Roosevelt Papers: Telegram
The President to the Secretary of State1
operational priority
Secret for the Secretary from the President.
The following is the point of view of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as regards paragraph[s] b and c of Alusna 192114.2
It would not be deemed advisable to push Turkey at this moment into a declaration of war on the side of the Allies since the necessary compensation to the Turks in war material and war supplies including armed forces and ships would divert too much from the Italian front and the proposed Overlord operation. However, inquiries could be started on basis of lease by Turkey as a neutral of airbases and transportation facilities.
Sweden should not be asked at this time to make a large system of air bases available to Allied use since the necessary employment of Allied defending forces and Allied war material together with equipment and maintenance supplies and personnel would cause too great a diversion from Overlord operations. This would not debar later consideration of seeking lesser air bases from Sweden along the line of those recently obtained in the Azores.3
- Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.↩
- Hull’s telegram of October 19. It conveyed the military proposals which had been made by Molotov at the first regular meeting of the Moscow Conference and which are printed post, p. 134.↩
- For the British-Portuguese agreement of August 17, 1943, on the use of facilities in the Azores, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1946 (vol. 146), p. 447.↩