Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Qatar¹

Washington, May 30, 1975, 2352Z.

126783. Subject: An Arms Supply Relationship With Qatar. Ref: Doha 0503 (Notal); Doha 0546 (Notal); State 104007 (Notal).

1. We are prepared to enter into a modest arms supply relationship with Qatar which is consistent with our 1972 arms sales policy for the lower Gulf. This policy is governed by the following guidelines:

A) As a general rule, USG will approve the sale of equipment to the lower Gulf Emirates which will enhance the internal security capability of these states. USG will not approve the sale of equipment, sophisticated or offensive in nature, which could by its presence in this area, create a destabilizing factor. Sale requests will be considered on case-by-case basis within this guideline.

B) USG will support efforts by American commercial interests to sell reasonable amounts of defense articles and services of a type that will meet real security needs of these countries. Where commercial channels are inadequate, cash sales of U.S. military equipment and services under Foreign Military Sales Act will be considered if the sale of this equipment is consistent with our objective of furthering cooperation among these Gulf states.

C) In general, USG will wish to avoid sales that require presence of U.S. military personnel in these states on other than a temporary basis for providing technical assistance or maintenance. Private American companies will not be discouraged from providing, in connection with supply of U.S. equipment, administrative and training personnel to the region, but efforts will be made in this respect to avoid direct competition with ongoing foreign advisory programs.

2. Given policies described above, Qatar’s small size, modest military role in Gulf, and absence of palpable external threat, we are prepared to authorize the sale of some of items in which GOQ is interested. Conclusions on specific military hardware and training requests which GOQ has put to Embassy Doha have also been reached through process of defining what we believe to be most proper and feasible military supply relationship with Qatar as well as other lower Gulf Emirates.

3. Embassy may therefore inform GOQ that, if requests it has received have been approved by ruler, FMS cash sales, within normal lead times, of following amounts and types of equipment are hereby authorized:

A) 12 TOWed M101 105 mm Howitzers;

B) 12 106 mm jeep-mounted anti-tank recoilless rifles;

C) 12 trucks and 12 jeeps (including mounts) sufficient for support of Howitzers and recoilless rifles purchased in A) and B) above;

D) Ammunition in amounts DOD deems appropriate for weapons purchased under A) and B) above;

E) Unclassified training materials and aids appropriate to purchases made under A) through D) above.

4. Embassy Doha should verify GOQ understanding that we no longer produce 30 mm and 40 mm AAA guns about which its Brigadier Attiyah inquired and that we will thus be unable to meet Qatar’s particular anti-aircraft needs. (Begin FYI for Embassy only: We are not in a position to authorize exception to our arms policies which would be required to permit sale of automatic rapid-fire Vulcan air-defense system to Qatar. See para 3, State 037105 End FYI).

5. Embassy should also inform GOQ that, while we would support any military equipment sales made by sending quality assurance teams to Qatar for temporary periods, USG does not believe it to be in best interests of either country to consider assignment of US military instructors at this time. USG believes development of regional cooperation among lower Gulf states indicates that it would not be advisable for US to assign military instructor/advisory personnel for extended tours of duty this region. This is a policy decision which we have adhered to since small Gulf states became independent in 1971 and which we wish to maintain in view of recent congressional sensitivities to US military sales arrangements to countries in the Gulf region generally. We would therefore want to carry out all direct training of Qatar armed forces personnel necessitated by future equipment sales in the U.S. Also, in keeping with our policy of encouraging regional cooperation in the area, we hope GOQ will consider possibility of seeking training in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Iran for its military personnel.

6. P and A data for equipment approved for sale above will be forwarded by septel. FYI: Material listed in para 3 above will not be diverted or withdrawn from assets dedicated to U.S. Army active and/or reserve component units. End FYI.

Ingersoll

1. Summary: The Department informed the Embassy that the United States was prepared to authorize the sale of military equipment to Qatar.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750190—1087. Secret. Drafted by G. Quincy Lumsden, Jr. (NEA/ARP); cleared by Sober, Dickman, and Atherton, and in NEA/RA, PM, L/NEA, DOD/METG, and NSC; approved in P by Sisco. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Kuwait City, Manama, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat. Telegrams 104007 to Doha, May 3, and 546 from Doha, May 12, are ibid., D7501156–0366 and D750165–0498, respectively. Telegram 503 from Doha was not found. On U.S. policy on arms sales, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970, Documents 119 and 120.