J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
secret

1. Operations in the Southeast Asia Command

At the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mountbatten gave an account of his meeting with the Generalissimo the day before on the subject of the plan of operations in the Burma campaign.2 At this meeting the Generalissimo insisted that the alternative plan of campaign should be carried out, the plan for which, in fact, the resources were not available and which demanded an additional 535 transport aircraft.

When Admiral Mountbatten expressed his opinion that these aircraft could not be found and insisted that in this event it would be necessary for the Generalissimo to give his enthusiastic and personal support to the less extensive plan being put into effect, the Generalissimo acceded but said that first the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be asked formally to provide the aircraft necessary for the more extensive plan.

The Generalissimo also insisted that an amphibious operation should be carried out at the same time as the land operation in North Burma.

The Prime Minister gave the Generalissimo the details of the British Fleet to be available at which the Generalissimo expressed great pleasure.

Also, the Prime Minister informed him that the amphibious operation would not affect the land battle.

The Generalissimo made the point that it would, in that it would draw off part of the enemy air forces available.

Sir Charles Portal then made it clear that this would act both ways and that for an amphibious operation to be carried out at the same time as a land operation would mean that the whole air force would not be made available for the land operation.

General Arnold said that possibly 25 aircraft could be made available but that the figure of 535 might be impossible to find without taking aircraft away from other operations to which they had already been allotted.

In regard to the amphibious operation, Sir Alan Brooke said that the Generalissimo must be told that he must wait for the answer as it depends upon progress at Sextant. The question of air lift to China was then discussed.

Admiral Mountbatten said that the Generalissimo had been told [Page 348] that the average air lift over the “hump” for a period of six months during the course of the operation would be 8,900 tons per month.

The Generalissimo had demanded that the full 10,000 tons per month should be made available.

Admiral Mountbattan had made it clear that this was only a target figure which, indeed, had not been reached hitherto.

The Generalissimo had then said that he would deal direct with General Somervell in the matter.

General Arnold said that he would like the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide that support should not be given to the Chinese Air Force over and above that which had already been agreed upon.

Admiral Mountbatten asked that it should be accepted as a principle that if there should be an increase in the transport available over the “hump,” the right to use that additional transport should be reserved to the Southeast Asia Command.

General Marshall said this acceptance could not be given without reference to the President.

Admiral Mountbatten said that in view of the important issues involved, it was necessary to get a written agreement from the Generalissimo regarding the Burma campaign to be carried out before the monsoon in 1944. He understood that the Generalissimo would give the campaign his enthusiastic support and had accepted the implication of reduced air lift.

After further discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

a.
Agreed that it would not be possible to find the additional 535 aircraft that would be required for the more ambitious plan of campaign in North Burma to be adopted, and for the increased tonnage over the “hump.”
b.
Took note that Admiral Mountbatten would draw up a paper for submission to the Generalissimo with a view to getting the latter’s written agreement to the Burma operations now contemplated; this paper to be submitted for approval to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible in view of the impending departure of the Generalissimo from Sextant.3
c.
Agreed that it would be very desirable if Admiral Mountbatten would get a clearance to this paper in view of the dealings he had already had with the Generalissimo in the matter.

2. Approval of Decisions of C. C. S. 129th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

[Page 349]

Accepted the conclusions of the 129th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

3. Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that instructions should be issued to the Combined Staff Planners to have the Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan, now under study by them, completed prior to the return of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from Jerusalem. This date should be assumed to be about 1 December.4

4. “Overlord” and the Mediterranean

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Discussed the subject of “Overlord and the Mediterranean” in closed session.

  1. The meeting is also described in Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 63.
  2. The paper is printed post, p. 430.
  3. The plan is printed post, p. 765.