73. Telegram From the Embassy in Bahrain to the Department of State1
1772. Subject: MIDEASTFOR Discussion With Foreign Minister. Ref: State 271240.
1. Summary: Foreign Minister took occasion of my call on him Nov. 4 to raise issue of MIDEASTFOR and to state in strong terms that decision that MIDEASTFOR withdraw was GOB policy, decided in Cabinet, and that that policy has not changed. He expressed surprise that during his talks here DepSecDef Clements seemed to think otherwise since Foreign Minister had explained GOB views to Asst Secy Atherton in New York. I interjected that conversations last summer between Prime Minister and Ambassador Twinam and Chargé, as well as my own talk with Prime Minister Oct. 26 (Manama 1685), gave USG sound reason to believe that issue is not closed. Indeed, Foreign Minister himself in Amir’s meeting with Clements, as well as on previous occasions, left this impression and had proposed that “new formula” be found for MIDEASTFOR. Foreign Minister said formula he has in mind, which he claimed to have advanced to USG before, is that MIDEASTFOR as such be “disbanded” but that US Navy ships continue their mission in area by staying and resupplying in other ports, Saudi and Iranian, as well as in Bahrain. In short, “spread the burden”. But Foreign Minister said he wanted it clearly understood that MIDEASTFOR as it is now “will go”, adding that he would not be at all surprised if new US administration took initiative to withdraw MIDEASTFOR, which as foreign base is not very popular with many Democrats on Capitol Hill. End summary.
2. During course of seventy-five minute meeting Nov. 4 with Foreign Minister we discussed US elections, future course of US policy [Page 288] in Middle East, Gulf Foreign Minister meeting, travel of Arab League SYG (septels), and at his initiative future of MIDEASTFOR. He broached subject by expressing his surprise that during his recent visit DepSecDef Clements seemed not to be aware that GOB had decided, in cabinet, that MIDEASTFOR should leave Bahrain in June 1977. Foreign Minister said he had explained GOB views to Asst Secy Atherton in New York and, therefore, felt that Clements’ expressions of surprise and disappointment were unwarranted. He stressed point that he did not make policy, the cabinet did. Nothing, he added, has happened to change that cabinet decision.
3. Interjecting, I said that series of conversations last summer between Prime Minister and Ambassador Twinam, Admiral Bigley, and Chargé Burleigh gave USG good reason to believe that issue of MIDEASTFOR tenure remained open for discussion between our governments. I reminded Foreign Minister that he himself had said on numerous occasions, including during Clements visit, that “new formula” for MIDEASTFOR needed to be devised. Amir, during Clements’ visit, had said that there would be further discussion between us on this subject. This did not sound to me as if the issue were closed. Foreign Minister replied that perhaps there has been a misunderstanding. GOB policy is that MIDEASTFOR as it is now—a big power base which is a heavy burden for Bahrain—should leave in June 1977. Mission which MIDEASTFOR performs could be continued under another label. He said he has suggested to USG “for years” that political burden of MIDEASTFOR must be shared in the region. I asked for specifics and he said that Navy ships could call here for resupply, stay a month or so, and then do the same in Saudi and/or Iranian ports. Foreign Minister said Bahrain takes heavy criticism, in UN and among Third World countries, for being host to a super power base when, in fact, there are more U.S. military personnel in both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Question, then, is how to change the image of a “base” to something else. He asserted that some such arrangement as he described would be in our interest as well, including in administration’s relation with Congress. Indeed, he would not be surprised if new administration took initiative to withdraw MIDEASTFOR, or at least to change its nature, perhaps along the lines he suggested, rather than try to retain a base in an era when bases are unpopular, even within United States Congress.
4. Foreign Minister went on to stress Bahrain’s desire for continued friendly relations, including the continuation of its excellent relations with the US Navy “in some other form”. He repeated his well-known reasons for feeling that MIDEASTFOR withdrawal is in best GOB and USG interests, adding that GOB is sensitive to wider concerns since at time of last renewal of MIDEASTFOR agreement Bahrain had consulted other Arab states and had successfully argued that renewal was in [Page 289] best interest US-Arab relations, particularly during period of sensitive shuttle diplomacy. I said that his argument remains valid. It is as important now, particularly as new US administration comes into office, as it was then that neither the US nor its Arab friends send signals which can be deliberately distorted to their advantage by the enemies of a peaceful Middle East settlement. I felt withdrawal of MIDEASTFOR next summer would be such a signal and that, conversely, extension of MIDEASTFOR, within context of expanding and mutually beneficial US-Bahrain relations, including in military field, would be supportive of both US role in area and of roles of those Arab states working toward peace.
