Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers

The President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the President

[Cairo,] 25 November 1943.

Memorandum for: The President

The Effect of North Burma Operations on Cargo Delivery to China

1. The following data pertains to the current discussion between Lord Mountbatten and the Generalissimo, concerning the conflicting requirements between tonnage over the Hump and projected operations in North Burma.¹

2. General Stilwell maintains that the minimum tonnages which must be delivered over the Hump to maintain the Yunnan Force, the 14th Air Force, and the Chinese-American Composite Wing, is as follows:

		Total	For 14th Air Force & China-US Comp Wg	For Yunnan Force
November		9,700	6,500	3,200
December		9,700	6,500	3,200
January	8,0502	7,900	4,700	3,200
February	8,050	7,900	4,700	3,200
March	9,000	9,200	6,000	3,200
April	9,500	9,200	6,000	3,200
May	9,700	9,200	6,000	3,200
June2	10,000

3. Lord Mountbatten considers that these above tonnages should be accepted only as target amounts rather than guaranteed minimums. He must employ portions of the Air Transport planes to support the operation “Tarzan”.

4. The Generalissimo demands that 10,000 tons be delivered over the Hump each month, regardless of the logistics requirements of the Burma Campaign.

5. An optimistic estimate of the Air Transport Command’s ability to transport supplies over the Hump during the period of the North Burma operations, and with no diversion for these operations, is as follows:

November	9,000
December	9,000
January	9,444
February	11,000
March	12,000
April	12,000
May	12,000

Furthermore Lord Mountbatten has indicated a positive requirement for an additional 25 operating C–46 aircraft to make possible the Burma operations’ logistic requirements.

6. There is a project in the China–Burma–India theater to build a 4-inch pipe line from Assam to Kunming. The project has 16 C–47’s and 40 C–46’s allocated to it. In view of changes in the original plans for the pipe line, it may later be found possible to divert the 16 C–47’s to Lord Mountbatten.

7. It is suggested that in your discussions with the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo on this subject, you establish the following;

a. First priority in the use of U. S. Army transports on the India China Wing to be assigned to the delivery of the minimum tonnages recommended by General Stilwell for the 14th Air Force, the Yunnan Forces and the composite Chinese-American Wing (Air).

b. All Air Transport Command capacities or facilities in the China–Burma–India Theater, beyond those required to meet the guaranteed minimum tonnages, are to be available to Lord Mountbatten for the support of the Burma Campaign.

c. No additional transports can be promised for over the Hump activities or the Burma Campaign, beyond the 16 additional referred to in paragraph 6 above.

W. D. Leahy

Admiral, U. S. N.

1. See the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, November 25, 1943, ante, p. 348.
2. The italicized word and figures appear in Roosevelt’s handwriting.
2. The italicized word and figures appear in Roosevelt’s handwriting.