Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

Minutes of the Presidents Meeting With the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 19, 1943, 2 P.M., Admiral’s Cabin, U. S. S. “Iowa”¹

Moscow, November 19, 1943, 2 p.m.

secret

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2. Command

With regard to the memoranda dated 17 November 1943 submitted to him by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,² The President said he liked proposal “A” but did not like proposal “B”. On the other hand, he said he may have to compromise. We should, however, definitely go after “A”. He said he would take up the matter with the Prime Minister at the earliest time. He felt we should definitely try to go ahead with plan “A”, although we may have difficulty.

Admiral King observed that in his personal opinion, in that Overlord is only a part of the whole, the position set forth in memorandum “A” is completely logical and should appeal favorably to the British. He said the logic was as much on our side for memorandum “A” as was the logic on the side of the British for a unified command in the Mediterranean.³

Admiral Leahy observed that while memorandum “A” may be completely logical, the Prime Minister may feel that under his form of government he could not accept such a proposal.

Admiral King pointed out that the principle of unified command already existed in General Eisenhower’s theater. He felt that even though the British should point out that they would have difficulty in accepting the proposal in memorandum “A” because of their defense point of view, it should be pointed out to them that the “best defense is a vigorous offense.” Certainly memorandum “A” made for the best offensive command setup.

Admiral Leahy suggested that the Mediterranean unified command decision be postponed until after the over-all command matter is settled.

General Marshall said that he could not entirely agree with Admiral Leahy. He referred to the setup in the Middle East where Mr. Casey of Cairo was supposed to act in the position of an intermediary, between the British and U. S. commanders in that theater, the result of which would leave three commanders trying to get an agreement on a committee basis. He felt that any such arrangement could never prove satisfactory and added that they had failed over a period of a year and a half to come to satisfactory agreements. He believed that a committee setup was not a proper form of military command.

Admiral King commented on the relationship of Mr. Churchill to the British War Cabinet and General Marshall pointed out that at times the British Cabinet has overriden Mr. Churchill’s decisions.

In reply to a question from the President as to what total forces the U. S. and United Kingdom would have at home and abroad by the first of January 1944, the consensus of opinion seemed to be about as follows:

• Total Military Forces
  • U. S.—11,000,000
  • U. K.—4,500,000
• Overseas
  • U. S. Army—2,500,000—2,600,000
  • U. S. Navy—about one million
• United Kingdom
  • Army—About 2,700,000 total fighting men
  • Navy—About one million

The President observed that we are definitely ahead of the British as regards the total number of men we have overseas at the present time and that we will soon have as many men in England for Overlord as the total British forces now in that place.

General Marshall felt we were already ahead of the British in England. There are only five British operational divisions in England. We have now as many men in England as can be deployed as have the British. The British have the problems of breaking down divisions in order to provide service troops and reorganize new troops.

The President said that the Prime Minister told him last June that the British had about one million men in the Middle East at that time, including Syria, Egypt, Persia, and so forth. He added that he would like to have the figures on deployment of total of U. S. forces versus British forces, and General Marshall undertook to obtain those figures for the President.

General Arnold said that with regard to the air, we have passed the British rapidly. By 1 January 1944 we will have over 12,000 operational planes, while the British will only have about 8,000.

The President said he was concerned in the total number of U. S. forces engaged in the war against Germany, and much interested in the total air forces. He said he did not like memorandum “B”.

Admiral King observed that a supplementary memorandum⁴ regarding a particular British officer for command was only proposed in the event that it is indicated that memorandum “B” is the only one that can be accepted.

General Marshall pointed out that this particular British officer mentioned is well known in the United States. He understands us and is presumably a man of stature in Britain. He sticks to the point and does not permit himself to be pushed around.

The President referred to the last paragraph of memorandum “A” wherein it was stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could override the decisions of the proposed Supreme Allied Commander.

General Marshall pointed out that that paragraph had been put in so that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have the option of negative action. The idea was to get away from the “committee” command system. The proposed Supreme Allied Commander would have complete command control and make command decisions. Of course, he would submit his plans to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have never taken away from General Eisenhower his military command prerogatives. They do, however, take “means” away from General Eisenhower or add to his “means.” Our General Eisenhower makes his own plans and carries out his own operations. He decides where and when to bomb certain points.

