Office of the Historian

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President1

secret
[Washington,] November 22, 1943.

For the President from Secretary Hull:

Steinhardt reports Turkish Government has now made official reply to Eden’s recent proposals,2 summarized as follows:

1)
Turkey does not share British opinion that war between Turkey and Germany would not result from Turkey’s granting air bases, and Turkey is consequently unwilling to do so.
2)
Turkey believes she should take effective part in war on Allied side.
3)
However, the British have not supplied indispensable minimum arms promised by Churchill at Adana, nor has German strength deteriorated to extent contemplated at Adana before Turkey would be asked to come in.
4)
Consequently, Turkey’s coastal cities, communications, military bases, and industries would be promptly destroyed and Turkey would become liability instead of asset.
5)
Moreover, Eden’s proposals would leave Turkey as isolated belligerent, since they do not provide for collaboration of Turkey in action undertaken by Great Britain as contemplated in Anglo-Turk Alliance.
6)
Thus, demand that Turkey enter war before end of year would entail sacrifices beyond Turkey’s material capacity and inconsonant with Turkish Government’s elementary duty toward the people.

Steinhardt also reports from reliable Turkish sources that:

1)
Von Papen recently informed Turkish Government cession of even one Turkish air base would lead to immediate war declaration by Germany and Bulgaria with disastrous consequences for Turkey.
2)
Bulgaria has decided on active and effective cooperation with Germany in event of Turkish concessions to Allies, agreeing to immediate joint attack to occupy Thrace and Straits within three days, meanwhile destroying Istanbul from air and paralyzing Turkish communications in order to make prompt Allied assistance impossible.

Helsinki reports November 19 that it is clear that the Finnish Government as a result of intense German pressure, and despondency following Moscow Declaration3 has decided to continue in more strict collaboration with Germany.

The Chargé at Lisbon4 has been unable to arrange an interview with the Prime Minister5 before November 22.6 The Chargé has learned that the Portuguese apparently do not wish to be consulted or informed regarding the use of facilities at Horta and Teceria [Terceira?] by United Nations’ forces, since they consider this to be a matter entirely between the British and the Americans.7 The Chargé intends to ask Salazar to confirm this position particularly as it applies to the use of American engineering personnel.

I assume that the British are keeping you informed on developments in Lebanese crisis.8 We have been supporting the British from [Page 376] the beginning. Murphy informs us the question of authorizing Catroux to order recall Helleu approved by Committee by vote of 12 to 3. Three dissenting members were de Gaulle, Pleven and Diethelm.

C[ordell] H[ull]
  1. Presumably sent via military channels.↩
  2. See Kelley’s telegram 1844 of November 10, 1943, ante, p. 174.↩
  3. The communiqué and declarations issued on November 1, 1943, at the Moscow Conference are printed in Decade, pp. 9–14.↩
  4. George F. Kennan.↩
  5. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar.↩
  6. Kennan was to deliver to Salazar Roosevelt’s letter of November 4, 1943, printed in F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928–1945, vol. ii, p. 1466.↩
  7. See ante, p. 260.↩
  8. See ante, p. 84, footnote 2.↩