Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

023.1/5–2157

Chinese Summary Record

November 23, 1943, 8 p.m.

Translation

(1) On China’s International Position—President Roosevelt expressed his view that China should take her place as one of the Big Four¹ and participate on an equal footing in the machinery of the Big Four Group and in all its decisions. Generalissimo Chiang responded that China would be glad to take part in all the Big Four machinery and decisions.

(2) On the Status of Japanese Imperial House—President Roosevelt enquired of Generalissimo Chiang’s views as to whether the institution of the Emperor of Japan should be abolished after the war. The Generalissimo said that this would involve the question of the form of government of Japan and should be left for the Japanese people themselves to decide after the war, so as not to precipitate any error which might perpetuate itself in international relations.

(3) On Military Occupation of Japan—President Roosevelt was of the opinion that China should play the leading role in the post-war military occupation of Japan.² Generalissimo Chiang believed, however, that China was not equipped to shoulder this considerable responsibility, that the task should be carried out under the leadership of the United States and that China could participate in the task in a supporting capacity should it prove necessary by that time. The Generalissimo also took the position that the final decision on the matter could await further development of the actual situation.

(4) On Reparation in Kind—Generalissimo Chiang proposed that a part of the reparation Japan was to pay China after the war could be paid in the form of actual properties. Much of Japan’s industrial machinery and equipment, war and merchant ships, rolling stock, etc., could be transferred to China. President Roosevelt expressed his concurrence in the proposal.

(5) On Restoration of Territories—Generalissimo Chiang and President Roosevelt agreed that the four Northeastern provinces of China, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands [Pescadores] which Japan had taken from China by force must be restored to China after the war, it being understood that the Liaotung Peninsula and its two ports Lushun (Port of Arthur) and Dairen, must be included. The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization. President Roosevelt also raised the question of Hongkong. The Generalissimo suggested that the President discuss the matter with the British authorities before further deliberation.

(6) On Matters Concerning Military Cooperation—President Roosevelt proposed that, after the war, China and the United States should effect certain arrangements under which the two countries could come to each other’s assistance in the event of foreign aggression and that the United States should maintain adequate military forces on various bases in the Pacific in order that it could effectively share the responsibility of preventing aggression. Generalissimo Chiang expressed his agreement to both proposals. The Generalissimo expressed his hope that the United States would be in a position to extend necessary aid to China for equipping its land, naval and air forces for the purpose of strengthening its national defense and enabling its performance of international obligations. Generalissimo Chiang also proposed that, to achieve mutual security, the two countries should arrange for army and naval bases of each to be available for use by the other and stated that China would be prepared to place Lushun (Port of Arthur) at the joint disposal of China and the United States. President Roosevelt, on his part, proposed that China and the United States should consult with each other before any decision was to be reached on matters concerning Asia. The Generalissimo indicated agreement.

(7) On Korea, Indo-China and Thailand—President Roosevelt advanced the opinion that China and the United States should reach a mutual understanding on the future status of Korea, Indo-China and other colonial areas as well as Thailand. Concurring, Generalissimo Chiang stressed on the necessity of granting independence to Korea. It was also his view that China and the United States should endeavor together to help Indo-China achieve independence after the war and that independent status should be restored to Thailand. The President expressed his agreement.³

(8) On Economic Aid to China—Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that China’s post-war economic reconstruction would be a tremendously difficult task which would require United States financial aid in the form of loans, etc., and also various types of technical assistance. President Roosevelt indicated that close and practical consideration would be given to the matter.

(9) On Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva—President Roosevelt enquired especially as to the present status of Tannu Tuva and its historical relations with its neighbors. Generalissimo Chiang pointed out that the area had been an integral part of China’s Outer Mongolia until it was forcibly taken and annexed by Russia. He said that the question of Tannu Tuva, together with that of Outer Mongolia, must be settled in time to come through negotiations with Soviet Russia.

(10) On Unified Command—Generalissimo Chiang proposed the formation of a China–U. S. Joint Council of Chiefs-of-Staff or, as an alternative, China’s participation in the existing Britain–U. S. Council of Chiefs-of-Staff.⁴ President Roosevelt agreed to consult the chiefs of staff of the United States in order to reach a decision on the matter.⁵

1. The United States, China, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
2. See post, p. 864.
3. See post, pp. 389, 485, 864, 869; F. D. R., His Personal Letters, 1928–1945, edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950: 2 vols.), vol. ii, p. 1489; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 237–238.
4. See post, p. 388.
5. Roosevelt’s answer was negative; see post, p. 748. For consideration of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see also ante, pp. 305, 320.