General Marshall added that there had originally been another sentence included in this paragraph to the effect that either the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff could effect the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander on request. He said that this had been deleted, however, on Admiral Leahy’s suggestion, in that it was pointed out that the relief of the Supreme Allied Commander would be a matter for decision by the Chiefs of State.

In reply to a question from the President as to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding General Alexander as Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, Italy and the Balkans, General Marshall said that if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a United States officer, he felt that General Alexander would be satisfactory for Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, if the Supreme Allied Commander should be a British officer, General Eisenhower should become Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean.

The President said that he understood at Quebec that it was the opinion that General Eisenhower should stay until his mission was completed, that is, until he reached the Ancona line.⁵

General Marshall said he had not known definitely about this until the last afternoon of Quadrant but that he understood that General Eisenhower was to remain until he reached a point north of Rome.

Admiral King recalled that was the agreement at Quadrant but said he believed that the decision had been taken with the understanding that German resistance would be less than had actually been offered.

General Arnold agreed that the decision at Quadrant had been for General Eisenhower to remain in command in Italy until north of Rome and in a defensive position.

General Marshall stated that the name of the particular British officer for Supreme Allied Commander had been suggested in order to throw the British into a position where they could not back out in the acceptance of memorandum “A”. He pointed out that the Prime Minister had said to him (General Marshall) that it would be well for him to be the Overlord commander in that the Prime Minister was in England from where the operation would be launched whereas the President would be in the United States—in other words, General Marshall would act as the President’s direct representative on the spot.

The President asked for an opinion as follows: if we do not get a Supreme Allied Commander as proposed in memorandum “A”, do the Chiefs of Staff believe that the British would accept General Eisenhower as the Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean? The opinion of the Chiefs of Staff to this question was emphatically in the affirmative.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether General Eisenhower in Italy and General Wilson in the Aegean had really ever gotten together, General Marshall said that they had had one meeting, that he knew of, but that they had definitely separate commands.

Admiral King observed that both memoranda “A” and “B” accepted unified command in the Mediterranean.

The President agreed that it would be satisfactory if General Eisenhower became commander in chief of the Mediterranean. However, there might be some danger should General Alexander take over the Mediterranean command and then be dominated by the Prime Minister.

General Marshall said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted the contingency of General Alexander being dominated by the Prime Minister. On the other hand, the desirable condition of one command in the Mediterranean would exist. Naturally, executive direction would come from the British Chiefs of Staff.

Admiral Leahy said that evidently General Marshall thinks we should accept the British proposal for an Allied Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean and Middle East now. He (Admiral Leahy) did not feel that we should accept this until we have fought out the matter of a Supreme Allied Commander.

General Marshall felt that it would be illogical not to accept a Mediterranean commander in chief as proposed by the British immediately. He felt that it would be more logical and show good faith to accept the British proposal forthwith.

Admiral King said he was inclined to agree with General Marshall, and felt that the Mediterranean command should be dealt with on its merits forthwith.

Admiral Leahy, on the other hand, said that to agree to the overall Mediterranean command immediately would certainly not help the situation now in the Dodecanese.

The President felt that the over-all Mediterranean command proposed by the British might have resulted from an idea in the back of their heads to create a situation in which they could push our troops into Turkey and the Balkans.

Admiral King pointed out that the Mediterranean commander in chief would be under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that whoever the Commander in Chief might be he would necessarily have to seek approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any changes in his overall strategic plans.

The President observed that even if General Alexander should become commander in chief and desire to use U. S. troops and landing craft against the Dodecanese, the President could say no.

Admiral King observed that dispositions, allocations, lines of campaign of the commander in chief, Mediterranean, would be subject to decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of State.

General Marshall felt that the British would point out that they had suffered last week as the result of the lack of unified command in the Mediterranean. He said that a commander, in a position such as General Eisenhower, was always conservative regarding the sending of reinforcements to another command that was not his own responsibility. On the other hand, an over-all commander who had responsibility for an enlarged theater would feel differently toward bolstering up any weakened position in the theater for which he was responsible. He cited a recent command situation in Alaska as an example.

General Marshall said if General Eisenhower had had responsibility for the Middle East, the British doubtless feel, and perhaps rightly so, he would have influenced the attitude of Generals Tedder and Spaatz towards additional air support in the Dodecanese and the situation might have been different.

