Kuwait and the Gulf States
61. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa met with Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton to discuss MIDEASTFOR.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government. Secret. Drafted by Dickman. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers Hotel.
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Emirates
Summary: The Department declined to offer TOW missiles to Abu Dhabi.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750371–0533. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Richard Aherne (NEA/ARP); cleared by Atherton and in PM/SAS; approved by Sisco. Ambassador Sterner informed the Department of the request in telegram 2007 from Abu Dhabi, October 9. (Ibid., D750350–1159) The Department confirmed the denial in telegram 178831 to Abu Dhabi, July 20, 1976, insisting that the United Arab Emirates faced no threat from any regional armored force. (Ibid., D760278–0206) Sterner appealed this decision in telegram 2135 from Abu Dhabi, August 5, 1976. (Ibid., D760303–0427)
63. Telegram From the Embassy in Qatar to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy transmitted to the Department an analysis of Qatar’s likely positions on multilateral issues, regional issues related to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the limited means at U.S. disposal for putting pressure on the government.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Doha Embassy Files: Lot 79F187, POL, Political Affairs and Relations 1976. Confidential. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait City, Manama, Muscat, and USUN. Drafted by Paganelli on January 11. Telegrams 303856 to all diplomatic posts, December 29, 1975; 21 from Abu Dhabi, January 6; and 14 from Manama, January 7, are ibid., D750449–0471, D760003–0783, and D760005–0547, respectively.
64. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy expressed reservations about recent requests from the Department and the Embassy in Manama asking for a public Saudi declaration of support for MIDEASTFOR’s retention.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5, Bahrain. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Murphy; cleared by Jesse W. Lewis (POL/MIL) and Porter; approved by Horan. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Amman, Cairo, Doha, Khartoum, Kuwait City, Manama, Muscat, Sana’a, Tehran, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and the Secretary of Defense.
65. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency
Summary: The CIA assessed the United Arab Emirates’ regional diplomacy and its relationship with the United States.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79T00866A, Box 25, Folder 8. Confidential.
66. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Emirates to the Department of State
Summary: Simon and other U.S. Treasury officials visited the United Arab Emirates and discussed economic cooperation with Emirates officials.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760096–0770. Confidential. Repeated to Doha, Jidda, Kuwait City, Manama, and Muscat. Telegrams 596 from Abu Dhabi, March 7, and 592 from Abu Dhabi, March 6, are ibid., D760086–0873 and D760086–0579, respectively. Parsky met previously with Emirates officials to discuss the possibility of U.S. assistance for the United Arab Emirates, as reported in telegram 2444 from Abu Dhabi, November 26, 1975. (Ibid., D750412–0250)
67. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Twinam and Bahraini Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa al-Khalifa discussed the Bahraini request for military assistance in exchange for an extension for MIDEASTFOR.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 1, Bahrain (2). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 741 from Manama, June 14, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760229–0013. In telegram 761 from Manama, June 16, Twinam argued that an extension on MIDEASTFOR should be the sine qua non for any negotiation on military supply. (National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR) According to telegram 129738 to Manama, May 26, the Department approved sending a survey team. (Ibid., Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Bahrain) In telegram 904 from Manama, July 10, Twinam reported that the United States would have to make an additional “extensive military assistance commitment” in order to secure an extension longer than one year. (Ibid., Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government)
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy relayed information on the Kuwaiti defense budget and discussed the wisdom of U.S. arms sales policy towards Kuwait, given Kuwait’s wealth and limited absorptive capacity.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760305–1138. Confidential. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Jidda, Manama, Muscat, Tehran, the Secretary of Defense, and USCINCEUR.
69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Qatar
Summary: The Department declined to offer Qatar information it had requested on the F–5 aircraft.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760336–1107. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dickman; cleared in PM/SAS, NEA/RA, DOD/ISA, ACDA/IR/AT, NEA/IRN, and NEA; approved in P by Habib. Telegrams 863 from Doha, August 17, and 8443 from Tehran, August 19, are ibid., D760315–0660, and D760318–0380, respectively. Paganelli reported on the Qatari request for information on the F–5 in telegram 862 from Doha, August 17. (Ibid., D760315–0634) The Department had informed the Embassy earlier that the United States was prepared to sell military equipment to Qatar. See Document 55.
70. Telegram From the Embassy in Qatar to the Department of State
Summary: Ambassador Paganelli responded to the Department’s refusal to offer the F–5 to Qatar.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760348–0747. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait City, London, Muscat, Manama, Sana’a, and Tehran. For telegrams 862 and 863 from Doha, August 17, see footnote 1, Document 69. Telegram 220256 to Doha, August 17, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760336–1107. For the Department’s refusal to fulfill Doha’s request, see Document 69.
