Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

67. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State¹

Manama, June 16, 1976, 1254Z.

762. Subject: Middle East Force and Security Assistance for Bahrain. Ref: Manama 741.

Summary: June 15 Prime Minister made to me “official government request” that USG consider supplying military assistance to Bahrain on concessionary terms to enable Al Khalifa regime to justify “extending the agreement” under which Middle East Force enjoys facilities. Prime Minister and Crown Prince/Defense Minister clearly want concessionary arrangement “like Jordan and Turkey, not like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait”. In promising to forward request to USG, I stressed I was without instructions and hence unable to predict substance or timing of USG response. I explained at some length, however, on “personal basis” why this request seems to call for a new departure in U.S. Gulf policy requiring the most careful top-level consideration in the executive and possibly legislative authorization. Therefore on basis its own recent experience with proposed technical assistance program GOB should not necessarily anticipate a quick U.S. response. Meanwhile June 1977 deadline GOB has placed on U.S. Navy’s departure is drawing nigh and Middle East Force will soon need to start taking some practical steps to meet it. Should not GOB as first step, and without additional commitment by either government, unilaterally extend the deadline? Prime Minister ducked this suggestion, asked for official response to his request, and reiterated he would be willing to come to Washington to discuss this question personally with top USG officials, if he could be assured a definitive response there. Our own policy problems aside, this request, serious though it may be, seems flawed even from Bahraini perspective. End summary.

1. June 15 I spent an hour with Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Sulman discussing his desire, first raised June 13 with Commander Middle East Force Admiral Bigley and reported in Navy channels, to develop a military assistance relationship with the U.S. to enable ruling Al Khalifa family to justify retaining Middle East Force in Bahrain. Subsequently I spent an hour with his nephew Crown Prince/Defense Minister Shaikh Hamad bin Isa re-emphasizing points I had made to Prime Minister and trying to pin down more definitively what price these two senior members of government are asking this time. With apologies, I am persuaded this must be reported in some detail.

2. Prime Minister uncharacteristically raced through pleasantries to get right down to business, first ploughing the old ground of long-standing Bahraini friendship for U.S. and his unhappiness with the two decisions Cabinet has made to ask the Navy out. In October 1973 Cabinet in his absence had been swayed by Arab-Israel emotions. Last summer government had been under pressure re the Navy from Gulf neighbors and National Assembly at home. Now he is “in stronger position”: gone is the National Assembly, the people no longer want to “get mixed up in politics”, and he is hence free to serve the best interests of his people. He has “personal assurances” from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that they would not object if Bahrain let the U.S. Navy keep using “facilities which have no aspects of being a base”. He understands the U.S. Navy would like to stay in Bahrain and he has been thinking of ways to make it possible. (Shaikh Hamad later was eloquent in lamenting the great cost and human hardship of removing the Navy’s wives and children from this garden of Eden to some “desolate island” (Diego Garcia?) thousands of miles from nowhere.)

3. Prime Minister continued he had understood “USG is seeking” some sort of Saudi/Iranian approval for continued Middle East Force presence and wanted me to know that both the Shah and Prince Fahd had assured him Bahrain is “free to make its own decision” re Middle East Force. I corrected him, noting in first place USG would not be surprised to learn of such private assurances from Tehran and Riyadh since Middle East Force is in the Gulf because we believed in 1970 that it would continue to serve mutual interests of us and all Gulf states in contributing to region’s security. We were not seeking Saudi/Iranian approval; rather GOB had told us Middle East Force is a domestic political liability which it could no longer bear in absence of public, not private, Saudi/Iranian statements of support for Bahrain’s retaining it. (Shaikh Hamad later described Middle East Force as a political liability which is bearable only with significant evidence of benefits, like military assistance, which accrue to Bahrain by virtue of the US Navy’s presence;)

