Office of the Historian

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Qatar to the Department of State1

Doha, January 12, 1976, 0501Z.

34. Kuwait pouch Baghdad. Ref: State 303856, Abu Dhabi 0021, Manama 0014.

1. SUMMARY: Because of its vulnerability to Arab bloc and other pressures, Qataris cannot be expected to snap to when US barks in multilateral fora. There is some hope of improving Qatari performance if we pay more attention to their representatives abroad at earlier stages of development of our positions. Threats of curtailment of relations to enforce conformity are not credible, and stand to lose us more than we would gain. END SUMMARY.

2. From perspective of Qatar too, Ambassador Sterner’s observations, comments and suggestions on US multilateral diplomacy applied to Arab bloc are generally relevant.

3. On most multilateral questions, GOQ not only shelters under umbrella of Arab bloc but, despite its conservatism and anti-Communism, cowers within it in fear of Algerians and other Arab radicals. Saudi inertia and death of father figure Faisal substantially diminish Saudi influence on Qataris in international fora. GOQ is perhaps more influenced by consistent Egyptian adherence to anti-U.S. positions, in part because most of Foreign Ministry’s senior substantive advisors are seconded Egyptian diplomats.

4. GOQ’s disposition to line up against us on international issues, or at best to take a negative abstention stance, is further conditioned by its status as nonaligned, Third World, and OPEC nation. In all these contexts, at least at present, confrontative aspects of relationship with US outweigh cooperative ones. Although GOQ does not as yet have capacity to think through clearly most international questions, its usually fuzzy-headed conclusions, influenced by factors aforementioned, often put it on wrong side of argument as far as USG is concerned.

5. There is a positive element, suggested by Qataris themselves, that may hold some promise of better GOQ cooperation with us in [Page 257] international fora. After Qataris’ backsliding performance from positive to abstention position on Friendly Korean Resolution at 30th UNGA, GOQ Foreign Minister told me that fuller consultation with Qatari reps in Washington and New York early in game as U.S. positions being developed would help improve support of U.S. views. He strongly criticized what he described as our “last minute fireman” efforts in capital to secure GOQ support. Closer consultations at earlier stages is worth pursuing, although we have no illusions about how much difference it will make in GOQ’s performance.

6. Finally, I too would caution against loose use of threats in effort to compel conformity to U.S. positions. I agree fully with Ambassador Sterner that these threats would soon be exposed as not credible, since U.S. has more to lose than gain by curtailing relationships with Qatar and other small states in this area.

Paganelli

  1. Summary: The Embassy transmitted to the Department an analysis of Qatar’s likely positions on multilateral issues, regional issues related to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the limited means at U.S. disposal for putting pressure on the government.

    Source: National Archives, RG 84, Doha Embassy Files: Lot 79F187, POL, Political Affairs and Relations 1976. Confidential. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait City, Manama, Muscat, and USUN. Drafted by Paganelli on January 11. Telegrams 303856 to all diplomatic posts, December 29, 1975; 21 from Abu Dhabi, January 6; and 14 from Manama, January 7, are ibid., D750449–0471, D760003–0783, and D760005–0547, respectively.

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