The President asked, why Leros, why Cos? He said the Prime Minister had been upset as regards the United States attitude regarding the Dodecanese. He asked whether we knew of the details of the British operations in the Dodecanese initiated by the Middle East command before those operations began? The general consensus of opinion of the Chiefs of Staff was that the United States had not been informed in advance of the proposed operations in the Dodecanese. However, General Marshall said he believed possibly he had seen a British pink dispatch regarding their movements against these islands. He added that the British always regarded the Dodecanese as of greater importance than have we in the United States.

The President stated that before any change is made in the principle set forth in the command setup proposed in memorandum “A” there should be another meeting between himself and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He added that we could agree to a unified command in the Mediterranean but not at the same time as we took up the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander.

Mr. Hopkins observed that in discussing the matter of the Supreme Allied Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean, we were discussing a matter of principles rather than of personalities.

In reply to a question from the President as to whether it was felt the British would put General Wilson under General Eisenhower before General Eisenhower reached Rome, General Marshall and Admiral King said yes.

3. Spheres of Responsibility in Germany—Europe–Wide “Rankin”

The President observed that in the memorandum he received from Admiral Leahy on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁶ asking for guidance regarding spheres of influence as a result of a European-wide Rankin, the paper makes certain suppositions without actually saying so. He felt that whatever territorial dispositions were made should conform to geographic subdivisions of Germany. He said that the Soviet Government will offer no objection to breaking up Germany after the war, that practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five. He said (1) we might take southern Germany, Baden, Wurtenburg [Württemberg], Bavaria, everything south of the Rhine [Main?]. This area forms a sort of southern state. (2) Take everything north and west of that area, including Hamburg and Hanover, and so forth, up to and including Berlin to form a second state, and the northeastern part, that is Prussia, Pomerania, and south, to form a third state. He believed these general divisions were a logical basis for splitting up Germany. Especially was this so because the first or southern state was largely Roman Catholic; the northwestern portion is Protestant, while it might be said that the religion of the northeastern part is Prussianism. He felt that Marshal Stalin might “okay” such a division. He believed that the Chiefs of Staff would want to make a European Rankin conform to such a division. Actually the British wanted the northwestern part of Germany and would like to see the U. S. take France and Germany south of the Moselle River. He said he did not like that arrangement. We do not want to be concerned with reconstituting France. France is a British “baby.” United States is not popular in France at the present time. The British should have France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg. The occupation of these places should be British. The United States should take northwest Germany. We can get our ships into such ports as Bremen and Hamburg, also Norway and Denmark, and we should go as far as Berlin. The Soviets could then take the territory to the east thereof. The United States should have Berlin. The British plan for the United States to have southern Germany, and he (the President) did not like it.⁷

General Marshall agreed that the matter should be gone into again. He said the proposals in the paper before the President had devolved from a consideration of the United States concentration on the right of the Overlord line from England. The conceptions for occupation were primarily based on military considerations of Overlord. He said he saw a frank approach to the matter in the paper from three points of view: (1) a normal Overlord; (2) a partial Overlord, with some fighting; and (3) Rankin Case “C” (total collapse of Germany before Overlord got underway).

Admiral King observed that if Overlord should be underway when Germany collapsed, we would necessarily have a cross-over of our forces under the President’s plan. Particularly would this be so if we should have reached the line of the Seine.

General Marshall said that when Overlord was launched we must have U. S. forces on the right from a logistics point of view.

Admiral King observed that while the President’s idea regarding areas of occupation did not present insuperable difficulties, nevertheless there was a problem which would have to be worked out.

General Marshall said if a break comes, we could split our forces into two parts.

The President observed that there were no ports south of Hamburg and Bremen until the Dutch ports are reached.

Admiral King felt that the military plans for Overlord were so far developed that it would not be practicable to accept any change in Overlord deployment.

General Marshall said that the whole matter goes back to the question of ports in England. If we stick to Overlord we must have a scheme for disengaging Overlord at any stage of development in order to comply with the political considerations of occupation outlined by the President.

The President said it was his idea we should use as many troops from the United States in the occupation of Germany as possible. These can go around Scotland.

Admiral King felt that we must have a special occupational army, in a particular command, earmarked for occupation of northwest Germany.

General Marshall said that the Overlord conception was that the United States forces would be progressing on the right and those should be the divisions first to come home.