5. Picking up on my mention of USG–GOB military relations, Foreign Minister said he thought it “fine” that Defense Minister is getting survey team but that, as Shaikh Hamad said during Clements’ visit, US has been slow in this area and what we are planning now, the survey team, cannot really effect the “bigger issues.” I replied that team will come very soon, that of course it will do its work according to our commitment to Shaikh Hamad, but that future of our relations in military, as in other fields, will depend on full context of our relations. In this context MIDEASTFOR’s continuing ability to play its role in region and beyond is issue to which we attach great importance, and to which I expected I will be instructed to return.
6. Foreign Minister said that military area is not his province, though he is pleased that GOB is now getting attention it has sought, but he did want to emphasize again that while GOB is willing to discuss some “new formula”, which should include neighbors, which would permit MIDEASTFOR mission to continue, MIDEASTFOR as it now exists in Bahrain “will go” in June 1977. I said I would of course report his views but that, as he knew, US feels that MIDEASTFOR has a value and a purpose of importance to both our countries and to the Gulf region and beyond which we do not want lightly to relinquish. While interesting, his ideas for, in effect, multiple homeports for MIDEASTFOR struck me as logistically very difficult and perhaps politically so as well in view of major roles Saudi Arabia and Iran now playing in area and in US-area relations. Foreign Minister said he had one last point to make and, rising, said he wondered if USG had not already approached Saudis about “helping” with MIDEASTFOR, perhaps during Clements travels, and been turned down. I said I knew of no such approach.
7. Comment: Foreign Minister was cordial as usual throughout our conversation. Though at times less forceful in expression than in his conversation during Clements’ visit, he also seemed more self-confident and assured in speaking for the GOB. Directly and by implication he made it clear that it was a Cabinet decision, which has not been [Page 290] changed, that MIDEASTFOR in its present form be withdrawn. Though he told Atherton in New York that his word on this issue would not be the final one, Foreign Minister spoke today as if his words had the backing of the man or men who do have the final word. It strikes me that if in recent weeks Prime Minister has been less than very commanding in dealing with his Cabinet colleagues about extending MIDEASTFOR, Foreign Minister may have gained Cabinet consensus to wait and see what posture of new US administration will be toward area as a whole and toward MIDEASTFOR specifically. Though informed and sophisticated in assessing the meaning of our elections for US policy, Foreign Minister clearly feels that new administration may take quite different view of form and locale of US commitments abroad. In absence of firm “marching orders” from Amir and Prime Minister, Foreign Minister could have made good case for wait and see posture.
8. If indeed Prime Minister’s initiative of last summer has been shelved by the GOB, we ought to learn this directly from him. It is increasingly difficult in my view for us to feel our way politically, or for the Navy to plan rationally, when we are getting one set of signals, which have weakened over the months, from the Prime Minister and another, increasingly assertive set from the Foreign Minister. I recommend, therefore, that I be instructed to call on the Prime Minister, present him with the details of the composition, arrival dates and funding arrangements for the survey team, and of course make the point contained in the last sentence of reftel. (Foreign Minister was clearly uninterested in the details of the team and I preferred to hold them for future use.) Also, I would like to discuss with Prime Minister in candid fashion the differences, and problems, we see between extending MIDEASTFOR in its present form and the concepts put forth today by the Foreign Minister. I would also point out the essential continuities of US interests and note as well that lifting the deadline now would not preclude a later decision by either side for withdrawal, and it would give us the time fully to examine those Bahraini concerns which he and Shaikh Hamad have raised with us.
9. I understand Admiral Crowe will request that survey team not come until about Nov. 22, after his return from Mid-Link Exercise. This delay would not exceed the 30 days arrival promised by Clements and it would help MIDEASTFOR and Embassy to have MIDEASTFOR in port in order assist in administrative support for team.
10. Dept may wish to repeat this message to other interested posts.
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Summary: The Embassy reported that Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa, noting Clements’ recent visit and his own conversation with Atherton in New York, insisted that there was no possibility MIDEASTFOR could remain in Bahrain past June 30, 1977.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760411–1246. Confidential; Exdis. Telegram 271240 to Manama, November 4 is ibid., D760410–1182. Telegram 1800 from Manama, November 7, reported that newly-appointed Ambassador Cluverius met with the Amir, who expressed “regret and embarrassment” at Shaikh Mohammad’s “too frank” conversation. The Amir also stated that “the Navy should stay.” Cluverius expressed some skepticism that the Amir would overrule his Foreign Minister, but also hoped that Bahrain might extend MIDEASTFOR’s rights. (National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR) The records of Clements’ talks with Bahraini officials and of the Foreign Minister’s meeting with Atherton are Documents 72 and 71, respectively.
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