Hopkins Papers
The President’s Personal Representative ( Harriman ) to the President 1
Dear Mr. President: In order that you may understand the Prime Minister’s reaction to the number one matter you asked me to discuss with him, I think I should explain in more detail his reactions and the circumstances under which I discussed it with him.
Max and I arrived late Wednesday afternoon2 after two nights on the plane with little sleep to find an invitation to dine with the Prime Minister that evening. Max was tired and would have preferred to go to bed. He was not, therefore, in too good a mood. The dinner, which included Mrs. Churchill and Kathleen,3 was argumentative and some of the fundamental disagreements between the two men [Page 14] came out. This type of argument with Max always upsets the Prime Minister.
Max left at midnight. I stayed to give the Prime Minister alone your several messages. The talk, which started with the proposed meeting, developed into a two hour discussion on every subject—from de Gaulle to China to India to Poland, etc., coming back throughout the talk to Russia and the question of the meeting.
I have never had a better opportunity to be direct and frank and, as he has since been more friendly than ever, it is obvious that he accepted the sincerity of my statements even though he did not always agree with them.
He firmly believes a three-cornered meeting is in the interests of the war but he admitted that his viewpoint is colored by considerations of the reaction in Great Britain. My main argument was based on the long view as against the immediate—(1) the value of the intimate understanding that in all probability would result from a tete-à-tete, impossible with three persons, and (2) the great importance of the favorable reaction of the American people to it and to your participation. I explained the difference in the public reaction in the United States to a personal meeting of two as compared with a three cornered meeting on British soil in which it would appear that he, Churchill, had been the broker in the transaction.
There is no doubt in my mind as to his sincere desire and determination to back you up in anything that you finally decide to do and, although I must emphasize his disappointment if he is not present, I am satisfied he would accept it in good part and that it would in the long run improve rather than adversely affect your relations with him.
If a meeting of three were held reasonably soon after your first meeting alone, he recognizes, I believe, the logic of the historic sequence of the two tete-à-tete meetings culminating in the third with three present.
Should Germany not attack this summer, there is much in the Prime Minister’s argument of the need for a closer military understanding between the Chiefs of Staff of the three countries. The question is whether much would come of a large meeting of the Staffs now unless you had first created a foundation of understanding which I am satisfied would come from the type of meeting you have in mind. In fact I am not [at?] all sure that you would not be able personally to accomplish more toward an immediate military understanding in the meeting you propose than would be accomplished by the larger meeting he proposes.
I explained to the Prime Minister the first night that there was no need for hurry in his reply, but he prepared a cable to you the next day,4 [Page 15] discussed it with Eden, and called me over to Number 10 (Annex) at one o’clock the following evening. I think he expected another argument from me and he seemed relieved when my only comment was that I thought his cable, although I did not agree with his reasoning, fairly expressed his views. On my way out I had a few words with Eden and got the impression from Eden that he personally was not unsympathetic to your position and was quite satisfied to let the decision rest with you.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
As you know, I am a confirmed optimist in our relations with Russia because of my conviction that Stalin wants, if obtainable, a firm understanding with you and America more than anything else—after the destruction of Hitler. He sees Russia’s reconstruction and security more soundly based on it than on any alternative. He is a man of simple purposes and, although he may use devious means in attempting to accomplish them, he does not deviate from his long run objectives.
The situation is today in the making and we have much at stake. If you don’t get a follow up on the Davies letter,5 you may want to, consider sending me to Moscow soon (assuming that you think I am the man to go).
I have thought a good deal about it since you talked with me and have some definite views as to how this situation might be handled. If you consider sending me, I would respectfully suggest that you recall me to Washington and give me an opportunity to put my ideas before you. You could then decide whether I should go. Real accomplishment by an Ambassador in Moscow is a gamble with the odds against success but the stakes are great both for the war in Europe and in the Pacific—and after.
I would know within a couple of months in Moscow whether I could be of value and would ask that, if I have not been able to do a job, I could then return or be fired.
I am so keen about the work you have given me in London, which I feel is of increasing value as the time for the offensive approaches, that I would like to go back to it if I cannot do a real job in Moscow. I am sure I can be of more use to you and the war in London than to remain in Moscow as a glorified communications officer.
Respectfully yours,
- The source text is the copy sent by Harriman to Hopkins July 5, 1943. The original has not been found in the Roosevelt Papers.↩
- June 23, 1943. “Max” is Lord Beaverbrook.↩
- Miss Kathleen Harriman.↩
- Presumably Churchill’s telegram 328, June 25, 1943, to Roosevelt, ante, p. 10.↩
- Stalin’s letter of May 26, 1943, to Roosevelt, delivered by Davies; ante, p. 6.↩