The President said he felt that the divisions now in North Africa, Sicily and Italy should be the divisions first to be sent back to the United States. He said one reason for the political “headache” in France was that De Gaulle hoped to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government. He felt that we should get out of France and Italy as soon as possible, letting the British and the French handle their own problem together. There would definitely be a race for Berlin. We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible.

Admiral Leahy observed it would be easy to go directly into northwest Germany. The problem of occupational troops proceeding to northwest Germany would certainly be less difficult than their fighting their way there across the intervening territory from northwestern France.

General Marshall observed that it was most important to keep commands in homogeneous control.

The President said he envisaged a railroad invasion of Germany with little or no fighting.

General Marshall said he assumed there would be a difficult lack of rolling stock and the land advance would have to be largely made on a motor truck basis.

Mr. Hopkins suggested that we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany.

In reply to a question from the President as to Admiral Leahy’s opinion of the occupational area divisions, from a State Department point of view, Admiral Leahy said that he felt we should definitely get out of France as soon as possible. We should accept any difficulties in order to get out of France at the earliest possible time. If we want to let De Gaulle have France, all well and good. However, whatever troops there are in France at the time of German collapse will certainly have to stay in order to supervise any elections. General De Gaulle wants to start the French Government right now. Possibly there will be civil war in France. The British should clear up such a condition. On the other hand, it would be much easier for the United States to handle conditions in Germany. The Germans are easier to handle than would be the French under the chaotic conditions that could be expected in France.

The President said he personally envisaged an occupational force of about one million United States troops. He expanded on the policy of “quarantine.” He said that the four United Nations by their police power could, if necessary, maintain order in Europe by the “quarantine” method. For instance, we do not want to use our troops in settling local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia. We could use the Army and Navy as an economic blockade and preclude ingress or egress to any area where disorder prevailed.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to how long the President contemplated it would be necessary to maintain one million men in Europe, The President replied for at least one year, maybe two.

Admiral Leahy observed that there will certainly be civil wars in many parts of Europe when the Germans let go. If the French divisions could be properly controlled, they could doubtless put down civil war in France. If De Gaulle could control the troops, he could put down the civil war—but what then? France will require food and munitions. The President said we may definitely have to keep certain divisions in France. He felt that Holland was no problem. The Queen will return there and all will be well. On the other hand, Belgium is a big question—it is a two-language country. Possibly a buffer state between Germany and France will be necessary. This buffer state could run from northern France, say, Calais, Lille, and Ardenne[s], through to Alsace and Lorraine—in other words, from Switzerland to the seacoast. This would be a single buffer state.

Admiral Leahy observed that this was also at one time a German proposal and called the interdicted zone.

The President observed that if we take the Rankin paper proposed by COSSAC,⁸ the British would undercut us in every move we make in the southern occupational area proposed for the United States. He said that it was quite evident that British political considerations were in the back of the proposals in this paper.

General Marshall said that the paper in the President’s hands as regards occupational zones works out logically. There would be less entanglement in forces, supply lines would be shorter and more direct. The paper was worked out on that basis.

Admiral King said that it was evident from any stage of Overlord it is imperative to plan for what operations should be necessary in order to switch to the occupation areas proposed by the President.

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5. Proposed Agenda for President’s Conferences With Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin

With regard to Item 1b of Enclosure “A”, “Chinese attitude towards Russian participation,”⁹ General Marshall questioned whether it would be wise to discuss this matter with the Generalissimo.

The President said the Chinese desire equal rights with Russia in Outer Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek wants Manchuria back. Unquestionably a discussion of this subject will cause trouble. The matter might be worked out, however, on the basis of “free zones”. The Generalissimo desires a trusteeship over Korea, administered by Russia, China and the United States as trustees.

General Marshall said the Soviets want Kuzan [Pusan?] in that it is close to Japan.

Admiral King said the Soviets want a nice big port and communication to Dairen.

Mr. Hopkins observed that the Generalissimo might ask the President for a discussion of all operations contemplated against Japan.

The President replied that he will tell the Generalissimo in general these operations, but did not propose to be specific or mention dates. The President said undoubtedly the Generalissimo will inquire about the matter of tonnage over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how Admiral McKean’s [McCain’s] plan for the bombing of Japan was coming along, Admiral King replied that it was being worked out and they were having rehearsals now from which experience will be gained.

The President said he will not bring up the question of a Supreme Commander in the Pacific.