4. This provoked somewhat heated response from the Prime Minister that he, “not the Shah and King Khalid”, determines Bahrain’s policy and if he decides the Navy should stay he does not need Saudi and Iranian approval. Bahrain has best of relations with “all Gulf states, even Qatar though they are sometimes unreasonable”, but Bahrain is “independent”. Yes, Saudis, Kuwaitis and UAE are being helpful to Bahrain’s economic development and public welfare schemes but Bahrain cannot let its neighbors make its policy and cannot become dependent on them for arms. (Comment: This is most impassioned display I have witnessed of the deep aversion of the proud and “aristocratic” Al Khalifa to increased subservience to richer and more powerful neighbors, and their consequent unrealistic longing for the return of the “special relationship” with Anglo/America. See Manama 181, “Bahrain awash in the Gulf” and previous reporting. We could exploit this tendency for limited bilateral gains but to do so would work against our broader objective of fostering regional cooperation in security matters.)

5. Prime Minister continued that “he and Shaikh Hamad” are trying to build a proper defense force, “small but effective”, not equipped with “obsolete weapons or second-hand equipment from Jordan or Saudi Arabia”. Bahrain needs “modest things” like guns and jeeps and a few helicopters and something “more than a coast guard but less than a navy”. (Shaikh Hamad later said while he did not really want to have jet fighter squadrons he would, of course, have to acquire them if only to prevent a “vacuum in the Gulf defense belt” which would invite Iraq or Kuwait pose embarrassing requests to station their aircraft in Bahrain.) Prime Minister wants “to build a defensive wall around this island” so that Bahraini people will feel their government can protect them, so that “our neighbors will not laugh at us”, and to sustain “the morale of our officers”. (Comment: That means largely Shaikh Hamad and his cousins.) Prime Minister continued that he is determined to arm Bahrain adequately from whatever source but obviously preferred American arms and training. Bahrain, however, cannot pay the “inflated prices” private American companies and the British and French ask and that the Saudis and Kuwaitis can pay. As he looks around he sees USG “helping all Bahrain’s neighbors” modernize their defense forces, “seconding” military advisors and “giving” weapons and training. The US Navy wants to stay in Bahrain, yet Bahrain has nothing of U.S. military help to show its people and its neighbors. Could not the USG “give” Bahrain some tangible evidence of military assistance to justify the continued US Navy use of Bahraini facilities?

6. I asked Prime Minister if this were a “personal inquiry” or should I report it as a “formal government request”? Bristling somewhat, he assured me this was “an official government request”. (Comment: This is important point in considering our response. Prime Minister obviously considers himself “the government” and yet sometimes prefers that we believe the Cabinet is “the government”. While I was with Prime Minister, his first cousin the Foreign Minister was receiving Admiral Bigley for a farewell courtesy call, and he hewed to the “party line” that, sad as it may be, Bahrain cannot keep the Navy in the absence of public support from neighboring states for doing so. Recently Development Minister Shirawi told me he had raised in Cabinet possibility of extending Navy’s departure and had found scant sympathy (Manama 711); Cabinet Affairs Minister Urrayed recently told me America’s “best friends” in Cabinet would not touch OPIC’s agreement until Navy left (Manama 620). These straws suggest to me Prime Minister and Shaikh Hamad are off on a private feeler (probably with Amir’s blessing) in asking for military assistance to justify keeping the Navy: that the Cabinet, which has twice voted the Navy out of Bahrain, has not yet been cut in. We have seen several indications over last two years that Prime Minister has special problems when it comes to Bahrain’s defense force. Personally he seems quite prone to arm the Al Khalifa to the teeth, but he serves an Amir and presides over a Cabinet both openly disdainful of military pretensions in this mini-state. And he must try to keep his nephew the Crown Prince, who is also his subordinate the Defense Minister, somehow active and amused without bleeding the public purse. Hence we have long suspected they have a “deal” going in which the Prime Minister will not press the Cabinet to divert public funds to buy Shaikh Hamad weapons but will try to help him persuade other countries to pay Bahrain’s defense tab. If this interpretation is correct, then the Prime Minister is looking to us to make an offer of military assistance he cannot refuse and can use both to persuade the Cabinet to let the Navy stay and to keep the Crown Prince content.

