Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt¹

secret

London, 23 October 1943.

Personal and most secret. Number 471. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. Your number 394.²

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3. Nov 15 would be 90 days from the beginning of Quadrant. In these 90 days events of first magnitude have occur[r]ed. Mussolini has fallen; Italy has surrendered; its fleet has come over; we have successfully invaded Italy, and are marching on Rome with good prospects of success. The Germans are gathering up to 25 or more div[ision]s in Italy and the Po Valley. All these are new facts.

4. Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects. We are to put 15 American and 12 British Divs into Overlord and will have about 6 American and 16 British or British controlled divs on the Italian front. Unless there is a German collapse Hitler, lying in the center of the best communications in the world, can concentrate at least 40 to 50 divs against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to the Sava and the Danube without necessarily weakening his Russian front. The disposition of our forces between the Italian and the Channel theatres has not been settled by strategic needs but by the march of events, by shipping possibilities, and by arbitrary compromises between the British and Americans. The date of Overlord itself was fixed by splitting the difference between the American and British view. It is arguable that neither the forces building up in Italy nor those available for a May Overlord are strong enough for the tasks set them.

5. The British Staffs and my colleagues and I all think this position requires to be reviewed, and that the commanders for both fronts should be named and should be present. In pursuance of Quadrant decisions we have already prepared two of our best divs, the 50th and 51st now in Sicily, for transfer to Overlord. Thus they can play no part in the Italian battle to which they stood near, but will not come into action again for 7 months and then only if certain hypothetical conditions are fulfilled which may very likely not be fulfilled. Early in Nov a decision must be taken about moving landing craft from the Mediterranean to Overlord. This will cripple Mediterranean operations without the said craft influencing events elsewhere for many months. We stand by what was agreed at Quadrant but we do not feel that such agreements should be interpreted rigidly and without review in the swiftly changing situations of war.

6. Personally I feel that if we make serious mistakes in the campaign of 1944, we might give Hitler the chance of a startling comeback. Prisoner German General Von Thoma was overheard saying “Our only hope is that they come where we can use the army upon them”. All this shows the need for the greatest care and foresight in our arrangements, the most accurate timing between the two theatres, and the need to gather the greatest possible forces for both operations, particularly Overlord. I do not doubt our ability in the conditions laid down to get ashore and deploy. I am however deeply concerned with the build up and with the situation which may arise between the 30th and 60th days. I feel sure that the vast movement of American personnel into the United Kingdom and the fighting composition of the units requires to be searchingly examined by the commander who will execute Overlord. I wish to have both the high commands settled in a manner agreeable to our two countries, and then the secondary commands which are of very high importance can be decided. I have the greatest confidence in General Marshall and that if he is in charge of Overlord we British will aid him with every scrap of life and strength we have. My dear friend, this is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted, and I am not satisfied that we have yet taken the measures necessary to give it the best chance of success. I feel very much in the dark at present, and unable to think or act in the forward manner which is needed. For these reasons I desire an early conference.⁴

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1. Apparently sent via military channels.
2. Ante, p. 37.
3. For paragraphs 1 and 2, which discuss the idea of holding a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff beginning November 15, 1943, before the Heads of Government should convene, see ante, p. 38.
4. For paragraphs 7 and 8, on arrangements for the Conferences, see ante, p. 39.