Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

740.0011 Moscow/345

Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹

Moscow, October 25, 1943—5:00 p.m.

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Turkey and the War: Post-war Planning.

Participants:	Mr. V. M. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
	The Secretary.

During the recess this afternoon, Mr. Molotov brought up the question of Turkey’s entering the war and made it very clear that Russia’s proposal is that she, the United States and Great Britain should “suggest” to Turkey that she come into the war and that by this word “suggest” he meant to suggest peremptorily, which meant in effect a command by the three great Powers.

I again made it clear that whatever the merits of the idea may be this was purely a military matter, which, as I had previously stated, came exclusively within the province of the President and the Chiefs of Staff so far as my Government was concerned, and added that no doubt they would be glad to talk this matter out with the Chiefs of Staff and the Heads of the other two Governments. I said that, of course, the British had taken the lead in dealing with the Turkish situation so far as she and the United States are concerned.

Mr. Molotov added that he saw no reason why the Allies and Great Britain should be furnishing arms to Turkey without getting some fighting out of her. I said that again I would have to refer him to Great Britain and to my own Chief of Staff along with the President. I concluded by saying that when this proposal, along with the Swedish proposal, was first made by Mr. Molotov for his Government, I had stated that I had no authority to deal with those war matters, but as a courtesy had promptly sent the proposals to my Government for any comment it might see fit to give to me.²

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .³

Mr. Molotov then asked me what different phases of international cooperation I had in mind. I again repeated to him numerous proposals that I had more than once stated to him since coming here. They included cooperation to preserve peace permanently and to provide for the maximum of economic advantages and benefits to each country for-the equal enjoyment of their respective peoples, to preserve world order under law so as to avoid international anarchy, to provide for relief against starvation in many nations immediately following as well as during the war, to relieve the post-war German situation, to deal with dependent peoples, to deal with stabilization as a basis for suitable international trade and like relations, etc., etc. He agreed and then inquired if isolation did not hurt the United States. I said the truth is it has almost destroyed the United States and Soviet Russia. He said he agreed that isolation would not do.

1. The memorandum is unsigned hut bears the typewritten initials “C[ordell] H[ull]” as those of the drafter.
2. For the Soviet proposal regarding Turkey, Sweden, and other matters, see post, p. 135. For Roosevelt’s letter of October 26, 1943, to Inönü, which dealt with the matter of their getting together but which also mentioned matters of substance to be talked over, see ante, p. 43.
3. For the paragraph omitted here, see ante, p. 40.