7. After repeating standard remarks about US regard for Bahrain and its welfare and our appreciation for Bahrain’s hospitality to US Navy, I told Prime Minister (and later Shaikh Hamad) that I was of course not instructed to reply to this request and could but refer it to Washington with the recommendation that it receive urgent and high-level consideration. But before I did so, both he and I must clearly understand what he is asking:

(A) Did he understand USG “gives” nothing in military assistance to Bahrain’s neighbors: they pay for it. Our present relationship with Bahrain is similar type: GOB is eligible for “Foreign Military Sales”, we have provided a coastal survey and training for Bahrain’s officers in the US, and are offering to send a helicopter force survey team. What sort of relationship does Bahrain seek that we are not already able to provide? A concessional one like Jordan and Turkey, countries in very different situations, enjoy? Prime Minister specifically acknowledged (and Shaikh Hamad later confirmed) that he is indeed seeking a concessional arrangement such as “Jordan and Turkey” have “not like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran”. Prime Minister said Bahrain wants to pay for US help, but at “special low prices”. (Shaikh Hamad later said Bahrain was fully prepared to pay reasonable prices but “not double the price like the Saudis do” for US military assistance and furthermore would not deal directly with commercial companies and would need “FMS credits” or “loans” from the USG to permit it to pay over time for what it gets.)

(B) Did Prime Minister understand that even should USG be able to provide a military assistance program for Bahrain the types and quantities of assistance provided would still be subject on a case-by-case basis to the limitations imposed by our policies toward providing arms in various parts of the world. He (and Shaikh Hamad later) professed to understand this, contending that Bahrain’s needs are reasonable by any definition. (Comment: I am still not sure they accept this reality.)

8. Then, stressing that I was now speaking “personally”, without instructions and “as a friend”, I reminded Prime Minister that when Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad had pressed Chargé Gatch back in 1971 for some sort of tangible evidence that Bahrain would benefit from continued US Navy presence I had fielded that request in Washington. Hence, counting the 1974–75 negotiations, this was the “third time around” for me in the GOB’s ever more expensive efforts to demonstrate to neighbors and citizens that the Navy’s presence is beneficial. I reminded Prime Minister that prior to Bahrain’s independence in 1971 USG had formulated a carefully reviewed and publically enunciated policy toward the Gulf. One element was the decision to keep Middle East Force operating out of Bahrain. We had felt this served the interests of all Gulf states including Bahrain and hence have had subsequent difficulty in accepting the GOB’s contention that the US Navy presence is a liability for which the USG must compensate in other ways. To the extent our Navy imposed any inconveniences on its Bahraini hosts, we had tried to adhere to the sound approach of paying for this in rent because, subject to budgetary vicissitudes, the GOB could be assured the Navy was good for its commitments in this regard. In 1974 GOB had suggested that our providing civilian US technical advisors would broaden the US-Bahrain relationship to make the continued US Navy presence more acceptable. This had given USG little philosophical problems since making civilian expert advice available to Bahrain and other Gulf states had all along been a notably popular element of overall US Gulf policy. How to provide a modest contribution of US public funds to this end had been a problem, but the proposed technical assistance was not directly linked to the US Navy presence and was justifiable on broader political/economic and commercial grounds. Still it had required legislative authorization, and thus eighteen months after the US executive had agreed to try to help with technical assistance the commitment is still not absolutely in hand, nor are the advisors in Bahrain. Now Prime Minister was suggesting a very different sort of condition for keeping Middle East Force in Bahrain, a concessionary military aid program which would be a new departure in US policy toward the Gulf. Personally I thought this request would require the most intensive top-level consideration in US executive and that responding favorably to it would probably require seeking legislative authorization for a commitment far more controversial than providing civilian advisors to assist public administration.

