77. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1
SUBJECT
- Future of the U.S. Middle East Force
Although the USG has made a concerted effort to persuade the Government of Bahrain to extend the present Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) stationing agreement beyond its 30 June 1977 expiration date, we have been unsuccessful so far in budging Bahrain from the deadline it has imposed.
Based upon the report of our Ambassador’s 28 December meeting with Bahrain’s Foreign Minister, the GOB currently displays distressingly little flexibility in its approach to the MIDEASTFOR issue. The Bahrainis have rejected our request to alleviate the time pressures exerted on the new US Administration by the mid-1977 termination.
Though six months remain before the agreement formally lapses, an orderly withdrawal from Bahrain by the end of June requires the commencement of phase-down activities in February. Delay of departure preparations beyond February will place further hardships upon some 600 MIDEASTFOR personnel and dependents who have already borne their share of uncertainty.
Another problem linked to the MIDEASTFOR withdrawal that must be dealt with soon is DOD’s future relationship with the school it now operates on the island which also serves US military dependents from Saudi Arabia and children of US and foreign diplomats and businessmen at Bahrain. Additionally, a way must be devised to satisfy the communications support requirements of the US Military Training Mission at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the Defense Fuel Quality Assurance Office at Bahrain; both organizations now rely on the MIDEASTFOR facility for communications services.
During my visit to Bahrain in late October, the Bahrainis stressed that they sought US cooperation in modernizing and expanding the [Page 295] Bahrain Defense Force. Subsequently, and as a prelude to fashioning a mutually acceptable quid pro quo, we voluntarily conducted in November a comprehensive, on-site survey of Bahrain’s defense requirements. We are now studying the survey team’s findings and preparing our recommendations for further negotiations with Bahrain.
Simultaneously, we are reviewing alternatives to the existing arrangement with Bahrain for MIDEASTFOR operations after mid-1977 and the options appear less attractive than Bahrain. We should persist in our search for a solution that will permit the Force to remain in the region.
Before it becomes necessary to begin withdrawal steps in February, the USG should be in a position to present to Bahrain a proposal that defines specifically 1) the security assistance quid pro quo we are prepared to offer in return for retaining MIDEASTFOR at Bahrain and 2) any modifications of the existing use MIDEASTFOR makes of Bahrain that might accommodate the Foreign Minister’s repeatedly professed desire for a “new formula.” Further, it would be desirable to precede this approach to Bahrain with a request for Saudi Arabia to use its influence on our behalf in resolving the MIDEASTFOR issue with Bahrain.
In sum, the Department of Defense considers the future of MIDEASTFOR to be an urgent and complex matter which we hope you can bring to the priority attention of the next Administration.
Summary: Clements requested that the NSC consider accepting an arrangement with Bahrain exchanging military supply for a MIDEASTFOR extension and that this option be brought to the attention of the incoming Carter administration.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs Convenience Files, Box 1, Bahrain (5). Secret. This memorandum formed an attachment to a January 7 action memorandum from Oakley to Scowcroft, upon which no action appears to have been taken. (Ibid.)
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