740.0011 Moscow/342
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Eden) to the
Secretary of State1
Moscow, 23rd October, 1943.
My Dear Secretary of State: I have the honour
to submit to Your Excellency for consideration by the Conference a
memorandum by the British Delegation on Persia.
2. I understand that this question, which figures as point 10 on the
draft Agenda, may be examined by the Conference at its meeting on
October 24th and I trust that your delegation will be in a position to
give favourable consideration to the proposal set out in the memorandum
when it comes up for consideration.
Yours sincerely
[Enclosure]
Memorandum “by the British
Delegation to the Moscow
Conference
Persia
- 1.
- The general policy towards Persia of the Allied Powers (Great
Britain and the Soviet Union) for the duration of the war at all
events, must stand the test of whether or not it conforms to the
engagements which the Allies have entered into in the Tripartite
Treaty.2
- 2.
- In return for the treaty right to maintain military forces in
Persia, and to use Persia’s communications (subject to certain
conditions of payment) in prosecution of the war against the
Axis, the Allied Powers have guaranteed the territorial
integrity and the independence of Persia, and have undertaken
“to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic
existence of the Persian people against the privations and
difficulties arising as a result of the present war.”
[Page 114]
Moreover, it is
specifically provided in the Treaty that the presence of Allied
military forces in Persia does not constitute a military
occupation and “will disturb as little as possible the
administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic
life of the country, the normal movements of the population and
the application of Iranian laws and regulations.”
- 3.
- The Government of the United States are also maintaining
considerable military forces in Persian territory. While the
Government of the United States are not yet in treaty relations
with Persia, it is believed that they will wish to conduct their
present relations with Persia in accordance with considerations
and obligations similar to those set out in the immediately
preceding paragraph.
- 4.
- For the period of the war, and particularly so long as the
Persian supply route to Russia continues to hold its present
importance, the policy of the Allies towards Persia should be
directed to securing her co-operation in the United Nations war
effort to her fullest capacity. Her military co-operation has
not been invited (even since her declaration of war on
Germany3) except to the extent that the Allies look to
the armed forces of Persia to maintain order and security within
the country, and especially on the supply routes. It is in the
economic and financial field that Persia can make her most
useful contribution.
- 5.
- In the Tripartite Treaty, Persia has undertaken to place her
system of communications at the Allies’ disposal. She has done
so. The Allies’ next requirement has been an uninterrupted
supply of currency to meet local expenditure of the Allied
military forces on the development and maintenance of the supply
routes to Russia. This has been secured, and the currency issue
may be regarded as settled. Of secondary importance is the
utilisation of Persia’s capacity to supply the Allies from her
natural and manufacturing resources with commodities of which
the Allies themselves may be in need, for example, foodstuffs,
minerals and other raw materials, arms, etc.
- 6.
- So long as Persia complies with her own Treaty engagements,
and so long as she grants the Allies their desiderata in the
financial and economic field, there is a moral obligation on the
Allies to do all that they can to ensure that their utilisation
of these facilities causes the least hurt to Persian economy,
and, in addition, to do all in their power, having regard to the
exigencies of their own situation, to safeguard the people of
Persia against the privations and difficulties which the war
must inevitably bring to them.
- 7.
- Benevolent treatment for Persia, to the extent of the Allies’
capacity, in exchange for co-operation from Persia herself, sums
up what should be Allied policy towards her during the war
period.
- 8.
- It is suggested therefore that the Conference might consider
the adoption of a declaration in regard to Persia in the
following terms:—
“The Governments of the U. K., the U. S. A., and the U.
S. S. R., having in mind the adherence of the Government
of Iran to the cause of the United Nations, rely with
confidence upon the desire of the Government and people
of Iran to make their contribution along the most
effective lines in furtherance of the struggle against
the common enemy.
The Governments of the U. K., the U. S. A., and the U. S.
S. R. undertake for [t]heir part to do all within their
power to safeguard the people of Iran from the
privations and difficulties which the present war must
bring to them, in common with all other peoples engaged
in the conflict. They further undertake to collaborate
closely with each other on all issues as they arise, and
to co-operate with the Government of Iran, with a view
to the furtherance of the United Nations’ war effort,
and in the best interests of the people of Iran.”4
- 9.
- It is for consideration also, whether such a declaration, if
adopted, should be made public.
