Moscow Embassy Records
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)1
Conversation
| [Participants:] | The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman |
| Mr. Bohlen | |
| The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
After an exchange of congratulations on the Tenth Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R., the Ambassador told Mr. Molotov that he expected to leave Moscow on Friday, November 19, to meet the President who would be in Cairo on November 22.
Mr. Molotov thanked the Ambassador for this information and then observed that the American press was commenting rather openly about the forthcoming meeting and that there seemed to be little secrecy observed.
The Ambassador replied that what appeared in the American press was of course nothing but speculation and that the main thing to keep secret was the time and place of the meeting. He had thought, however, that it would be very difficult to keep down speculation in regard to the forthcoming meeting since the whole world had expected it for so long.
The Ambassador then said that, although he had immediately telegraphed to the President to obtain further information in regard to the size of the American military staff and the military subjects to be discussed, the President unfortunately had left before he could reply. The President was now on shipboard and it was impossible to communicate with him since radio silence was being observed. He added, however, that General Deane and he would be prepared to give Mr. Molotov or the Soviet military representatives any opinions or [Page 94] information they might have as to the probable subjects to be discussed at the meeting. The Ambassador said in regard to the military staff that, while he had no definite information, he believed it would be very restricted.
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He then asked Mr. Molotov if there was anything he could tell him as to the size of the Soviet military staff who would go.
Mr. Molotov replied that that question had not yet been definitely decided but he assumed that the military staff would be rather small. The Ambassador repeated his offer to give Mr. Molotov any information that either he or General Deane had in regard to possible subjects to be discussed at the meeting, adding that he would of course be glad to transmit to the President any observations in regard to the meeting which Marshal Stalin or Mr. Molotov might have.
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The Ambassador then gave a short description of the general character and atmosphere of previous meetings between the President and Mr. Churchill, which he assumed would be the same at the forthcoming meeting in Tehran. He stressed the informality of the President’s talks with Mr. Churchill and his willingness to discuss any subject whatsoever. Therefore it was not expected that any formal agenda would be drawn up.
Mr. Molotov said that when men of the character of the President, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill met it was much better to dispense with formality.
The Ambassador then told Mr. Molotov that he had been somewhat surprised from a message of Mr. Churchill’s2 to learn for the first time that Chinese military representatives were expected to be at the Cairo conference, and that he was certain from the President’s message suggesting that Mr. Molotov come to Cairo,3 that the President likewise had not yet heard that any Chinese would be present.
Mr. Molotov said that the first they had heard of this possibility was also from Mr. Churchill’s message but that anyway he could not have left until the end of November since he had had an increased quantity of work because of the slight illness of Marshal Stalin. He added that Marshal Stalin was practically well again but, in order to run no risks which might impede the forthcoming meeting was still staying in his room.
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The Ambassador then turned to the question of communications between the President and Stalin while the President was in Cairo [Page 95] before the Tehran meeting. He suggested that messages be sent from Cairo through the military channels to General Connolly in Tehran who could then turn them over to the Soviet representatives for transmission to Moscow by direct Soviet wire.
Mr. Molotov replied that he thought in matters of that kind it was better to follow the previous practice and have them sent direct from Cairo to the Embassy here and delivered in the usual fashion, since he regarded it as undesirable to have other persons involved in handling these messages.
The Ambassador pointed out that communications between Cairo and Moscow were very slow and that furthermore messages from Stalin to the President might be difficult through this channel since he understood the Soviet Government had not yet established a mission in Cairo. The Ambassador then suggested that possibly, since the British had quicker communications between Cairo and Moscow than we had, and since any messages from the President would in effect be joint messages from himself and Mr. Churchill dealing with the date of arrival in Tehran, etc., it might be possible to use the British channels. Mr. Molotov agreed.
Mr. Molotov then inquired whether any announcement would be made of the arrival of the President and Mr. Churchill in Cairo, to which the Ambassador emphatically replied that there would not.
The Ambassador asked Mr. Molotov if he knew of the date of arrival of Marshal Stalin and himself in Tehran, whether it would be on the 27th, the first date mentioned by the President.4 Mr. Molotov replied that this question had not yet been decided but it probably would be some time around the 27th or just after.
The Ambassador informed Mr. Molotov that he was notifying no one of his departure and that technically Mr. Hamilton, who would be in charge of the Embassy in his absence, would not be Chargé-de[Chargé d’] Affaires. Mr. Molotov expressed approval of this arrangement since it would lend added security to the whole question of the meeting.
- For the passages which are omitted, see post, p. 201.↩
- Churchill’s message to Stalin, quoted in Churchill’s telegram 500, November 10, 1943, to Roosevelt; ante, p. 78.↩
- Roosevelt’s telegram of November 8, 1943, to Stalin; ante, p. 71.↩
- See Rosevelt’s telegram of November 8, 1943, to Stalin, ante, p. 72.↩