transport aircraft which are required for the Mandalay plan,2 it is agreed that the plan presented by Admiral Mountbatten at the First Plenary Session3 shall be accepted.
2.
The stipulation which the Generalissimo has made that an amphibious operation is to be carried out in March4 is noted, and will be taken into consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when amphibious operations in all parts of the world are reviewed in about a week’s time.5 Meanwhile preparations are being pushed forward in the Southeast Asia Theater for an amphibious operation to meet this date, should approval be subsequently given.
3.
A fleet of adequate strength to cover such an operation and to obtain command of the Bay of Bengal will be assembled by the beginning of March.
4.
The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command,6 will be authorized to divert not more than an average of 1,100 tons per month from tonnage over the “hump” to the requirements of the Burma campaign. Diversions in excess of this figure may be made by him only to meet sudden and critical emergencies of the battle or by permission of the highest authority. The Air Transport Command will use its utmost energy to raise the efficiency of its operation and increase [Page 431] the “hump” tonnage to a full 10,000 tons per month into China by the late winter and a further increase in the spring.
5.
The Supreme Allied Commander is delegating his command over the Chinese-American Task Force starting from Ledo to Lieutenant General Slim commanding the 14th British Army, until the main body reaches Kamaing, when he will place the force under the command of Lieutenant General Stilwell.
6.
It is the intention to resume the offensive in October 1944, when the monsoon stops; it is, however, too far ahead to decide the precise resources which will be available.

  1. In response to a suggestion from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten prepared on November 25, 1943, a list of the points with regard to operations in the Southeast Asia Command on which Chiang’s concurrence should be obtained before his departure from Cairo. The document here printed is Mountbatten’s list as amended by the Combined Chiefs and approved by them on November 26; see ante, p. 358. The paper is undated but was subsequently circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on December 2, 1943. The substance of this paper was apparently discussed with Chiang at the meeting of the Heads of Government on the afternoon of November 26, 1943, at which time Chiang agreed to all points set forth therein; see ante, p. 366. Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 65, states that Chiang reversed himself the following morning (November 27) shortly before leaving Cairo. According to this account Chiang asked Stilwell to remain at Cairo and to insist on the airborne assault on Mandalay and the delivery of 10,000 tons of supplies per month by air to China.

    For an amended version of paragraph 4 of this paper, see C. C. S. 411/5, post, p. 821.

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  2. Regarding the Mandalay plan, see ante, pp. 338, 347.↩
  3. See ante, p. 312.↩
  4. See ante, p. 314; see also p. 347.↩
  5. See post, pp. 675 ff.↩
  6. Admiral Mountbatten.↩