71. Memorandum of Conversation
Summary: Assistant Secretary of State Atherton discussed relations and MIDEASTFOR with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5, Bahrain. Confidential. Drafted by Twinam. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers Hotel. Although Shaikh Mohammad and Atherton did not discuss the matter directly, Bahraini Minister of Defense Shaikh Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa had informed Chargé d’Affaires Albert Burleigh on September 18 that Bahrain was no longer interested in helicopters, but wanted the F–5B, E, or F instead. Burleigh proposed predicating MIDEASTFOR’s extension on the sale in telegram 1408 from Manama, September 19. (Ibid., Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 21–5, Arms Procurement and Sales) In telegram 1503 from Manama, October 3, Burleigh pointed out the inconsistency between the information he had received and the conversation between the Foreign Minister and Atherton, highlighting once again the differences and confusion among Bahraini policymakers. (Ibid., DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR)
72. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State
Summary: Clements met with the Bahraini Cabinet to discuss MIDEASTFOR.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760399–0007. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to the Secretary of Defense, CNO, CINCUSNAVEUR, and COMIDEASTFOR; repeated Niact Immediate to Sana’a, which was instructed to pass the telegram to Clements’ party. Clements met separately with Defense Minister Shaikh Hamad, who detailed Bahrain’s extensive list of desired weapons systems, and afterwards assured Clements that the United States should remain “optimistic” about MIDEASTFOR. When Clements left Bahrain, he suggested Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates as alternative bases for MIDEASTFOR, a proposal relayed by the Department to those Embassies for comment in telegram 264352, October 27. (Ibid., D760400–0284) The record of Atherton’s conversation with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa is Document 71.
73. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State
Summary: The Embassy reported that Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa, noting Clements’ recent visit and his own conversation with Atherton in New York, insisted that there was no possibility MIDEASTFOR could remain in Bahrain past June 30, 1977.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760411–1246. Confidential; Exdis. Telegram 271240 to Manama, November 4 is ibid., D760410–1182. Telegram 1800 from Manama, November 7, reported that newly-appointed Ambassador Cluverius met with the Amir, who expressed “regret and embarrassment” at Shaikh Mohammad’s “too frank” conversation. The Amir also stated that “the Navy should stay.” Cluverius expressed some skepticism that the Amir would overrule his Foreign Minister, but also hoped that Bahrain might extend MIDEASTFOR’s rights. (National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR) The records of Clements’ talks with Bahraini officials and of the Foreign Minister’s meeting with Atherton are Documents 72 and 71, respectively.
74. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State
Summary: Porter advised the Department that the Saudi Government would probably not publicly support the retention of MIDEASTFOR unless progress were made with Bahrain.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760445–0089. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Manama. Repeated as telegram Tosec 310379/292927, December 1. (Ibid., D760445–0532). Telegram 1941 from Manama, November 21 is ibid., D760433–0567. In telegram 283435 to Jidda, November 18, the Department said that only Saudi Arabia could convince Bahrain to allow the retention of MIDEASTFOR, and instructed Porter to raise the issue with the Saudi leadership. (Ibid., D760430–0677) Clements’ October 24 meeting in Bahrain is Document 72.
75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait
Summary: The Department informed the Embassy that given Kuwait’s limited ability to absorb advanced military equipment, it disapproved all proposed sales of A–10, F–5, and other aircraft.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760454–1076. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Edward Padelford (NEA/RA); cleared in NEA/ARP, PM/SAS, PM/MC, ACDA, DOD, and DOD/ISA and by Fish; approved by Palmer. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Manama. Telegrams 4851 from Kuwait City, October 15, and 5023 from Kuwait City, October 26, are ibid., D760387–0911, and D760399–0534, respectively. Telegram 3775 from Kuwait City, August 9, is Document 68.
76. Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Bush to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Bush indicated to Scowcroft that the Saudi leadership opposed the retention of MIDEASTFOR.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 79M00467A, Box 24, Folder 458. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Knoche signed for Bush. According to the distribution sheet, the memorandum was hand-carried to Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Atherton.
77. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)
Summary: Clements requested that the NSC consider accepting an arrangement with Bahrain exchanging military supply for a MIDEASTFOR extension and that this option be brought to the attention of the incoming Carter administration.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs Convenience Files, Box 1, Bahrain (5). Secret. This memorandum formed an attachment to a January 7 action memorandum from Oakley to Scowcroft, upon which no action appears to have been taken. (Ibid.)