Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President1

secret
urgent

(Personal and secret for the President from Harriman)

Molotov has informed me of U. J.’s cable to you 5 November2 regarding the meeting. Although I am not at all sure that you want any suggestions from me on this subject, I cannot help but offer them as I place such supreme importance on this meeting.

(1)
The following might appeal to you as a possible plan.
(a)
That U. J. be invited to send Molotov and representatives of the Red Army staff to the military conference with you and the Prime Minister and your respective staffs.
(b)
That if the place of this meeting is selected, say, in the Cairo area the question of a meeting between the three of you be held open. If at some time during this meeting the weather appears to be propitious, U. J. could fly down from Moscow and you and the Prime Minister could leave your place for Tehran the same morning. The flying time from Cairo to Tehran is about 6 hours. From Moscow to Tehran about 8 hours. You might plan to remain in Tehran 30 hours, which would give reasonable opportunity for two 3–cornered meetings and for you to see U. J. alone as well.
(2)
I have checked the weather experience in and out of Teheran and find that during November ‘41 and ‘42, regular scheduled flights have been maintained between Cairo and Tehran with only two flights delayed and neither of these more than 24 hours. In our own experience last year with delivery of planes to Russia from Abadan to Tehran, 3 flights weekly were maintained during November last year. Although the weather in December becomes progressively less favorable, January and February are the really bad weather months of the year. It would seem that there was a good chance, at least during the end of November or early December, of making forward predictions of the weather for three days. The risk of delay from weather is greater to U. J.; on the other hand, you would not have to leave until you were sure that he was going to depart and the greater risk of delay on his return journey would be his, not yours.
Generals Deane and Vanderberg [Vandenberg] have made the study of past weather experience on which the above is based.
(3)
I feel satisfied that U. J. would agree to this plan for a meeting. If for any unusual reason, the weather should delay his departure from Moscow beyond your ability to wait, a public statement could subsequently be issued explaining that the weather and not any other reason had prevented your getting together.
  1. Sent by the United States Naval Attach, Moscow, via Navy channels.
  2. Ante, p. 67.