65. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
SUBJECT
- Situation in the United Arab Emirates
The four-year-old United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a confederation of seven small city-states that are autonomous in such important areas as the use of oil revenues, defense, and internal security. The rulers of the sheikhdoms still regard each other with a good deal of suspicion and jealously guard their prerogatives against the encroachment of [Page 260] the central government. Economic and social forces are, nevertheless, slowly knitting the sheikhdoms together.
Much of the credit for the development of the UAE belongs to its president Sheikh Zayid, who is also the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the largest and by far the wealthiest of the sheikhdoms. Using a deft combination of consensus politics and timely handouts, Zayid has managed to maintain generally good relations with his squabbling fellow rulers. He has cautiously steered a middle course in both domestic and foreign affairs, thus reducing factionalism and eliminating issues his opponents might exploit. He has seen to it that certain traditional bedouin and Islamic features remain prominent, in order to reduce the impact of foreign workers inundating the country.
Though he tries to rule largely by consensus, Sheikh Zayid has taken care to make the Abu Dhabi Defense Force—responsible to him personally, not in his capacity as president of the UAE—the largest and best equipped military force. Zayid has promoted the unification of the UAE and local military and security forces, but his fellow rulers have thus far been able to stave off this development.
The tension between central and local interests is likely to remain a permanent problem for the UAE. Zayid himself would have trouble holding to the larger view if he were not president of the union, and it is not surprising that Zayid’s major obstacle in establishing an effective central government is Sheikh Rashid, the ruler of Dubai, the second most important sheikhdom. Although Sheikh Rashid is the UAE’s vice-president, he sees no reason to contribute to the strengthening of the central government to Zayid’s benefit, and at his own expense.
[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]
The UAE in its first four years has sought to obtain recognition as a united entity, while avoiding any foreign antagonisms that could impair the knitting together of the sheikhdoms—a problem compounded somewhat by the existence of large foreign communities, including Palestinian, in the sheikhdoms, and the UAE’s dependence on foreigners for many critical functions.
Although Zayid seems to be personally inclined to inject the UAE into Arab and international affairs, even if he has to use a major portion of Abu Dhabi’s resources to do it, he is somewhat constrained by the other rulers who believe that his money, if not his time, would be better spent at home. He must also tread carefully so as not to step on the toes of Riyadh or Tehran, who expect him to follow their lead. The result has been a cautious, pragmatic, middle-of-the-road policy.
Zayid keeps his Arab credentials in good order, tries to avoid taking a position on intra-Arab differences, and is aloof on most east-west issues—but he is maintaining a society that is western-oriented [Page 261] and capitalistic. He has not, so far, permitted communist states to establish a presence in the UAE, although some of his advisers have been pushing for relations with the Soviet Union and Zayid may be giving some thought to this.
The UAE has consistently supported the traditional conservative regimes of the Arabian Peninsula. Zayid has given assistance to both Oman and North Yemen, mostly economic but including some discreet military assistance as well, largely to strengthen them against South Yemeni subversion. He worked hard to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia on a border dispute that had poisoned relations between the two countries for years. He accepts Iran’s role in the area as a fact of life and is not too concerned by the Shah’s claim to have primary responsibility for security in the Gulf.
Much of Zayid’s foreign policy consists of lavish handouts, first to the Arab confrontation states, then to other Arab states needing assistance, and finally to other Islamic states. In 1974 alone, he gave away nearly a quarter of Abu Dhabi’s income. Last year’s drop in oil production, however, combined with increasing complaints from the other rulers, has forced Zayid to curb his commitments.
US–UAE relations are basically good. The UAE values US technological strength; Americans are personally popular there. But Zayid is sensitive to the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli situation; Abu Dhabi was the first Arab state to announce an embargo against the US during the October 1973 war. Zayid has since probably come to a greater appreciation of the complexity of the problem and US negotiating efforts. He knows that renewed war would disrupt the UAE’s ties with the west and possibly extend radical interests in the Gulf. He nevertheless is also subjected to the arguments of those who oppose a negotiated settlement and would like to see US efforts fail.
Oil policy is an additional area of difference. Following the quadrupling of oil prices, the speculation in the US media about the possibility of US action against Gulf oil fields caused feeling against the US to run fairly high. With the world-wide economic slump since, however, the UAE seems to have come to a better realization that oil decisions cannot be taken in isolation of world economic conditions.
Regardless of the outcome of Middle East peace negotiations, the UAE will be careful to balance US interests there with those of other friendly industrial powers—the UK, France, eventually perhaps Japan. Should the Arab-Israeli situation deteriorate sharply, of course, US commercial interests would suffer.
Summary: The CIA assessed the United Arab Emirates’ regional diplomacy and its relationship with the United States.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79T00866A, Box 25, Folder 8. Confidential.
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