With regard to item 1b [d] of enclosure “A”, “Importance of Chinese assistance to operations in North Burma” The President said he thought it might be desirable to bring General Somervell into the discussion of this matter.

General Marshall then told about the organization of 3,000 U. S. volunteers, organized as a special brigade for long-range penetration groups to precede the Chinese forces. He said that great efforts had been made to organize this United States unit. They had been provided with special equipment and special planes.

In reply to a question from the President as to what had been heard regarding the training of Chinese troops in Yunnan, General Marshall said that General Stilwell, in a recent dispatch, said that Chinese troops lacked equipment, lacked food, suffered from malnutrition, and that he had only received a very small percentage of the troops that were needed. The Chinese divisions each consist of from four to five thousand troops. They are all new men and underfed, and must first be brought into suitable physical condition before their training can commence. He added that the British were despondent regarding the matter of Yunnan forces.

General Marshall added he thought it would be a serious error to clamp down additional United States troops between the Chinese, British and Indian troops. We are already sending 4,000 additional troops to India in order to build airfields. We also have a battalion in this area constructing a railroad.

In reply to a question from the President as to whatever happened about the Generalissimo’s request for a regiment of marines near Ichang, which would result in making some 200,000 Chinese really fight, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Hopkins stated that they had never heard of such a request.

General Marshall said that any such proposition as putting a large unit of U. S. troops in the vicinity of Ichang would result in increasing the difficulty of the supply problem over the hump.

In reply to a question from the President as to how the tonnage over the hump was getting along, General Arnold said that by means of night flying and thus avoiding Japanese fighter opposition and other improved methods, he hoped to attain a figure of about 10,000 tons this month. He added that we will step up the tonnage as rapidly as possible. He pointed out, however, that we must have American troops in China in connection with this supply route. As far as he knew the pipeline project was up to schedule.

The President said if Germany should be cleaned up, we must study how many bombers could be operated from the vicinity of Vladivostok.

General Arnold said that General Bradley’s plan had proposed the operation of 100 bombers maximum by supply from Alaska.¹⁰

With regard to item 2c (1), subject “Post-war Problems—Chinese participation in the occupation of Japan”—The President said the Chinese will undoubtedly want to take part in the occupation of Japan.

With regard to item 2c (3), “Military and naval bases for mutual assistance”—The President said it was contemplated that the Mandated Islands would be under the composite sovereignty of the United Nations. The Chinese want Formosa and the Bonins. The military bases required in the Mandated Islands would be occupied by the United States. There might be an over-all civilian control of the entire group and civilian control of the smaller islands. Certainly we would not want to occupy the smaller islands in the Mandates.

Mr. Hopkins felt that if it was believed that Formosa would be an important place for a base, the Generalissimo would be glad to give base rights to the United States.

The President agreed but said that these base rights in Formosa should not be given on a permanent basis in that the Generalissimo would not agree to any permanent bases.

With regard to Enclosure “B”, “Proposed agenda for the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister”¹¹—The President said that Mr. Churchill is still interested in working for a European economic federation. He said that we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence. We do not want to be compelled, for instance, to maintain United States troops in Yugoslavia.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to whether there would be any compromise in the Prime Minister’s proposal, he (The President) said that the United States would not act initially but could send air or naval forces.

In regard to U. S. policy on non-participation in operation of eastern Mediterranean-Balkan area, The President said we must be concerned with the Soviet attitude in this matter.

General Marshall said we must see the question of this Balkan matter settled. We do not believe that the Balkans are necessary. To undertake operations in this region would result in prolonging the war and also lengthening the war in the Pacific. We have now over a million tons of supplies in England for Overlord. It would be going into reverse to undertake the Balkans and prolong the war materially. It would certainly reduce United States potentialities by two-thirds. General Marshall pointed out that commitments and preparations for Overlord extend as far west as the Rocky Mountains in the United States. The British might like to “ditch” Overlord at this time in order to undertake operations in a country with practically no communications. If they insist on any such proposal, we could say that if they propose to do that we will pull out and go into the Pacific with all our forces.

The President said that we could tell the British that they have lots of troops in the Middle East, close to the Balkans, why not send them to the Far East? He pointed out that the Soviets are now only 60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they cross the Bug River, which they might do within the next two weeks, they would be on the point of entering Rumania. The Soviets might say, “If someone would now come up from the Adriatic to the Danube, we could readily defeat Germany forthwith.”

