Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

J. C. S. Files

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

secret

[Aboard the U. S. S. “Iowa”,] 17 November 1943.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff present herewith for your consideration drafts of two proposals, Enclosure “A” and Enclosure “B”, relative to the command arrangements for the European Theater.

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Enclosure “A” is the more sound and from a military point of view is the better plan.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

[Enclosure “A”]¹

Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

secret

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

1. Current operations in the war against Germany and those approved for the immediate future are grouped geographically and functionally into three categories:

a. Operations in the Mediterranean area involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

b. Operations in the northwestern part of Europe, also involving combined forces with land, sea, and air components.

c. Operations against interior Germany involving combined strategic air forces based both in the Mediterranean area and in northwestern Europe.

2. Each of these operations is an entity requiring unity of command over the forces which are engaged.

3. These operations are all intimately related to each other, with a common, over-all objective—Defeat of Germany. Events in the Mediterranean area attract enemy forces and affect enemy capabilities, which in turn have an important bearing upon our capabilities in northwestern Europe, and vice versa. Strategic air operations against interior Germany strongly affect our capabilities in both areas. Furthermore, the flexibility of the strategic air forces permits their employment in varying degree to assist the Allied forces in either area.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is clearly indicated. This command should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied force commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. The immediate appointment of this commander is, in our opinion, most urgently necessary. Even if he is appointed now, it is improbable that he will be able to organize his staff and begin to function before the end of January 1944. The situation which may develop in Europe by that time requires a more positive over-all command arrangement than that now functioning under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Any delay in setting up such a command may lead to confusion and indecision at a critical time, thus delaying the attainment of early victory in Europe.

5. In matters pertaining to strategic bombing, it is imperative that unified Allied command be established. The rapidity with which decisions regarding air operations must be made demands command control, as opposed to general directives or occasional direct action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We cannot escape the responsibility for adopting every means known to us to save the lives of our men and the planes they fly. The one effective method is to insure the rapid coordinated employment, on a day to day operational basis, of United States air forces in both the U. K. and Mediterranean by day and R. A. F. bomber units by night in order to obtain the maximum dispersion of enemy air and anti-aircraft defense, and to take the greatest possible advantage of weather conditions in both theaters. This unified command must, therefore, be established without delay and must embrace all the strategic air forces engaged against Germany, including the United States Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the establishment of unified command in the Mediterranean area.² We are in accord with this proposal, with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and commanded as in paragraph 5 above.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to make the following proposals to the British Chiefs of Staff:

a. That a Supreme Commander be designated at once to command all United Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic under direction from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. That an over-all commander for northwestern European operations be appointed, under the Supreme Commander.

c. That a strategic air force commander be appointed, under the Supreme Commander, to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

d. That the Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean shall come under the Supreme Commander.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further propose that the Supreme Commander be directed to carry out the agreed European strategy, and

a. Be charged with the location and timing of operations;

b. Be charged with the allocation of the forces and matériel made available to him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and

c. That his decisions on the above questions be subject to reversal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire your approval of these proposals.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy³

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

[Enclosure “B”]⁴

Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President
secret

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Command of British and U. S. Forces Operating Against Germany.

[Paragraphs 1–3 of this draft are identical with paragraphs 1–3 of enclosure “A”, printed supra.]

4. The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff now consider that the war in Europe has reached a stage where the necessity for command direction over all these forces, in conformity with general directives of the Combined Chiefs, is clearly indicated. This command direction should be vested in a single commander, and he should exercise command over the Allied commanders in the Mediterranean, in northwest Europe, and of the strategic air forces. However, we believe that the appointment of an over-all commander would be unacceptable from the British viewpoint at this time. Therefore, we feel that it would be inadvisable to press for such an appointment now. Rather, we suggest that the designation of a Supreme Commander for operations against Germany should be the ultimate goal toward which we aim and that our efforts at this time should be limited to the establishment of an Allied commander over the Mediterranean, as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, and simultaneously the establishment of an Allied commander over the Strategic Air Forces.

[Paragraph 5 of this draft is identical with paragraph 5 of enclosure “A”, printed supra.]

6. We are in accord with the British proposal for the establishment of a unified command in the Mediterranean area, but only with the proviso that the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force should be specifically excepted and that its command should be in accordance with paragraph 5 above.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to make the following proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. That the British proposal for unified command in the Mediterranean be accepted, with the proviso that the operational command of the U. S. Fifteenth Air Force be excepted from that command and included in the Allied strategic air force.

b. That a strategic air force commander be appointed to exercise command over the U. S. Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and the British Bomber Command.

8. We intend to advocate 7 a and b above as initial steps. For the future, the control of the Supreme Commander should be extended first to include coordination of all operations which are in direct support of Overlord, and second to include command of all operations (except U. S. S. R.) in the battle against Germany.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy⁵

Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

Organization Chart
(Subenclosure to Enclosure “A”)

Organization Chart
(Subenclosure to Enclosure “B”)

1. For subenclosure, entitled “Organization Chart”, see p. 207.
2. See ante, p. 150.
3. As this paper is a draft, the signature is typewritten.
4. For subenclosure, entitled “Organization Chart”, see p. 208.
5. As this paper is a draft, the signature is typewritten.