9. Thus I thought Prime Minister faced an awkward timing problem. It seemed to me USG might need a lot of time to sort out his request, and much longer yet to deliver thorough legislation on any tentative commitment it might feel able to make. Yet GOB, quite by its own choosing and despite our pleadings to contrary, had imposed a June 1977 deadline for US Navy’s departure, and some time soon the Navy must start taking practically irreversible steps to meet it. Therefore, in my “strictly personal” view, the first step should be for GOB to extend the deadline so that, without any commitment by either party, USG and GOB could in propitious circumstances consider under what if any conditions the Middle East Force presence might continue to serve mutual interests.

10. Prime Minister ducked this by reverting to suggestion made earlier in the conversation that he would be willing to make working visit to Washington at appropriate time (he would prefer early fall) to discuss his proposal at high level in USG. He would come with “something in black and white in hand” (I took this to mean an offer to “extend the agreement”) but would have to be assured in advance that he would be “received as a friend”, and that USG officials would talk with him “frankly and honestly” and be prepared to give him a “definitive answer”. (Comment: I take that to mean a positive commitment to provide military assistance on concessional terms.)

11. I assured Prime Minister that, whenever he came to Washington, it would be as a “friend” and that USG officials would always talk with him in candor. But insofar as a “definitive answer” is concerned, I would have to inquire. He again urged that I seek an official response to his request.

12. Comment: This request by Bahrain’s Prime Minister (and his nephew the Crown Prince/Defense Minister) is far from frivolous. He would regard it as sincere, reasonable and in a long-standing tradition of Bahraini-American friendship. It must be handled with care. Nevertheless, quite apart from fact this Bahraini attempt to raise the price for keeping Middle East Force poses for US difficult question of national purpose and policy the request is flawed even from the Bahraini perspective.

(A) The Prime Minister is not conceding that the US Navy presence serves Bahrain’s interest; it is rather to remain the perpetual liability in the US-Bahraini relationship. Hence, we are expected to be ever in Bahrain’s debt for its being here, and to pay, in ever more controversial currency and seemingly open endedly.

(B) Apparently the Cabinet, which we have been led to believe has sole power to let the Navy stay or make it go, is not offering us a deal. Rather the Prime Minister is dropping us a hint that if we offer a military assistance deal to the Cabinet he might be able to persuade it to let the Navy stay.

(C) These “people of Bahrain”, whom the Prime Minister criticizes for having wanted to “get mixed up in politics”, are being trotted out again so that we might believe they can be taught to dislike the idea of our Navy’s presence less as they learn to love Shaikh Hamad’s army more. We have substantial reason to believe Bahrain’s defense force has scant support in the Cabinet, to say nothing of among the populace at large. Hence a significant USG role in developing the defense force, particularly if it involved presence of US military advisors here, threatens to be controversial among Bahraini public, and among some of Bahrain’s neighbors. How then could such a US contribution turn critics of the US Navy presence around?

13. Department at its discretion may wish to repeat this message to appropriate regional posts and military addresses.

Twinam

1. Summary: Ambassador Twinam and Bahraini Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa al-Khalifa discussed the Bahraini request for military assistance in exchange for an extension for MIDEASTFOR.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Staff for Middle East and South Asian Affairs, Convenience Files, Box 1, Bahrain (2). Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Telegram 741 from Manama, June 14, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760229–0013. In telegram 761 from Manama, June 16, Twinam argued that an extension on MIDEASTFOR should be the sine qua non for any negotiation on military supply. (National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR) According to telegram 129738 to Manama, May 26, the Department approved sending a survey team. (Ibid., Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Bahrain) In telegram 904 from Manama, July 10, Twinam reported that the United States would have to make an additional “extensive military assistance commitment” in order to secure an extension longer than one year. (Ibid., Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government)