68. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1
3775. Subj: New Multi-Year Kuwaiti Defense Budget: Implications for US Military Sales Policy.
1. Summary: Recently approved $3 billion defense procurement budget will permit Kuwait to resume extensive military purchases through mid-1984. As in the past, principal suppliers probably will include US, UK and France, but alleged initial deal with Soviets would give them about 10 percent of purchases during this period. Bulk of actual intended Kuwaiti purchases still a mystery. There is some cause for concern that, using ample budget to acquire still more sophisticated weapons systems, Kuwait MOD will strain its absorptive capacity, rather than consolidating numerous systems already purchased but not all delivered. Given fundamental rationale for military sales to Kuwait, to create new US political influence and leverage where little now exists, Embassy believes that new procurement budget strongly justifies our policy (reftel) to avoid major new commitments for the present, since added purchases from other sources will make absorption of additional US systems still more difficult. Further, our best insurance against US sales causing bilateral friction due to absorption problems will be to let Kuwaitis resolve these problems as best they can, to refuse sales we judge difficult of absorption and to implement previously approved sales only in well-planned packages of training, support systems, and equipment. Otherwise, purchases from US could not only net US no political gain, but US could also be made scapegoat for Kuwaiti aspirations frustrated by shortages of manpower and technical skills. End summary.
2. Kuwaiti National Assembly approved July 19 a generous defense procurement budget of 877 million Kuwaiti dinars—just over three billion US dollars. (This amount is over and above Ministry of Defense single year routine operating budget of about $260 million for July 76–June 77 period.) Procurement budget figure was arrived at, as usual, during closed sessions of the Assembly and prior private “hearings” of Assembly’s financial committee. No procurement budget line items [Page 274] are available publicly, but we understand that budget is intended to cover MOD procurement through mid-1984. (The last multi-year MOD procurement budget of approximately $1.5 billion was intended to suffice over 1973–1980 period, but the 1973 funds apparently were exhausted in the spring of 1976.)
3. We have no clear idea yet how the GOK will use the bulk of the procurement funds provided in this latest budget. We can, however, forecast some probable and possible purchases in the next few years which logic says it would pay for. With this caveat in mind, Department may be interested in the following preliminary estimates of the major military matériel and services which GOK may acquire with multi-year procurement budget:
A. Military Technical Training Center, which USG has refused to provide under FMS, but for which US private source may yet receive contract.
B. Navy-associated purchases, including patrol boats (from as yet unknown source—the GOK is now receiving bids); missile system for patrol boats (probably French); hovercraft (probably British); basic naval training (possibly US) for 200 sailors; and port equipment and supplies.
C. Ground equipment, which reportedly will include Soviet tactical missiles, may include Soviet anti-aircraft guns, and apparently will involve considerable additional equipment and presence of Soviet personnel, all part of alleged $300 million sales package. Other ground matériel may include US-source equipment for two self-propelled Howitzer battalions in addition to 160 APCs, for which FMS contracts are now under preparation.
D. National Command and Control System of as yet unknown origin. The GOK apparently plans to request bids and then bargain with a number of private firms, probably including US firms, for manufacture and installation of this expensive system.
4. Adding together order of magnitude values of items noted above, we come nowhere close to $3 billion total budget level. Figure may include considerable sum for military construction, including naval ports, airfields and facilities for conscripts, and it may reflect Kuwaiti experience with previous multi-year budget of half this amount which was used up in less than half the seven year obligation period.
5. In Embassy’s view, the GOK would be wise to delay future purchases of major items of equipment until items already purchased are received and absorbed into Kuwaiti military forces. Major items ordered, but not all delivered include: Mirage, A–4, and C–9 aircraft; Gazelle and Puma helicopters; Chieftain tanks; IHawk; and TOW. Kuwaiti absorptive capacity (particularly in Air Force) is already [Page 275] strained and will, in our estimation, reach embarrassingly critical point in 1977 when French and US aircraft deliveries are in full swing and IHawk program is well underway. Moreover, we learned recently that, contrary to our earlier understanding, Air Force plans to retain its old British lightning fighters until 1980, which will delay needed improvement in overall Kuwaiti aircraft maintenance capability.
6. Also, Soviet ground equipment deliveries in 1977, if any, on top of British Chieftain tank deliveries (beginning in September 1976) could well aggravate absorptive problems of ground forces unless Soviets are as careful as British will be to prepare the Kuwaitis to receive new matériel. Owing to long lead times contemplated for major US ground equipment, we are unable to estimate yet the absorption problems which the delivery of such equipment would cause—the possible sale of equipment for two US self-propelled Howitzer battalions is the leading case in point. On the plus side, Kuwait’s first conscription law is scheduled to go into effect in 1977 and, we assume, US self-propelled Howitzers (and related equipment) and APC’s would not be delivered until at least two years thereafter. On the other hand:
A. There is now serious shortage of both people and technical skills required for any major new ground equipment:
B. Purchase of major equipment would require permanent expansion of ground forces with large numbers of raw recruits;
C. We are not persuaded that GOK is prepared to make conscription work. It is anybody’s guess whether what will be politically controversial conscription system will provide Kuwaiti soldiers in sufficient numbers, be structured to retain them, or will be accompanied by major technical training effort necessary to enable conscripts to operate and maintain exotic purchases from various sources; and
D. We are not convinced that MOD will be able to organize Army logistical system to service new purchases from all sources, though careful packaging and implementation of US sales could reduce logistical problems peculiar to US equipment.
7. Underlying rationale for US military sales to Kuwait is fundamentally political and bilateral—we now have little leverage on GOK and we seek more. Hence, we have strong interest in seeing that Kuwaiti military modernization proceeds with minimum bilateral irritation. We are concerned, however, that Kuwaitis may well not postpone further major equipment purchases, given their apparently ample new budget. We are also concerned that Kuwaitis’ attention may be taken up by glamorous new purchases and that they will continue to have relatively little interest in the consolidation of their matériel position (insufficient attention to administrative and logistical systems, particularly parts control, technical training and basic military construction necessary for proper storage, maintenance and repair.) Our British colleagues here [Page 276] share these concerns, and even the French acknowledge that the Kuwait Air Force will have difficulty maintaining up to high standards the bulk of its past and current French aircraft purchases within the foreseeable future. There is some risk, therefore, that US could become a scapegoat for what seems to be developing into an increasingly expensive and perhaps even more disorderly modernization of Kuwaiti forces.
8. In this situation, we believe that the rationale for US policy on US military sales to Kuwait and the central policy provided reftel—no major new commitments in Kuwait until ongoing programs are well established—remain realistic and valid. We also believe that we should continue to eschew broad military advisory effort in Kuwait, though the Kuwaitis might possibly request this as their absorption problem mounts. (But this is their problem; USG should merely avoid contributing to it.) In addition, we would underline the need for USG to refuse sales we judge difficult of absorption and to resolve that any FMS sales implemented under this policy will be structured only as full-cost packages, including adequate training and support services in addition to matériel. To do otherwise would invite long-term bilateral irritation over our military supply relationship—rather than political gain.
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Summary: The Embassy relayed information on the Kuwaiti defense budget and discussed the wisdom of U.S. arms sales policy towards Kuwait, given Kuwait’s wealth and limited absorptive capacity.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760305–1138. Confidential. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Doha, Jidda, Manama, Muscat, Tehran, the Secretary of Defense, and USCINCEUR.
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