Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

November 22, 1943, 3 p.m.

secret

Admiral Leahy suggested, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed, that General Sir Alan Brooke should take the Chair at the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Sextant.

1. Conduct of Conference

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the future work of the Conference, with particular reference to the necessity for considering operations in the Far East as early as possible.

Sir Hastings Ismay said that he understood it was likely that the President and Prime Minister would hold a plenary session with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at 1700 on Tuesday, 23 November, and that it had been suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Wednesday, 24 November.

General Marshall read out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum prepared by General Stilwell giving the Generalissimo’s views of future operations in the Chinese Theater.² He suggested that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should separately study this memorandum on the following morning³ and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff collectively should consider it at 1430 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁴ These proposals were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed that the Generalissimo and his principal advisers should be invited to be present at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 1530 on Tuesday, 23 November.⁵

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Agreed that the procedure to be used at Sextant should follow the lines of that used at the Quadrant Conference, with specific reference to the recording of decisions, the approval of minutes, and the reports to the President and Prime Minister.

2. Proposed “Sextant” Agenda (C. C. S. 404 and 404/1)⁶

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British proposals set out in C. C. S. 404/1 were designed to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study at the earliest possible opportunity operations affecting the Chinese Theater. They could then turn to operations in Europe in order that if possible they should have fully considered these before meeting the U. S. S. R. representatives.

Admiral King said he felt that the British agenda was acceptable as an outline into which the details suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff could be fitted.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the Sextant agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 404/1.

3. “Eureka”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the arrangements for Eureka.

4. Relations Between Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Representatives of the U. S. S. R. and China

General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the question of their relationship both during the Conference and in the future, with the military representatives of the U. S. S. R. and China. This seemed particularly important in view of the recent Four-Power agreements concluded in Moscow.⁷ There had already been an intimation from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he would welcome an invitation for a Chinese military representative to sit with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It might facilitate the development of good faith and mutual understanding with the U. S. S. R. and China if each were invited to have a representative present with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he thought that this should be based on a well thought out scheme, rather than on day-to-day decisions. There might be certain advantages in having the Soviet representatives attend at least some conferences in order that they could appreciate the difficulties of a world-wide war on every front in comparison with their own and China’s highly localized operations.

Admiral King said that the question raised a basic problem in that it might lead to the permanent expansion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into a Four-Power body. It was pointed out that it would be impossible for the Chinese and the Soviet representatives to sit at the same table since they were not engaging the same enemies, nor could the Soviet representatives attend deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the war against Japan.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Chinese and Soviets should, during the present Conference, be invited to be present only when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussing the problems of the particular fronts in which each was interested. With regard to the Soviets, it would of course most certainly be necessary, when a Western Front was opened, that our action should be coordinated with theirs and that the delegates attending meetings for this purpose should be able to speak with full authority.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this would be equally true if Turkey was brought into the war and operations in that area were undertaken.

Sir Hastings Ismay said that at Moscow it had been clear that the Soviet representatives did not realize that the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was in continuous operation. They would, he thought, expect to be invited only to Conferences such as Quadrant or Sextant, but not to attend all the meetings at these Conferences. There had been no signs of their suggesting permanent representation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

There was general agreement that, subject to further consideration, the best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At Eureka, however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet representatives to attend all meetings held.⁸

5. Reaffirmation of Over-All Strategic Concept and Basic Undertakings

Without discussion,

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—

Accepted the over-all strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in C. C. S. 380/2.⁹

2. Post, p. 370.
3. For a summary of the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held November 23, 1943, 11 a.m., see Stilwell’s Command Problems, p. 61.
4. For the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Chinese military officers, November 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m., see post, p. 316.
5. The meeting with Chiang and his principal advisers was held November 23, 1943, 11 a.m., instead of 3:30 p.m. For the minutes of the meeting, see post, p. 311.
6. Post, pp. 368 and 369.
7. For the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed at Moscow October 30, 1943, by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, and issued November 1, 1943, see Decade, p. 11. The records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, 1943, are scheduled to be published in Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i.
8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff held one meeting at the Tehran Conference (Eureka) at which the Soviet military representative (Voroshilov) was not present, namely, the meeting of November 30, 1943, 9:30 a.m., post, p. 555.
9. Ante, p. 157.