Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the President1
For the President from Secretary Hull
You will recall that just prior to my departure for Moscow you approved a paper entitled “Civil Affairs for France”2 which outlined the basic principles under which the Supreme Allied Commander would operate with regard to civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities. This paper had likewise received the approval of our War Department and subsequently was approved by the British Government. It was submitted to the Moscow Conference and by agreement with the British and Russian Delegations was referred to the European Commission. In view of the urgency of the matter and possible delay in setting up the Commission we suggested informally to the British that the Foreign [Page 393] Office might wish to take immediate steps to clear it in London through the American and Soviet Embassies.
The British Foreign Office has, however, now come back with suggestions for an entirely different approach communicated in a memorandum left with the Department by the British Embassy.3
The British memorandum sets out that the British Government feels “that in view of recent changes at Algiers and in particular of the fact that the French resistance movements, whose role will be of such importance when Allied landings take place, are now strongly represented on the Committee, the collaboration of the French Committee and of the French military authorities may be impossible to obtain unless the matter is cleared on the Governmental level with the French Committee before the Allied military authorities get into touch with the French military authorities in the matter. And French co-operation in the planning, and later in the actual work of civil administration, is essential to its success.”
The memorandum also states that the British Government anticipates that since the Russian Delegates raised the matter at Moscow the Russians will again revert to the question of “the status and role of the French Committee” as soon as discussion is resumed with them. Consequently the British feel, the memorandum continues, that “since this question raises an important aspect of a combined Anglo-American operation, it would be desirable that Anglo-American agreement should be reached before discussions are opened with the Soviet Government” and that for these reasons the British Government sees “no practical alternative to an early discussion of the whole problem with the French Committee, and feels4 that this ought to be done very soon if events are not to overtake action.”
A similar approach has been made by Peake of the Foreign Office to Phillips in London and COSSAC requests an early reply. Phillips telegraphs in part as follows:
“(3) The proposed basic scheme envisages a French director of civil affairs. Manifestly his authority and responsibility would not extend to appropriate parts of the zone of operations until military conditions therein permit. However, under Rankin ‘c’ conditions, which envisage a Nazi collapse and the cessation of organized resistance by the German forces, on or before d day, there would arise an almost immediate need for the establishment of a provisional French administration for virtually all France. It would appear that the only available organization capable of handling such a situation in the large areas outside the corridors through which our forces will pass, is the French National Committee which now has the support of the resistance groups. The foregoing refers only to Rankin ‘c’.
[Page 394](4) In the case of Overlord, this situation would probably not arise until very extensive areas of France have been liberated. Until this situation arises, the French director’s responsibility would be necessarily limited to providing civil administration in areas to the rear of the fighting zone and then only as the military situation permits a progressive transfer of civil responsibility to him.
(5) Therefore, the immediate and pressing problem now before us is related [to planning5] for the cooperation of Rankin ‘c’.”
As you will observe, giving the changes in the French Committee as their reasons, the British have now advanced a basic contention that we should agree to negotiations with the French Committee relative to the basic civil affairs formula on a governmental level rather than the previous arrangement of dealing with French military authorities on a combined military operational level.
I should appreciate receiving your instructions as to the nature of the reply you wish made to this British suggestion as well as to the proposal that the French Committee be permitted to assume control of “virtually all France” under Rankin “c” conditions.
- Sent by the White House Map Room, via military channels.↩
- Not printed herein. Documentation on this subject is scheduled for publication in another volume of Foreign Relations pertaining to 1943.↩
- Not printed herein.↩
- Reads “feel” in the original British memorandum.↩
- These two words in Phillips’ telegram of November 19, 1943, were inadvertently omitted in the extract as sent by Hull to Roosevelt.↩