General Marshall said we will have to be ready to explain to the Soviets the implications of any such move. If the Soviet forces get to the Bug River, we can then throw in our air to assist them. We could force the issue from England. He felt that we should not bring up the matter of asking the Soviets for their plans until we are committed to our own plans. Then we could give them air support.

In this connection General Marshall inquired of the President what sort of an organization he contemplated for doing business with the U. S. S. R. on a military basis. He felt that we should come to the Soviets on specific problems and should definitely have a Soviet officer know what we are doing.

The President pointed out that we should not forget about the control commission in London.¹² This commission will undoubtedly ask for a military committee as a part of that setup.

Admiral Leahy observed that the control commission in London will mean nothing but trouble for us.

Admiral King pointed out that if Turkey entered the war it would result in drawing away supplies and troops from other operations. He asked whether it would be possible to have another conference like this before meeting with the U. S. S. R.

The President indicated in the affirmative.

General Arnold said the Soviets should give us advance notice of what air facilities would be available for bases and operations against Japan. It was important to get this information as soon as possible.

General Marshall suggested that Burma, Sumatra and Akyab were not on the list for the President to discuss with the Prime Minister. He said that the Prime Minister was in favor of operations against Sumatra, or the Andaman Islands.

Admiral Leahy felt that by now the Prime Minister may be somewhat “fed up” with that idea.

Admiral King pointed out that the British say that without more help from us they can only do the Andaman Islands operation, which is certainly a case of marking time.

The President said he was much annoyed about the Azores matter.

Admiral Leahy felt that it was perfectly proper to be annoyed and that the British could be of more help regarding the Azores if they wanted to.

Admiral King observed that recent naval ships and planes which entered the Azores were well treated by the Portuguese and British.

General Arnold said our first transport plane will arrive in the Azores tomorrow.

Admiral King observed that the airfields in the Azores were much better than had been expected.

General Marshall thought that what we really should have had was a “go-getter” in Lisbon. From the attitude of our representative there he felt it was a wonder we have anything.

With regard to Item 1a of Enclosure “C”, “Proposed agenda for the President’s meeting with Marshal Stalin”¹³ regarding the topic, “Soviet collaboration in Strategic Bombing, including use of Soviet Bases by U. S. Forces”—The President said that the Soviets would like to have our planes but not our personnel.

Admiral Leahy said he believed the Soviets were softening in their point of view regarding this matter.

With regard to the Italian fleet and Italian shipping, Admiral King said he did not believe the Soviets were in a position to demand Italian ships.

The President said it would be better to let the U. S. S. R. have one-third of the ships as a token of good-will. No transfer of title was contemplated. He said we should not be concerned about the Italian attitude in this matter. The idea was to retain the Italian ships in the possession of the Allies and allocate them for best use as necessary. We will certainly prevent any future Italian Navy. After using these ships to our heart’s content we can talk about the matter of eventual title. Then we could give back a few of the ships to the Italians. He felt that it would be all right for the ships given to the U. S. S. R. to be manned by Soviet personnel if a reasonable proposition for the use of them is made by the Soviets.

Admiral Leahy observed that the conference had been of great benefit to the Chiefs of Staff.

The President then reiterated his idea of a U. S. occupational zone for Germany and drew out the proposed line of demarcation on a map. This map had been obtained from Rear Admiral Brown and was handed to General Marshall at the conclusion of the meeting.¹⁴

1. Present were Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, Brown, and Royal.
2. Ante, p. 203.
3. See ante, p. 150.
4. Ante, p. 209.
5. For the decision under reference, see Matloff, pp. 224–228.
6. Not printed herein.
7. For reference to a map on which Roosevelt sketched his idea of these occupation zones, see last paragraph of this document and footnote 14.
8. For a summary, see post, p. 786.
9. Ante, p. 245.
10. The plan under reference, advanced by Major General Follet Bradley in 1942, concerned the flying of planes to Russia via Alaska and the development of Siberian bases. See Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953) in the series United States Army in World War II, pp. 343–346.
11. Ante, p. 246.
12. Presumably the European Advisory Commission, the establishment of which had been agreed upon at the Moscow Conference.
13. Ante, p. 247.
14. The map is printed in Matloff, facing p. 341.